Speaking about the rivalry of the Su-27 and F-15, they often recall the results of various air battles between Sukhoi and Efok. And if adequate modeling (in a sufficient degree of approximation to real combat) long-range air combat (DVB) is very difficult ... close air combat (BVB) makes it quite possible to assess the potential of aircraft in a "dog dump".
One of these episodes was a training air battle (modestly nicknamed by partners as “joint maneuvering”) between pilots of the Lipetsk Center for Combat Use and Retraining of Air Force Flight Personnel and pilots of the 1st Fighter Wing of the US Air Force during our visit to Langley air base in 1992.
America showed the plane to Russia
Journal "Wings of the Motherland" No. 6, 1993
Recently, Langley Air Base (Virginia), where the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing of the US Air Force is based, received a friendly visit from the Lipetsk Center for Combat Use and Transfer of Air Force Pilots. They flew to the east coast of the United States along the northern route, through Chukotka and Alaska, on two Sy-27UB two-seater combat training fighters and an Il-76 military transport. It was the first visit of this kind: previously, only top-class testers on specially prepared machines were sent to America. This time, the "combatants" Colonel A. Kharchevsky and Major E. Karabasov arrived (the delegation was headed by the head of the Lipetsk Center, Major General of Aviation N. Chaga), on serial (though thoroughly washed) fighters.
Fighter pilots could not deny themselves the pleasure of a little "fight". Major E.Karabasov was the first to "challenge". He proposed to conduct a demonstration air battle between the Cy-27 and F-15 directly above the Langley airfield, with a wide involvement of spectators. However, the cautious Americans rejected this proposal. A message appeared in the local press: they say, it is necessary to maintain commitment to the world. However, soon the Americans themselves volunteered to conduct a "joint maneuver" in the pilot area.
In the zone located in the ocean at a distance of 200 km from the east coast of the United States, three fighters took off: Sy-27UB (in the front cockpit - E. Karabasov, in the back - an American pilot), F-15D with an American pilot in the front cockpit and a Russian military - air attaché, who acted as an interpreter - in the back, as well as an F-15C escort aircraft. The range of permitted piloting altitudes was 2500-8500 m (civil air routes passed above and below).
According to the joint maneuvering plan, the Cy-27 was originally supposed to be kept on the tail of the F-15, in the future it was supposed to change the planes.
On command to start joint maneuvering, the Eagle, turning on the full afterburner, immediately tried to break away from the Cy-27, however, according to Karabasov, this task turned out to be impossible for the F-15D: using only the minimum afterburner mode or maximum (non-afterburner) thrust, our fighter hung on the tail of the "American" without much difficulty, the engines of which constantly worked at maximum afterburner mode, while the angle of attack of the Cy-27 never exceeded 18 degrees.
After the planes switched places, Karabasov turned the throttle to full afterburner and began to leave the F-15D on a vigorous turn with climb. The "Eagle" followed, however, having turned 180 degrees, the Cy-27 pilot, to his surprise, found that he was already flying almost towards the F-15. Having completed one and a half full turns, the Cy-27 went into the tail of the F-15 and "caught" it in the sight. But at the same time, Karabasov discovered that he "shot down" not the F-15D, but the F-15C flying behind. Seeing his mistake, he left alone the single "Eagle" and set to work on the one, which by that time had lost sight of the Cy-27 and asked the observer: "Where is the Flanker?" "He's behind you," replied the follower.
Indeed, the Cy-27 took up position behind the F-15D, keeping it in sight and remaining invisible to the American pilots from the first vehicle. After that, the F-15D again tried to break away from the Cy-27, but, despite all the efforts, nothing came of it. This "air battle" ended (earlier, Karabasov had to repeatedly conduct mock air battles with MiG-29 aircraft, which, according to him, was much more difficult to cope with than with the F-15).
A similar "joint maneuver", which ended with the same result, was carried out with the F-15D by Colonel Kharchsvsky.
After the Americans, answering the correspondent's question about which fighter turned out to be the best, answered with some embarrassment: the planes are approximately equal. However, in private conversations with residents of Lipetsk, they recognized the unconditional superiority of the Cy-27 (in general, our pilots noted some stiffness in the judgments shown by the owners, which is somewhat discordant with the image of the Americans that we have formed as people free from the "secrecy complex" that is attributed to us) .
In Langley, ours were given the opportunity to fly the F-15D. In their opinion, "Eagle" is a well-controlled car with excellent visibility. It practically does not fall into a corkscrew (it has no restrictions on the corkscrew "Eagle"). Karabasov several times tried to make the F-15D spin from different positions, however, he only drove his nose from side to side, not wanting to start spinning. Obviously, when creating the Needle, Mawdonnell-Douglas took into account the sad experience of its predecessor, the F-4 Phantom-2 fighter, which practically did not get out of a spin (although it fell into it with difficulty), which caused the death of many dozens of crews . During the maneuver, the aircraft reached angles of attack up to 30 units (which corresponds to 25 degrees).
The maximum operational overload at subsonic speed y F-15D is limited to 9. The control of the aircraft, according to the Lipetsk pilots, is "soft", the machine listens perfectly to the pyley, the force on the pychke is much less than y Cy-27. However, the aerodynamics of the F-15 is less than perfect. It accelerates more slowly in maneuvering and slows down faster; At the same time, the acceleration characteristics of the F-15D in the straight line are not inferior to the Cy-27UB.
The stall on the F-15 starts a little earlier than on the Cy-27. Its approach can be judged, in particular, by the increasing noise in the cockpit.
The F-15 takes off a little slower than the Cy-27 (during the take-off of the four, consisting of two Cy-27s and two F-15s, our cars, in order to withstand the formation, were forced to take off the afterburner, while the Americans accelerated at full speed).
The minimum speed of the F-15 is 210 km/h. This is much more than y Cy-27 and MiG-29. However, the efficiency of the one-piece swivel stabilizer is maintained during a run at speeds up to 100 km/h.
The turn radius of the F-15 is greater than that of the Cy-27. In general, according to Kharchevsky, the "Eagle" is inferior to the Cy-27 in terms of maneuverability and is approaching the MiG-29. At the same time, according to another pilot who tried the F-15D during the return visit of the Americans to Lipetsk in September 1992, the Eagle's maneuverability is more in line with the capabilities of the MiG-23MLD (this may seem somewhat unexpected for readers who are accustomed to critical estimates "twenty-third").
The Pratt-Whitney F100-PW-200 engines, developed on the F-15D, have the worst throttle response compared to the AL-31F turbofan engine (indirectly, this also manifested itself during the piloting of the Cy-27UB by the American pilot: Karabasov, who was sitting in the front cockpit of the Sparky, noted, that the American is unnecessarily sharp, obviously out of habit, working as an ore). The F-15 engine control lever does not have latches, which seemed to our pilots not entirely convenient.
They also did not like the cockpit of the American fighter, dark brown, almost black coloring of instrument panels and small-sized instrument indicators clearly lose to the gray-painted cockpit of the Cy-27 with its huge, by Western standards, "alarm clocks" the sharper Karabasov, who was very delicate in his judgments, called the American cabin "terrible").
The seat of the McDonnell-Dugpas ACES-11 ejection seat seemed hard and uncomfortable (however, it can be assumed that the hard seat of a fighter has the advantage that it facilitates the process of "feeling" your aircraft, because it is known that one of the main organs of perception of the spatial position of the aircraft is the very place y pilot). But the absence of a winch for pulling the belt turned out to be completely unexpected (during piloting, Karabasov brought the F-15D into negative g-load and watched how the American "hung" in the front cockpit, not expecting this and not tightening the waist belt in a timely manner). However, the review turned out to be excellent both forward and backward (the small headrest of the ejection seat practically did not interfere with it). The pre-launch preparation of the F-15 is longer than that of the Cy-27 and requires a significantly larger number of operations.
Inferior to the F-15 domestic fighter and in practical range. Almost all flights (including aerobatics) of the Iglas are carried out with a ventral external fuel tank (the practical flight range of American fighters, contrary to our opinion, is not so great and amounts to a little more than 2000 km without PTB, the necessary ferry range is achieved in due to the use of external tanks, the total volume of fuel in which is practically equal to the volume of internal tanks).
During the return home, our cars were accompanied by F-15s. Their crews showed great concern because of the headwind on the track, although they carried three PTBs. Which, however, almost ended tragically: the Cy-27 at Langley was filled with American fuel with a specific density lower than that used by us. At an altitude of 13 km, where they "climbed" at the insistence of the Americans, who were afraid of an oncoming air flow that "ate" the range, cavitation occurred, which led to the stop of all four Cy-27 engines. The planes began to "crumble" down, attempts to launch the turbofan were unsuccessful and the possibility of catapulting was already considered. However, at an altitude of about 3 km, the engines started working.
It is worth adding that the pilots of the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing who worked against ours are not ordinary combatants, they are the American fighter elite, which traditionally has high flight qualifications and excellent tactical training.
So the reference to the fact that two Soviet aces smashed ordinary American pilots will not work. No - the Americans were also aces.
Some comrades say that the article is nonsense, and Kharchevsky is a liar, though they don’t believe in this episode, referring to various plates and graphs ...
Well, the most advanced cite the American version of events that appeared 10 years later:
F-15 vs Su-27? (F-15 vs. Su-27?)
Tom Murphy
Twice in the last month there was a discussion on the site about how Sushki had dinner with Needles in the summer of 1992.
I was very surprised, especially because I had never heard of it before. I flew the Needles with the 94th Fighter Squadron at Langley, the same one that visited Russia and then hosted a Russian return visit to the US.
With my impeccable ability to miss important events, as always, I managed to leave the squadron just before all this happened. But I personally knew and flew with 90% of the pilots who were then part of the squadron and with all 100% of the pilots participating in these mutual visits.
Somehow, in the 10 years that have passed, they never once mentioned in our many conversations on this very subject that any mock combat took place. I don't think it could have happened (meaning they would never have mentioned it.). (DACT - Dissimilar Air Combat Training. That is, exercises with foreign equipment)
In addition, I still fly in the Air Force Reserve as an F-15 instructor at Langley, which means I'm up to date with all the latest F-15 programs and how it performs.
Of course, there must have been some data (secret or unclassified) of such an outstanding event and the conclusions drawn if the Needles were beaten so badly. But they are not. Absolutely. Dot. After reading the last thread, I decided to check it out.
Instead of relying on hearsay, I spoke to three airmen with whom I served at Langley. These pilots flew in the back seat in Sushki, drove the Russians in Needles, flew with Sushki and still fly the F-15.
I gave them the "story" from the Air Force's Monthly magazine, as it was quoted, and after their hysterical laughter stopped, they told me the following: the number of air battles between the Needles and Sushki in the summer of 1992 was absolute zero, they simply do not was in nature. Training fights between them were not only viewed as undesirable and discouraged, but were absolutely forbidden. Nobody wanted the political problems that could arise if any car lost control and crashed, or worse, there was a collision in in the air with the intense maneuvering that mock combat involves.Secondly, despite the warm feelings that we are in Lately tested against the Russians, no one would let them know any secret information, so the F-15s flew with the radar turned off, electronic warfare equipment and other equipment. When all of your weapon systems are off, mock combat becomes pointless, unless you want to replicate World War I, World War II, or the Korean War with only guns. But in this case, give me a better A-10, which can turn around on the spot and has a big gun.
What actually happened (and what probably became the basis of this dramatic story) is that in addition to flying in the back seat, the F-15 and Su-27 flew together (while in line, one or two miles apart and at a distance 2000 to 3000 vertical feet). During 90 degree turns, one aircraft turns and flies 3000 to 4000 feet from the other, at its 6 o'clock, at which point the second aircraft begins its turn to stay in line with the first, making a 90 degree turn.
During one of these turns, Drying, instead of continuing her expected maneuver, lingered at 6 o'clock on her Needle (behind him), at a distance of 3000 feet. After a few seconds of thinking about what the Sushka pilot was doing, the F-15 pilot, for 20 seconds, tried to shake Sushka off his tail, but to no avail. What does this prove? Basically, nothing.
Among fighters, no one starts a fight 3,000 feet directly behind the enemy, because that's the equivalent of pounding a seal pup with a club. Instead, the attacker moves to the 4 or 8 o'clock position 3,000 feet before combat begins. But even then, in this more difficult situation, the attacker remains in his offensive position 95% of the time (probably meaning 95% of the time).
And those 5% when he loses his position from behind, this is the result of gross mistakes made by him when maneuvering. It must also be emphasized that this was an isolated incident, unplanned, unexpected and done without great desire, and not at all a series of mock battles.
As Paul Harvey says, "this is another part of the story" directly from the participants in the events, and not from a magazine article with a second, third or fourth hand retelling or an Internet rumor repeating what someone else wrote.
In the future, if you want to argue about the qualities of these two aircraft, please excuse us from repeating this non-event (which did not happen) as evidence, but compare them based on published data on their performance and weapon systems.
Proof in EnglishWhom to believe in this situation is up to you.
How brazenly and shamelessly the representatives of the United States lie - everyone, I think, is aware.
I believe Alexander Kharchevsky more - an authoritative pilot even then ... Well, later on, in general - Major General, Honored Pilot of the Russian Federation, head of the 4th Center for Combat Use and Retraining of Flight Personnel and commander of the Falcons of Russia aerobatic team.
And we will return to "plates and graphs" ... In order to know how crafty they can be.
P.S.
In connection with this "joint maneuvering" in 1992, it is worth mentioning one more episode that characterizes the Americans well. Laconically and streamlined described in the last paragraph of the first article.
I have long wanted to know in detail about that little-known story that happened to Kharchevsky and his wingman in 1992 in the USA. And I couldn't resist: Comrade General, tell me... He considered. Slightly went nodules on the cheekbones. Looked expressively. - ... You can write anything, even lie beautifully, for a bunch of words. But I don't want to talk to the camera. Alexander Nikolaevich got up and, going around the table, from somewhere behind our backs suddenly took out a square bottle and three crystal glasses. From behind the bottle glass, magnified by the refraction of the liquid, the motionless eye of some strange snake stared at us. Vietnamese? .. - The experience of serving in the Far East did not let me seem like a complete ignoramus. My younger colleague smiled modestly. I, according to a long-established habit, briefly reported, naming the garrison and the type of activity. From ours, that means, - Nikolaevich summed up with a slight smile, quickly pouring us full with precise movements and splashing into his glass to the very bottom. Although for the entire time of the conversation he did not take a sip. We listened to his story while drinking vodka with an unusual Asian flavor and eating sweets and cookies. ... Together with the then Major Karabasov, his wingman, and a group of chiefs, they flew to America on a pair of Su-27UB combat training fighters. Now it is known not only to specialists how that trip went in general. Upon arrival, on approaching the base, the Americans held our planes for 1 hour and 10 minutes. in the waiting area over the ocean until the amount of fuel on the “dryers” became close to the emergency balance, in order to prevent guests from showing their complex aerobatics over the air base, in front of the American public. The Americans themselves at that time demonstrated a demonstrative battle in the airspace. It seems to be a trifle, but such trifles speak volumes both in public and, moreover, in international relations. Especially for pilots who, by definition, are not at all average abilities. Probably, it is not worth telling in detail the well-known fact that at that time our pilots, when jointly conducting several air demonstration battles, completely tore apart the best overseas aces. The superiority of domestic technology and flight skills of our pair was so impressive that the American "eagles" stopped smiling and shaking hands when they met on the ground. All they had to do was grind their teeth in impotent rage, wiping their powder away. At the end of the trip, it almost turned into a tragedy. That's what I asked the general to tell in detail. During the flight from Langley to the main air base on both "dryers" controlled by Kharchevsky and his wingman Georgy Karabasov, the power plants were simultaneously turned off. As it turned out later, the Americans simply refueled our cars with low-quality fuel. Although, when analyzing the incident, everything was blamed on the inattention of the personnel and the difference in fuel density. After the emergency report of the wingman and the immediate shutdown of his engines, Kharchevsky told the F-15 pilots accompanying them: “Don't leave us! If we cannot start the engines, tell the rescuers the place of our ejection." The best US aces, who the day before had lost all the air battles to our pilots, only gleefully laughed on the air and, having stepped on the gas, flew away. I wanted to lie, but I could not ... Height - 14,000 meters. All four engines on both machines stopped. Below is the American desert. For a hundred kilometers around - not a living soul. All consumers of electricity, except for the radio station, are turned off so as not to discharge the batteries. Planes glide in complete silence, falling to the ground, only the hiss of oxygen in the mask is heard. The seconds pass quickly, the speed and altitude drop. And then Kharchevsky, having considered the impasse, decides to take risks. Gives a command to the follower: “Jora, we go into the peak, let's try to start. Do as I do!". Two sky-colored heavy fighters, freely falling to the ground, resembling air bombs. The stalled turbines are reluctantly gaining momentum from the oncoming flow of increasingly dense ground air, pumping rotten American fuel from the fuel lines into the combustion chamber. Height decreases rapidly and inevitably. And if it doesn't work... There is no time to think about it. From the rapid descent, the ears are blocked, the pilots, opening their mouths, shouting and taking deep breaths, try to equalize the intracranial pressure. Otherwise, the eardrums will burst to hell! They don’t hear each other - what kind of negotiations are there, to hell with it?! .. And suddenly, the slave shouts into the air: “The right one has started! Leveling!” One of his engines worked on three and a half thousand, as they reported later. In fact, there were only two thousand, no more. The turbine howled, shaking the whole machine, throwing up some indigestible mold produced by fierce friends, and the colonel pulled the control stick towards himself, losing his sight from the overload that had piled on ... According to the report, he came out at two thousand. Really - I almost scooped up a couple of cacti with air intakes. Do not scare your high authorities, they are unlikely to appreciate. Unless he later reported to his immediate superior, unofficially. It's amazing that they got through. They walked to the base, or rather, hobbled, each on the same engine. There was no guarantee that such a madness could be repeated successfully. The devil knows what is poured in the tanks for moonshine! We slowly gained a safe height, caught up with the already slowly descending Americans, sat down after them at the base, without any hysteria. “Well, Russian birds (Russian birds), - coming up with an impudent grin, they left the US “eagles” accompanying them in flight already in the parking lot, out of radio air, - did you have a hard time? Okay, be glad you're still alive." And one added, lowering his voice: “Pissed? It will be worse next time!" ... Alexander Nikolayevich pushed his untouched glass aside and looked out the wide window at the sky. Outside, the brakes of an approaching command vehicle creaked. Here they are, our overseas "friends" ...
From an interview with A. Kharchevsky already when he was a general:
- Iron. Deal.
Kharchevsky quickly and intently glanced at me across the table and looked into my eyes.
- Where did you serve?
And Kharchevsky is still rushing towards the now hated desert sand, frantically looking at the engine sensors.
Not made with fingers yet! ..
Su-27 (according to NATO codification: Flanker, Flanke - English. Strike on the flank) is a Soviet / Russian multi-purpose highly maneuverable all-weather fighter developed by the Sukhoi Design Bureau and designed to gain air supremacy. The main designers of the Su-27 at different times were Naum Semenovich Chernyakov, Mikhail Petrovich Simonov, A. A. Kolchin and A. I. Knyshev.
The first flight of the prototype took place in 1977, and in 1984 the aircraft began to arrive in aviation units. At the moment, it is one of the main aircraft of the Russian Air Force, its modifications are in service in the CIS countries, India, China and other countries.
On the basis of the Su-27, a large number of modifications have been developed: the combat training Su-27UB, the carrier-based fighter Su-33 and its combat training modification Su-33UB, the Su-30 and Su-35 multirole fighters, the Su-34 front-line bomber, and others.
History of creation
Start of development
In the late 1960s, the development of promising fourth-generation fighters began in a number of countries.
The United States was the first to start solving this problem, where back in 1965 the question of creating a successor to the F-4C Phantom tactical fighter was raised. In March 1966, the FX (Fighter Experimental) program was deployed.
The design of the aircraft according to the specified requirements began in 1969, when the aircraft received the designation F-15 Eagle. On December 23, 1969, the winner of the competition to work on the project, McDonnell Douglas, was awarded a contract for the construction of experimental aircraft, and in 1974 the first production F-15A Eagle and F-15B fighters appeared.
As an adequate response, the USSR launched its own program for the development of a promising fourth-generation fighter, which was launched by the Sukhoi Design Bureau in 1969. It was taken into account that the main purpose of the created aircraft would be the fight for air superiority. The tactics of air combat included, among other things, close
Prototypes
T-10
In 1975-1976, it became clear that the original layout of the aircraft had significant drawbacks. However, a prototype aircraft (named T-10-1) was created and took to the air on May 20, 1977 (pilot - Honored Test Pilot Hero of the Soviet Union Vladimir Ilyushin).
In one of the flights, the T-10-2, piloted by Evgeny Solovyov, fell into an unexplored region of resonant modes and collapsed in the air. The pilot died.
At this time, data about the American F-15 began to arrive. Suddenly it turned out that for a number of parameters the machine does not respond terms of reference and is significantly inferior to the F-15. For example, the developers of electronic equipment did not meet the weight and size limits assigned to them. Also, it was not possible to realize the specified fuel consumption. The developers faced a difficult dilemma - either to bring the car to mass production and hand it over to the customer in its current form, or to undertake a radical reworking of the entire machine. It was decided to start creating the aircraft practically from scratch, without releasing a car that lags behind its main competitor in terms of its characteristics.
In the shortest possible time, a new machine was developed, the design of which took into account the experience of developing the T-10 and the experimental data obtained. And already on April 20, 1981, the experimental T-10-17 aircraft (another designation T-10S-1, that is, the first production one), piloted by V. S. Ilyushin, took to the skies. The machine has been significantly changed, almost all nodes are created from scratch.
The data obtained during the tests showed that a truly unique aircraft was created, which in many respects has no analogues in the world. Although there were some disasters here: in one of the flights in critical mode, Alexander Komarov died due to the destruction of the glider. Some time later, in the same mode, N. Sadovnikov got into a similar situation. Only thanks to the great skill of the test pilot, later Hero of the Soviet Union, world record holder, the flight ended successfully. N. F. Sadovnikov landed a damaged aircraft on the airfield - without most of the wing console, with a chopped keel - and thus provided invaluable material to the developers of the machine. As a matter of urgency, measures were taken to refine the aircraft: the structure of the wing and airframe as a whole was strengthened, and the area of the slat was reduced.
In the future, the aircraft was subjected to numerous modifications, including in the process of mass production.
Adoption
The first production Su-27s began to enter the army in 1984. Officially, the Su-27 was adopted by a government decree of August 23, 1990, when all the main shortcomings identified in the tests were eliminated. By this time, the Su-27 had been in operation for more than 5 years. When adopted by the Air Force, the aircraft received the designation Su-27S (serial), and in air defense aviation - Su-27P (interceptor).
Design
Glider
Su-27 is made according to normal aerodynamic scheme and has an integral layout: its wing mates smoothly with the fuselage, forming a single load-bearing body. Wing sweep along the leading edge is 42°. To improve the aerodynamic characteristics of the aircraft at high angles of attack, it is equipped with large swept roots and automatically deflected noses. Influxes also contribute to an increase in aerodynamic quality when flying at supersonic speeds. Also on the wing are flaperons, simultaneously performing the functions of flaps in takeoff and landing modes and ailerons. The horizontal tail consists of an all-moving stabilizer, with a symmetrical deviation of the consoles, it performs the functions of an elevator, and with a differential one, it serves to control the roll. The vertical plumage is two-keeled.
To reduce the overall weight of the structure, titanium is widely used (about 30%).
On many modifications of the Su-27 (Su-30, Su-33, Su-34, Su-35, etc.), the front horizontal tail unit is installed. Su-33, a variant of the sea-based Su-27, in addition, has folding wing and stabilizer panels to reduce dimensions, and is also equipped with a brake hook.
The Su-27 is the first Soviet serial aircraft with a fly-by-wire control system (EDSU) in the longitudinal channel. Compared to the booster irreversible control system used on its predecessors, the EDSU has greater speed, accuracy and allows the use of much more complex and efficient control algorithms. The need for its use is due to the fact that in order to improve the maneuverability of the Su-27, it was made statically unstable at subsonic speeds.
Power point
The basic Su-27 is equipped with a pair of widely spaced AL-31F bypass turbojet engines with afterburners located in engine nacelles under the rear fuselage. The engines developed by the Saturn design bureau are distinguished by low fuel consumption both in afterburner and in the minimum thrust mode. The mass of the engine is 1520 kg. The engines have a four-stage low-pressure compressor, a nine-stage high-pressure compressor and single-stage cooled high and low pressure turbines with an afterburner. The separation of the engines was dictated by the need to reduce mutual influence, create a wide internal tunnel for the lower gun suspension and simplify the air intake system; between the engines there is a beam with a drag parachute container. The air intakes are fitted with mesh screens that remain closed until the nose wheel is off the ground on takeoff. The concentric nozzles of the afterburners are cooled by an air stream passing between two rows of "petals". On some modifications of the Su-27, it was supposed to install a rear-view radar in the tail boom (in this case, the braking parachute was transferred under the aircraft body).
The modernized Su-27SM2 fighters are equipped with more powerful and economical AL-31F-M1 engines equipped with thrust vector control. Engine thrust was increased relative to the base engine AL-31F by 1000 kgf, while fuel consumption was reduced from 0.75 to 0.68 kg/kgf*h, and an increase in compressor diameter to 924 mm made it possible to increase air consumption to 118 kg/s . AL-31FP (on some modifications of the Su-30) and more advanced "Product 117S" (on the Su-35S), equipped with a rotary nozzle with a thrust vector deflected by ±15°, which significantly increases the maneuverability of the aircraft.
On other modifications of the fighter, upgraded engines with thrust vector control AL-31F-M1, AL-31FP and Izdeliye 117S are also installed. They are equipped with deeply modernized Su-27SM2, Su-30 and Su-35S aircraft, respectively. The engines significantly increase maneuverability and, above all, allow the aircraft to be controlled at near-zero speeds and reach high angles of attack. The engine nozzles deviate by ±15°, which allows you to freely change the direction of flight both vertically and horizontally.
A large volume of fuel tanks (about 12,000 liters) provides a flight range of up to 3,680 km and a combat radius of up to 1,500 km. The placement of external fuel tanks on the base models is not provided.
Airborne equipment and systems
The on-board equipment of the aircraft is conditionally divided into 4 independent, functionally connected complexes - the SUV weapon control system, the PNK flight and navigation complex, the KS communications complex and the airborne defense complex of the BKO.
Optical search and aiming system
The OEPS-27 electro-optical system, which is part of the armament complex of the base Su-27, includes a laser rangefinder (effective range up to 8 km) and an infrared search and aiming system (IRST) (effective range 50-70 km). These systems use the same optics as mirrored periscopes, articulated with a coordinating glass ball sensor that moves in elevation (10° scan, 15° aim) and azimuth (60° and 120°), allowing the sensors to remain "directed". The big advantage of OEPS-27 is the possibility of open targeting.
Integrated thrust vectoring and flight control system
The nozzle control of the AL-31FP engine is integrated into the flight control system (FCS) and software. The nozzles are controlled through digital computers, which are part of the entire SPC as a whole. Since the movement of the nozzles is fully automated, the pilot is not busy managing individual thrust vectors, which allows him to fully concentrate on flying the aircraft. The UPC system itself reacts to any action of the pilot, working, as usual, with the handle and pedals. During the existence of the Su-27, the UPC system has undergone significant changes. The original SDU-10 (radio-controlled remote control system), which was installed on early Su-27s, had limited angle of attack, and was distinguished by the vibration of the thrust vector control stick. On modern Su-27s, a digital UPC is installed, in which the traction control functions are duplicated four times, and the yaw control functions are duplicated three times.
Cabin
The cabin has a two-section canopy, consisting of a fixed canopy and a drop-off part that opens up and back. The pilot's workplace is equipped with an ejection seat K-36DM-. In the basic SU-27 model, the cockpit was equipped with the usual set of analog dials and a small radar display (the latter was removed from the aircraft of the Russian Knights group). Later models are equipped with modern multifunctional liquid crystal displays with control panels and an indicator for displaying navigation and sighting information against the background of the windshield. The steering lever has autopilot control buttons on the front side, trim and targeting joysticks, a weapon select switch and a fire button on the back side.
Armament and equipment
The H001 airborne radar is equipped with a Cassegrain antenna with a diameter of 1076 mm and is capable of detecting light fighter class air targets at a distance of 60-80 km in the forward hemisphere and 30-40 km in the rear hemisphere. The radar can simultaneously track up to 10 targets in the ATS mode (support on the way) and control the guidance of two missiles at one target. In addition, there is a quantum optical-location station (KOLS) with a 36Sh laser rangefinder, which accompanies targets in simple weather conditions with great accuracy. OLS allows you to guide the target at short distances without emitting radio signals and without unmasking the fighter. Information from the onboard radar and from the OLS is displayed on the line-of-sight indicator (IPV) and the HUD frame (indication on the windshield).
Missile weapons are placed on the APU (aircraft launcher) and AKU (aircraft ejection device), suspended at 10 points: 6 under the wings, 2 under the engines and 2 under the fuselage between the engines. The main armament is up to six R-27 air-to-air missiles, with radar (R-27R, R-27ER) and two with thermal (R-27T, R-27ET) guidance. As well as up to 6 highly maneuverable R-73 melee missiles equipped with TGSN with combined aerodynamic and gas-dynamic control.
Comparison with other fighters
The comparative combat capabilities of the F-15 and Su-27 can be judged from the results of a visit to the United States at Langley Air Force Base in August 1992 by pilots of the Lipetsk Center for Combat Use and Retraining of Air Force flight personnel and a return visit by American pilots to Lipetsk in September of the same year, as well as Savasleyka Air Base in 1996. "Joint maneuvers" of the F-15D and Su-27UB aircraft were organized (according to Russian pilots, the F-15 is inferior in maneuverability at subsonic speeds not only to the Su-27, but also to the MiG-29). , which, however, says little about the superiority of any of the machines, since close combat is now extremely rare and combat using missiles and an advantage in detecting the enemy at long distances are becoming more important.
During the joint US-Indian exercises in February 2003, several training dogfights took place. Russian and French-made aircraft of the Su, MiG and Mirage families took part in the exercises from the Indian side.
During maneuvers in three out of four training air battles, Indian pilots on the Su-30MKI (Su-30 modernized commercial Indian) managed to "defeat" the Americans.
Concerned about the growing number of sales of Russian Su-27 and Su-30 fighters around the world, the US military command has acquired two Su-27 fighters from Ukraine Russian production. They will test the effectiveness of new American radars and electronic jamming systems.
Combat use
- On March 19, 1993, during the Abkhazian war, the Russian Air Force Su-27 took off from the Gudauta airfield to intercept two air targets (presumably a pair of Georgian Air Force Su-25s), but the targets were not detected. When turning to return, he was allegedly shot down by an anti-aircraft missile in the area with. Shroma, Sukhumi district. Pilot Shipko Vatslav Alexandrovich died.
- In 1999-2000, several Su-27s took part in the Ethiopian-Eritrean war as part of the Ethiopian Air Force. In aerial combat, they shot down 3 Eritrean MiG-29s (another MiG may have been written off due to damage) without suffering losses.
- During the war in South Ossetia, the Su-27, together with the MiG-29, controlled the airspace over South Ossetia. It is possible that several attempts were made to intercept the Georgian attack aircraft. The exact results of these sorties are unknown. It is possible that on 10.08.2008 a Georgian attack aircraft was shot down in one of them.
Exploitation
Countries using Su-27 and Su-30
In total, about 600 aircraft were produced.
Are in service:
Russia - up to 350 aircraft
China - 46 aircraft (purchased before 1996), in 1998 an agreement was signed to assemble 200 fighters under the J-11 brand. For 2008, a total of 276 Su-27s, Su-30s and J-11s.
Ukraine - 27 aircraft. For 2010.
Kazakhstan - 25 aircraft for 2010.
Uzbekistan - 25 aircraft for 2010.
Belarus - 23 for 2010.
Angola - 14 aircraft for 2010.
Vietnam - 12 aircraft, delivery of 24 more is expected.
Ethiopia - 11 Su-27s for 2010.
Armenia - 10 aircraft.
Eritrea - 10 aircraft for 2010.
Indonesia - 2 Su-27SK, 3 Su-27SKM ordered (to be delivered in 2009).
USA - 2 aircraft, used for research purposes.
| LTH: |
| Modification | Su-27 |
| Wing length, m | 14,70 |
| Aircraft length, m | 21,935 |
| Aircraft height, m | 5,932 |
| Wing area, m2 | 62.037 |
| Wing sweep angle, deg | 42 |
| Weight, kg | |
| empty plane | 16300 |
| normal takeoff | 22500 |
| maximum takeoff | 30000 |
| Fuel mass, kg | |
| normal | 5270 |
| maximum | 9400 |
| engine's type | 2 turbofan engines AL-31F. |
| Maximum thrust, kN | |
| afterburner | 2 x 74.53 |
| afterburner | 2 x 122.58 |
| Maximum speed, km/h: | |
| near the ground | 1380 |
| at high altitude | 2500 (M=2.35). |
| Maximum rate of climb, m/min | 18000 |
| Practical ceiling, m | 18500 |
| Dynamic ceiling, M | 24000 |
| Practical range, km | |
| on high | 3680 |
| near the ground | 1370 |
| Maximum turning speed, deg/s | |
| established | 17 |
| unsteady | 23 |
| Takeoff run, m | 450 |
| Run length, m | |
| without drag chute | 620 |
| with drag parachute | 700 |
| Max. operating overload | 9. |
| Armament: | 30 mm gun GSh-301 (150 rounds). Combat load - 6000 kg on 10 hardpoints: Can be installed: up to 6 medium-range air-to-air missiles R-27ER1, R-27ET1, R-27ETE and R-27ERE, up to 4 short-range missiles R-73 with thermal seeker. |
The interview was conducted by the special correspondent of the journal "Science and Life" T. Novgorodskaya
"I will never forget the first demonstration flight of the Su-27 in Paris, organized by British Aerospace (British Aerospace) together with the designers and test pilots of the Sukhoi Design Bureau" - these are the impressions of the "premiere" of the fighter from British Air Force pilot John Farlight. - Victor Pugachev did a 360 degree turn in a Su-27 in 10 seconds, the average speed on the turn was 36 degrees / s. And then we only hoped that our next generation fighter could reach 25 degrees / s. This is the speed with which the pilot is able to turn the aircraft so that the entire weapon system is ready to attack.Assuming that our new machine will meet in battle with the Su-27 in 10 seconds, it will have, if you are very lucky, to lower the landing gear and sit down. airshow can be used by combat aircraft in real air combat.For an ordinary viewer, an airshow is only a superficial action, but if you belong to the aviation industry, then the maneuvering of combat aircraft ashin completely define the limits in which the aircraft can fly. And naturally, when you see that there are no limits for the Su-27, or that the plane goes to the vertical, comes to a stop, falls back down, goes into a normal flight and does this not once or twice, but over and over again, you understand that this is not an exception, not a trick, but the norm. The difficulty of this maneuver is not how to enter the mode, but how to get out of it. Usually we are not allowed to exceed angles of attack of 20-25 degrees: if we exceed, we lose control of the machine ... But the Russians perform their maneuvers, changing the angle of attack in a wide range, while remaining confident in controlling the aircraft with a perfectly symmetrical flow around. The same goes for engines. Western engines "suffer" from strict restrictions on angles of attack. In the flight of our fighters, one has to think at the same time about the maneuvers of the enemy, and about one's own limitations from an aerodynamic point of view - about what the pilot should not do. Of course, such a situation is not very comfortable for the pilot, it is much easier for him when you can do whatever you want to be able to aim at the enemy and pursue him. What the Russians have achieved amazed us to the core. "The Su-27, with its revolutionary design and aerodynamics, set new standards in the production of fighters. The person whose name is inextricably linked with the history of its creation is the general designer of the Sukhoi Design Bureau, Doctor of Technical Sciences, full member of the International and Russian Engineering Academies of Aviation and Aeronautics, Hero of Russia, laureate of the Lenin and State Prizes Mikhail Petrovich Simonov. In 1995 he was awarded the gold medal named after V. G. Shukhov, and in 1998 the editors of the magazine "Aviation week and Space Technology" named him "legend of the year". His name is inscribed on the Board of Honor of the Hall of Fame at the National Air and Space Museum in Washington, along with the names of I. I. Sikorsky, S. V. Ilyushin and Wernher von Braun. Mikhail Petrovich gave an interview to the journal "Science and Life" for the first time, although he has been reading our journal since 1946. M. SIMONOV, General Designer of Sukhoi Design Bureau, answers questions from the editors.
M. P. Simonov.
Schematic of the cobra maneuver.
Air combat in the "bell" mode (a - disruption of Doppler tracking, disruption of the capture of the enemy's radar and escape from attack; b - exit from the "bell" mode and attack of the enemy; c - capture and defeat of the enemy).
Su-27 performs a "cobra". Angle of attack 110 degrees.
Su-30 MKI. The blue color of fuel burning in the afterburner of the engine indicates the high quality of the combustion process.
Air combat on a turn.
The Su-35 aircraft performs the "cobra" maneuver. The picture shows moisture condensation in the areas of rarefaction of air above the front horizontal tail and the central part of the wing.
Experimental aircraft Su-47. At the time of aerobatics, the vortices of the resulting moisture seem to flow down from the ends of the wings.
Mikhail Petrovich, everyone who has ever been to an air show and seen what Su planes can do, or at least watched reports from air shows while sitting at the TV, is interested in how and why such machines are created?
In the 9th grade I read the book "Some Causes of Pilot Errors". Pilots are never immune from mistakes. Aviation, as it was, remains very demanding on both pilots and designers. Due to equipment failure or crew error, not only the aircraft, but also the crew and passengers die.
The corkscrew is one of the most difficult and hazardous phenomena. This is a practically uncontrollable mode, oriented in space in the most unfortunate way: the aircraft rotates "nose" down. When it hits the ground, an "air pack" explodes and the plane is blown into small pieces. It would seem that in order to solve the problem, it is enough to teach all civil aviation pilots how to recognize the "stall edge", after which the aircraft enters a tailspin. It must be said that in aviation there are several similar phenomena, starting with the fact that the car rolls, but not all of them lead to a spin. However, despite the fact that all military fighter pilots are trained in basic exit techniques various kinds spin, not all of them manage to emerge victorious from a real situation (most often due to piloting errors, less often due to failures aviation technology). There are aircraft that, due to their design and aerodynamic features, cannot get out of some types of spin at all.
When operating civil aircraft, extreme cases are not typical. But for combat aircraft, maneuverability is a condition for survival. Therefore, all the design bureaus of the world are working on the characteristics of maneuverability. It is she, in combination with the weapons that the aircraft carries, that provides the solution to the tasks.
-What are the tasks involved in this?
Maneuverability is the ability of an aircraft to change its position in the airspace. Naturally, there must be a need to introduce an aircraft into a maneuver. In a combat situation, it arises by itself: you need to take such a position in the airspace that the enemy aircraft is in the zone of action of your weapon, and your aircraft, on the contrary, would not fall into the aiming zone. It is clear that the winner will be the one who can turn his car first and send it to the target. Combat vehicles of the classic type of the 40-60s of the last century experienced great difficulties in battles, since their maneuverability characteristics were rather limited. Usually air battles are fought in large groups - twenty planes: a huge "tangle" of machines is spinning in the air, and everyone wants to survive. The planes of the old classic designs differed little from the enemy planes, so the battles lasted quite a long time - 5-6 minutes. The engines in this case worked at the limit modes - accordingly, the fuel consumption was high. And even after the victory, not everyone managed to fly home. Every fifth plane died after the battle due to the fact that the fuel ran out and had to "flop" where God would send. Well, if the pilot ejected, and if he tried to land, for example, on a highway at high speed, the outcome was a foregone conclusion. The pilots of some countries, entering the battle, knew that they would not be able to get out of it. To fly away, it was necessary to "substitute" the "tail", and he immediately fell under the scope. Therefore, they fought to the end, and when the red light came on, they ejected from a fully functional fighter.
-...A disposable plane?
The life of a pilot is more valuable ... But one way or another, lack of maneuverability is very costly. Therefore, a breakthrough in the field of super-maneuverability modes, when the risk to the life of the pilot and the machine becomes minimal, has become the number one task.
-Is it possible to predict during the development of a fighter that it will have super-maneuverability?
It is usually known "against whom" the aircraft is being created. At the time when the Su-27 was being developed, we were "friends" together with the "Warsaw Pact" against the NATO countries. We needed to make an aircraft that would be significantly superior to their F-14, F-15, F-16 and F-18 fighters.
In our aviation industry, we are represented by the Sukhoi Design Bureau and a large number of co-developer enterprises. For example, radars are made for us by research institutes and design bureaus. We do not develop an engine, we say what kind of engine we need - and it is created in the Design Bureau named after A. M. Lyulka. Such a scientific and technical union ensures the development of each component of the fighter at the highest level. After all, in order for the new aircraft to be better and to be able to defeat the enemy fighter, we must have the best engine in the world, the best radar station in the world, the best missile weapons in the world, and everything else is also the best. Working on the SU-27, we made a seemingly good aircraft, superior to the F-15, but by how much? On "slightly". Therefore, again in the case of close combat, we can get into a complex "turntable", where the aircraft will have equal opportunities to die or win.
We realized that a truly decisive superiority over the enemy can be obtained by allowing the pilot to maneuver not only better, but several times better. There is such a thing as the angular rate of turn on the target. In combat, the advantage is realized by the fighter that manages to turn around earlier. We came to the conclusion that if we provide our aircraft with twice the speed of turning to the target, its maneuverability can be called super-maneuverability.
Supermaneuverability is the ability of a fighter from any position in airspace to turn towards a target with an angular velocity at least twice the angular velocity of the enemy aircraft.
-Probably, to ensure extreme conditions, special requirements are also imposed on engines?
First of all, they should have better traction. A modern military aircraft engine is a turbojet equipped with an afterburner. (Afterburner is an operating mode in which additional fuel is injected into the combustion chamber. This achieves a significant increase in thrust, however, at the expense of additional fuel consumption.) A stream of gases escapes from the two engines installed on the Su-27, which pushes the car with a force of 25 tons (12.5 tons - each engine). Similar engines of American fighters at the time of the creation of the F-15 developed 10.8-11 tons of thrust. There are, of course, other requirements. It is not bad, for example, to control the position of the aircraft in flight with engines whose nozzles can deviate by + 15 degrees. This is especially important when the aircraft hits supercritical angles of attack in the process of piloting in combat. The critical angle of attack of the Su-27 is 24 degrees. And the combat situation sometimes requires that the aircraft turn to an angle of attack of 60-90 degrees, or even 120 degrees to the direction of flight. When the pilot gives a command to the engine turn control stick, the engine must instantly deviate to the required angle.
The nozzles of two AL-31FP turbojet engines of the Su-30MK multifunctional fighter are capable of deflecting 32 degrees horizontally and 15 degrees vertically. Thus, the aircraft can do what is not available to other machines of this class: "slow down", and then turn around on the spot, like a helicopter.
When we first flew to an exhibition in Paris in 1983 with the conclusion of the State Institute for Combat Aircraft Testing that the Su-27 fighter was inferior to the American F-15 in terms of performance, we still believed that the Su-27 was superior to US aircraft. The customer considered our statement too presumptuous.
American fighters set a whole series of climb records. (Rate of climb is the time from the moment the aircraft starts off until it reaches some height - 3000 m, 6000 m, 12 000 m, and so on.) That is, "from a stop" it must reach an altitude in the shortest possible time. World records were then set by the F-15 fighter.
We made a series of record flights on the Su-27 fighter and broke all the records of the F-15, thereby managing to prove that our aircraft is superior to the F-15 in terms of rate of climb.
-How did it happen?
The aircraft at the start must stand still, like a sprinter. But in order to ensure the adhesion of tires to concrete, no brakes are enough. To keep the fighter in place, they tried to use a tank. They attached it with a cable to the lock on the lower surface of the aircraft, but they did not rejoice for long. Full afterburner lasted for exactly a second, then there was a rattle, and the Su-27 dragged the tank along the runway. I had to look for another way out. Nearby, the runway was being repaired, a huge industrial bulldozer "Caterpillar" was working on it. They drove a bulldozer, hitched a tank to it, and a plane to the tank. The launch of the Su-27 "from a place" was ensured.
The engine at the moment of start works in the limiting mode. After the lock opens, the plane takes off, takes off and goes to the vertical. While in a vertical climb, it accelerates to supersonic speed. Not a single device, not a single space rocket at low altitudes of the vertical exceeds the speed of sound. This occurs only at high altitudes, where the density of the atmosphere is low. And we are already at an altitude of 2000-3000 m, we are moving to supersonic speed.
Then, in flights at the air show, characteristics were obtained better than American ones.
In a classic fight, two fighters "twist the turntable" until one of them is in position to engage the target. But if we go into battle and at the very first moment we turn the plane 90 degrees to the stream, the target is sighted, it is captured, the missile is launched and it is defeated. Thus, due to super-maneuverability, it is possible to radically improve close combat and guarantee victory for yourself within ten seconds (not minutes).
-They say that at first they thought that the Su-27 did not come out of a spin?
Yes, that was the conclusion of TsAGI on tests in a wind tunnel: the plane does not come out of a spin. And if a combat aircraft does not come out of a spin, something must be done. A system for limiting limiting modes was developed, which does not allow the aircraft to exceed an angle of attack of 24 degrees.
Not a single model of the Su-27 aircraft in the TsAGI wind tunnel got out of a spin. We fought honestly, so we made a 10-meter half-life model of our aircraft, suspended it from a Tu-16 bomber and dropped it from a height of 10,000 m. The model was equipped with an automatic control system and went into a stall angle, while, if it did not come out of a , the landing parachute opened. However, it turned out that in half of the modes the large, free-flying model came out of a spin, and in half it did not. We could not tell the pilot: "Fly, everything is fine." Therefore, they agreed with TsAGI to put a limiter on the aircraft. It was, of course, strange: we want to work at high angles of attack, but we are not able to make an aircraft for this.
The most interesting thing happened during the tests. Aircraft testing is a huge job, about 5 thousand flights, in which the aircraft is tested for aerodynamics, strength, missile launches and bombing, and much more. Even before the "cobra" V. G. Pugachev carried out an exit at high angles of attack. I was very worried, because by that time the American F-16 fighter had several cases when the plane reached an angle of attack of 60 degrees, but could not “get off” it - it’s good that it had an anti-spin parachute, with which it was possible to escape from this angle. We tested differently. They were very worried when Pugachev reached a high angle of attack, but he managed to return the plane to its original mode - everything ended well.
Subsequently, flight experiments showed that when reaching high angles of attack, the development of a spin motion does not occur. The results showed that there is a fundamental possibility of the aircraft reaching ultra-large angles of attack with a subsequent return to the so-called operational flight modes. This opened up prospects for super-maneuverability. But 20 years ago we did not know this yet. There were only the first experimental flights.
And in one of the flights, test pilot V. Kotlov on the Su-27 with a faulty air signal system (the air pressure receiver was depressurized), having incorrect information about the Mach number M (equal to the flight speed measured in sound speeds) and trying to compensate for the "max "angle of climb, "balanced" at an altitude of 8000 m vertically and began to fall on the tail. He believed that the plane would settle into some kind of normal flight mode - instead, it "suspended" between heaven and earth. It was so unusual and incomprehensible: the speed generally dropped to zero, and the altitude was 8000 m. He began to rush around the cockpit, removed the afterburners, and again "gave". The plane began to fall on its tail, weightlessness appeared - later this technique was called the "bell".
-And all this happened in a matter of seconds?
Seconds 20. In the air - it's a lot. At an angle of attack of 60 degrees (and we only had a resolution of 24 degrees), the plane fell into a tailspin, became "nose" down and began to rotate. The pilot then realized what had happened, and reported to the control tower: "Corkscrew!" Since it was believed that the Su-27 plane did not get out of a spin, the command set on the KDP was "carved on granite": "Eject at an altitude of at least 4000 m."
In general, ejection cannot be called a favorite occupation of pilots, therefore, in order to avoid serious consequences, the pilot released control and began to carefully prepare for an ejection. But at the last moment I saw that the plane came out of the spin itself and began to exit the dive. The Su-27 turned out to be left to itself and left the dangerous regime on its own. Having checked the controllability of the aircraft, Kotlov made a safe landing at the airfield.
-Maybe it was an accident?
At first they decided so. After all, only one such case occurred in 1000 situations of use. For the most part, it didn't change anything. But soon an even more incredible event occurred in the Far East. The Su-27 pilot performed the task of reaching the intercept in automatic mode. He exceeded the allowable angle of attack, as a result, the plane fell into a tailspin. On command from the ground, the pilot ejected, after which the Su-27 not only got out of the spin on its own, but also continued flying in automatic mode until it ran out of fuel. Soon a third case occurred in Lipetsk, like two drops of water similar to the first. This has already forced us to develop a special research program. As it turned out during the tests, the Su-27 was distinguished by a certain "instability" in entering and exiting spin modes. It was found that the use of the most "strong" aerodynamic methods of recovering from a spin does not always lead to its termination. And at the same time, in a number of situations, the aircraft itself came out of a spin with the handle and pedals in the neutral position. This was due to the peculiarities of the vortex aerodynamics of the Su-27 at different angles of attack and slip.
A significant contribution to the "victory" over the spin was made by the well-known spin specialist, Honored Test Pilot of the USSR, cosmonaut, Hero of the Soviet Union Igor Petrovich Volk. He ran spin tests and found that the Su-27 would come out of all spin modes.
-Why, after all, when testing models, the opposite conclusion was made?
It turned out that it was not the layout of the aircraft that mattered, but the scale of the model (the Reynolds number Re, which relates the flight speed, the size of the aircraft and the viscosity of the air, is much larger for real machines than for models, especially smaller ones).
-Supermaneuverability leads to a decrease in the "visibility" of the aircraft on radar. How?
Supermaneuverability is a system of close air combat techniques. If the pilot receives a signal that he is in the zone of radiation of the enemy radar, the first thing he needs to do is go to the vertical. Gaining altitude and losing speed, he leaves the zone of "visibility" of radars operating on the Doppler effect. (The Doppler effect is the change in wave frequency observed when the wave source moves relative to their receiver. - Note. ed.) But the enemy is not a fool: he can also turn around. But our plane moves vertically (the "bell" figure), while its speed tends to zero. And all locators see the target precisely by changing the speed (they work according to the Doppler principle). If the measured speed drops to zero, or at least to such a small value that the enemy radars cannot calculate the Doppler component, then we are lost for the enemy. Visually, he sees us, but on the radar spectrum - no. This means that if the enemy has a missile with a radar (semi-active, active) guidance head, he will still not launch it, because the missile will not be able to lock on to the target.
-Are there any other ways to make the plane "invisible"?
Such "ghost" planes are just beginning to appear. The greatest effect of the new technology is expected for all aircraft of the so-called fifth generation. The F-111A fighter-bomber became the first aircraft created using the "stealth" ("ghost") technology. True, the fighter did not work out of it. The aircraft had very low visibility, but poor flight properties - a kind of "faceted iron" (faceted shapes were needed so that the radar beams were reflected from the surface and directed in a completely different direction).
I read that in the process of creating a new fighter, it became necessary to radically improve the avionics equipment. How reliable is it in super-maneuverability modes?
In fact, the world believes that "Russian" electronics does not deserve attention. I have a different opinion. We order our co-developers exactly the radars we need. If the locator, which is on the F-15, weighs 244 kg, then ours is several times larger. But we are not very upset. We want the locator to provide target detection at a certain range. And we set this range to a large one. The same can be said about the optoelectronic target detection and aiming system.
When the American strategic reconnaissance (SR-71) began to fly to us "from around the corner" (from Norway. - Note. ed.) along the entire coast to Novaya Zemlya, Su-27 and Su-30 fighters were put on guard at the northern borders. When once again the SR-71 "surfaced" - ours were already in the air. We decided to outwit them and gave the command not to turn on the radar, but to turn on the electro-optical system, which "sees" in the infrared spectrum and at a great distance. When the SR was flying at high altitude, and our planes were facing it, we saw it at a great distance. Since the "American" did not violate the borders, nothing could be done with him, but we kept him at gunpoint.
So it is impossible to say that our radio-electronic equipment is worse. It is exactly as we ordered, focusing on the machines of a potential enemy. And to make such an aircraft that can lift our electronics is not a problem.
Is it true that a new wing design has been used to improve aerodynamic qualities in new generation aircraft?
In order to reduce the wave drag of an aircraft wing when moving at supersonic speeds, it is necessary to sweep the wing, that is, deflect it relative to the velocity vector (set it at an angle). If the wing is set in such a way that during "chatter" (disturbed flows), the wing twists at negative angles during its deformation, then the lift drops, but this is not dangerous from the point of view of wing destruction. If you make a reverse sweep, a gust of air deflects the wing up - the lifting force immediately increases. And if the force increases, the wing deviates further, the angle increases again. Despite the risk of destruction, swept-wing aircraft have very good aerodynamic characteristics.
The Americans had such an experimental X-29 fighter, for some reason they considered its design solution unprofitable. We consider the creation of such an aircraft to be a technically solvable task with the help of composite materials. A metal wing cannot withstand divergence - the destruction of the wing from twisting. We have had cases when steel wings of a model with a reverse swept wing were destroyed during blowing in wind tunnels. Today we can create a special composite structure based on carbon fiber, epoxy resin, high modulus organic materials - in particular, from the very fabrics from which bulletproof vests are made.
-What are your hopes for fifth-generation fighters in terms of super-maneuverability?
Large. If our "competitors" make fifth-generation aircraft, we also need them. We can say that there is a certain law of conservation of equilibrium. Recently we were at a foreign exhibition, and there the commander of the Air Force of one of the countries said: "We need your aircraft. We have different fighters, but we want a Russian to stand next to them, but with such characteristics that the enemy is afraid." So, there was no conflict. This is the goal of creating a new fighter that would ensure political balance in the world.
So, the previous page completed our acquaintance with two, without a doubt, outstanding fourth-generation fighters. As you can easily see from the biographies of the Su-27 and F-15 families, these combat vehicles were created and then improved over decades, mainly to fight each other. Therefore, any normal reader will inevitably have a question: which of the fighters still won this mainly absentee (one would like to say - fortunately!) duel? Who was better and in what respect? After all, as we remember, the Eagle was created to confidently fight Soviet maneuverable fighters, which showed very high efficiency during the Vietnam War. And the Su-27 was made from the very beginning with the aim of surpassing the F-15. To what extent did Soviet designers manage to solve this most difficult task?
It is quite natural that when comparing aircraft, the first impulse is to look at the performance charts. Firstly, it is immediately clear from them that these machines are really close in dimension. Thus, the maximum takeoff weights of purely fighter aircraft differ by less than 10%: for the Sukhoi, this is from 28,000 kg for the base Su-27 to 33,000 kg for the Su-27SK, for the Needles, from 25,400 kg for the F-15A up to 30850 kg for the F-15C. The maximum speeds are also very close: 2650 km/h for the F-15A and F-15C and 2500 km/h for the Su-27. As you can see, here the difference is about 9%. The maximum available overloads for the latter options are completely the same - 9 days each. The practical ceiling is the same - 18300-18500 m.
Secondly, it is easy to see that the F-15 family aircraft are slightly smaller in geometric dimensions than their competitors: in fuselage length by 2.5 m, in span - by 1.65 m, in height - by 0.7 m (compared to with Su-27UB). Accordingly, the Needles have a slightly lighter design: the empty weight of the F-15A is 12,700 kg versus 16,380 kg for the Su-27. Therefore, the Soviet aircraft is equipped with more powerful engines. If the AP-31F thrust at full afterburner near the ground is 12500 kgf, then the F100-PW-200 has 10630 kgf.
Thirdly, the LTH tables contain a number of lines that clearly speak of certain advantages of "Dry". For example, in terms of flight range without PTB, the Su-27 is almost 2 times superior to the F-15A (3900 km versus 1970 km). The same can be said about takeoff and landing characteristics (Dry fit into a runway less than 700 m long, while Needles need more than 1100 m). That, in fact, is all that can be said based on the analysis of the tables. The question "who is the best?" remained without a convincing answer. Well, what did we want by comparing a dozen and a half numbers? After all, a modern combat aircraft is a complex means of armed struggle and is characterized by many hundreds of different parameters. These include not only performance characteristics, but also indicators of on-board electronic systems and weapons systems, information on visibility and survivability, various operational and technological characteristics, data on the cost of production, operation and combat use. The effectiveness of the aviation complex as a whole depends on how successfully the combination (let us emphasize, it is the combination) of these parameters meets the specific conditions for the production and use of the aircraft. Therefore, by the way, aircraft with any one outstanding parameter, for example, the fastest or highest altitude, very rarely turn out to be successful. After all, for a sharp improvement in a single indicator, designers inevitably have to worsen many others. From this point of view, both considered aircraft may well qualify for the honorary title.
By the way, when studying the tables, you should always remember that in the modern world an airplane is a commodity, and the numbers in the tables are its advertising, so they always give a slightly more optimistic picture. Of course, there should be no doubts about the decency of respected aircraft manufacturing companies. These figures can be trusted one hundred percent. You just need to know what they really mean. For example, the maximum speed of a fighter is indicated. But at the same time, it is silent that this speed was achieved on a specially prepared copy, as a rule, without external suspensions and with a minimum fuel supply, piloted by a test pilot of the highest qualification during a specially organized flight. And what speed will a combat vehicle of this type develop after 10 years of operation, with weapons and a tank on an external sling, under the control of a young lieutenant, if the engines have already undergone two repairs, and not the highest grade kerosene is poured into the tanks? There are no such data in such tables. But it is the real performance characteristics that should interest us in the first place if we want to more or less correctly compare two aircraft.
These general remarks are intended to give an idea of how difficult and thankless the task of comparing aircraft according to their official characteristics is. Another thing is to analyze real air battles involving competitor aircraft during military conflicts. In this case, the picture is close to reality. But even here, factors not directly related to the aircraft, such as the qualifications of the pilots, the degree of their determination to fight, the quality of the work of the supporting services, etc., play an important role. to our joy, these aircraft nevertheless met several times in the sky during various training duels. This happened during mutual visits of pilots from Russia, Ukraine, India and the United States.
The first such visit took place in August 1992, when the Langley Air Force Base (Virginia), where the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing of the US Air Force, then armed with the F-15C / D, was based, was visited by pilots of the Lipetsk Center for combat use and retraining of the Russian Air Force flight personnel : Major General N. Chaga, Colonel A. Kharchevsky and Major E. Karabasov. They arrived on two combatant Su-27UBs, the escort group arrived on an Il-76. After a friendly meeting and a short rest, E. Karabasov proposed to hold a demonstrative air battle directly above the Langley airfield in the presence of spectators. However, the Americans did not agree to this show, which, in their opinion, was too militaristic. In return, they proposed to conduct "joint maneuvering" in the pilot zone over the ocean (200 km from the coast). According to the scenario, first the F-15D had to get away from the pursuit of the Su-27UB, then the planes had to change places, and already the "Dry" was supposed to "throw off the tail" of the "Eagle". E. Karabasov was in the front cockpit of the Su-27UB, and an American pilot was in the back. An F-15C flew out to oversee the fight.
At the command to start joint maneuvering, the Eagle, turning on the full afterburner, immediately tried to break away from the Su-27UB, but this turned out to be impossible: using only the minimum afterburner mode and maximum afterburner thrust, E. Karabasov easily "hung on the tail" of the American. At the same time, the angle of attack of the Su-27UB never exceeded 18 *. As we remember, in combat units, the angle of attack on the Su-27 is limited to 26 ", that is, in that duel, the Russian pilot not only confidently held the F-15D in sight, but he still had a solid margin of available overload! changed places, E. Karabasov switched the throttle to full afterburner and began to move away from the F-15D with an energetic turn and climb. "Eagle" trailed behind, but immediately fell behind. After a turn and a half, the Su-27UB went into the tail of the F-15, however the Russian pilot made a mistake and "shot down" not the F-15D, but the F-15C observer flying behind. Realizing the mistake, he soon caught the two-seat Eagle in sight. All further attempts by the American pilot to get rid of the persecution did not lead to anything. On this " the air battle is over.
So, in close maneuvering combat, the Su-27 convincingly demonstrated its complete superiority over the F-15 due to smaller turning radii, higher roll and rate of climb, and better acceleration characteristics. Note that it was not the maximum speed and other similar parameters that provided these advantages, but other indicators that more deeply characterize the aircraft. According to A. Kharchevsky, the reasons for such a clear victory of the Su-27 are its high thrust-to-weight ratio: the Russian aircraft picked up speed on an ascending trajectory faster than the F-15. The latter had to first make a kind of "step" - fly a little horizontally in order to gain speed, and only then start climbing. The Russian pilots took advantage of this, not giving the Americans time for horizontal acceleration, immediately dragging them into a vertical maneuver.
Let's try to analyze this version more deeply - let's calculate the thrust-to-weight ratio of the fighters in that sortie. Since the thrust of the engines is known, for this we can only estimate the weight of the aircraft. For F-15D: 13240 kgf - empty weight; plus 290 kgf - equipment weight, including two pilots; plus 6600 kgf - the weight of the fuel consumed (for a flight to the pilot area and back with a range reserve of 25%, maneuvering for half an hour, of which 5 minutes in full afterburner mode); plus 150 kgf - the weight of the PTB structure, since the required amount of fuel exceeds the capacity of the internal tanks; in total, without a combat load (shells for a cannon and missiles), the takeoff weight of the F-15D was approximately 20330 kgf. At the time of the start of "joint maneuvering" due to fuel consumption, the flight weight decreased to approximately 19400 kgf. When determining the corresponding values for the Su-27UB, we will proceed from the fact that the weight of an empty aircraft is 17,500 kgf, as indicated in many publications. Having carried out a similar calculation for Sukhoi, we get its take-off weight of 24200 kgf, and the weight for the “battle” comb is about 23100 kgf.
If we now divide the table values of engine thrust by the weights obtained, then it is easy to see that at the beginning of the duel, the thrust-to-weight ratio of the Su-27UB near the ground in full afterburner mode was 1.08, and the F-15D was 1.11, that is, the Igla had it was more. So Kharchevsky's version does not stand up to scrutiny. The thing is different - thrust per 1 m 2 midsection of the aircraft, the Su-27 has almost 20% more than the Igla (respectively, 6330 kgf/m G and 5300 kgf/m 2 ). In combination with the best throttle response of the AL-31F engine, this provides an advantage in acceleration characteristics. According to David North, Associate Editor of Aviation Week amp; Space Technology, which made a fact-finding flight on the Su-27UB at the Farnborough-90 air show, accelerates the Russian fighter from 600 km/h to 1000 km/h at full afterburner in just 10 seconds. In his report, North emphasizes the good throttle response of the Sukhoi engines.
It is known that the degree of aircraft maneuverability is numerically expressed by the magnitude of the available overload, i.e., the ratio of the maximum lift force developed by the aircraft to its weight at a given moment. As we remember, the maximum available overloads for the Su-27 and F-15 are equal. Nevertheless, in the events described, Sukhoi demonstrated a constant advantage precisely in maneuver. This means that the point is not in the absolute value of the overload, but in something else, for example, in the time it takes to reach it. And this time depends on the efficiency with which an aircraft of one or another aerodynamic configuration is able to generate lift. Unlike its competitor, the Su-27 is made according to an integrated circuit, in which the fuselage and wing form a single carrier system, which ensures high values of the lift coefficient during the maneuver and low drag, especially at trans- and supersonic speeds. In addition, the integrated layout, characterized by a smooth transition of the fuselage into the wing, compared to the traditional layout, provides a significantly larger volume of internal fuel tanks and eliminates the use of PTB. This also has a positive effect on the aerodynamic quality of the Su-27.
The positive aspects of the integrated layout of the "Dry" are significantly enhanced by its careful development. Thus, the pointed root burrs of the Su-27, in contrast to the blunt burrs of the F-15, not only create a positive increase in load-bearing properties at angles of attack greater than 10", but also provide a reduction in pressure pulsation on the upper surface of the wing, which causes aircraft shaking and limits it. maneuverability An important feature of the Su-27 is the wing with a deformed median surface, giving it a characteristic "serpentine" appearance. This wing is "tuned" to provide maximum aerodynamic quality in the middle of the maneuvering area in close combat. In these modes, the quality of the deformed wing is 1, 5 times higher than the quality of a flat wing, and the gain takes place in a fairly wide range of angles of attack.As for the maximum aerodynamic quality of the aircraft as a whole, it is known that at M = 0.9 the quality of the F-15А can reach a maximum of 10, and the Su- 27 -11.6, which is a record figure for fourth-generation fighters. The new layout of the Su-27 provides not only an increase in lift, but also a decrease in drag, which has a positive effect on the acceleration characteristics of the aircraft.
I would like to emphasize once again that the best maneuverability characteristics of the Su-27 compared to the F-15 were achieved due to a better aerodynamic layout, and not a decrease in the load on the bearing area. This is proved by simple calculations of the specific load on the bearing surface (due to the fact that for both aircraft the fuselage and empennage play a significant role in creating lift, the flight weight will be referred not to the wing area, but to the entire area of their planned projections, which we calculate according to the given in drawing book). We get that at the beginning of the duel, the load on the planned projection of the Su-27UB was 220 kgf / m 2 , a F-15D - 205 kgf / m 2 , that is, almost the same (the difference in the order of the calculation error).
Another important characteristic, on which the maneuverability of a fighter depends, is the speed of roll entry and the speed of rotation around the longitudinal axis. The greater these speeds, determined by the effectiveness of the lateral controls and the mass-inertia characteristics of the machine, the faster the aircraft enters the turn and goes into the turn of the opposite rotation. The ability to quickly change the direction of the turn is the most important tactical advantage, because it allows you to effectively get away from the enemy’s blow and start the attack yourself.
D. North, referring to Viktor Pugachev, claims that the angular rate of roll of the Su-27 is close to 270 deg/s. This value is higher than that of the F-15 and roughly corresponds to the F/A-18.
Fully positive aspects of the aerodynamic layout and power plant Su-27 manifest itself due to its static instability. Unlike the stable F-15, Sukhoi, as it were, independently seeks to change the direction of flight, and only the constant operation of the fly-by-wire control system keeps it in an equilibrium position. The essence of controlling a statically unstable fighter is that the pilot does not “force” him to perform this or that maneuver, but “allows” him to perform it. Therefore, the time required to withdraw from any established flight mode and start maneuvering is much less for the Su-27 than for the F-15, which was also one of the components of Sukhoi's success in the duel with the Iglom. Thus, the outstanding maneuverability characteristics of the Su-27, so convincingly demonstrated in the American sky, are a completely natural result of a set of design solutions that distinguish this fighter from the F-15.
In 1993, a return visit to Lipetsk of the Eagles group from the 1st TFW took place. When he was preparing, a very revealing incident arose, allowing us to draw a conclusion about the airfield mileage of an overseas fighter. The advanced group of Americans who arrived in Lipetsk, who had the task of settling all issues related to the reception of the F-15, was horrified by the state of the local runway, which was considered quite safe by Russian standards. In any case, the "Dry" flew from her regularly. The guests also said that it was simply impossible to fly the F-15 from such a runway. In the end, the visit did take place, but the Americans taxied, took off and landed very carefully. They can be understood: the Igla wheels are inferior to the Su-27 wheels both in diameter and in the width of the pneumatics, and the air intakes, unlike the competitor, are not protected from foreign objects. However, it is believed that with a minimum load on the external hardpoints, the F-15 can be operated from unpaved runways with a strength of about 12-14 kgf / cm 2 . True, the cases of flights of "Needles" from the ground are unknown to the author.
Of interest is the assessment given to the F-15 by Russian pilots who got the opportunity to pilot the Eagle in America and at home.
Su-27 became the first Soviet fighter capable of carrying 10 air-to-air missiles
Here is the opinion of A.N. Kharchevsky: “The F-15 is a well-controlled machine with excellent visibility, which does not have spin restrictions. When you try to make it spin from various positions, the plane only moves its nose from side to side, not wanting to start spinning. During maneuvering, the "Eagle" reaches angles of attack up to 25 °, while maintaining controllability. The control of the aircraft is soft, the car obeys the rudders perfectly, the effort on the handle is much less than that of the Su-27. However, the aerodynamics of the F-15 is less perfect than that of the Sukhoi: it accelerates more slowly during maneuvering and slows down faster ... The stall on the F-15 begins a little earlier than on the Su-27. Its approach can be judged, in particular, by the increasing noise in the cockpit. The takeoff of the F-15 is slower than that of the Sukhoi (during a group takeoff of a four, consisting of two Su-27UBs and two F-15s, the Russian aircraft were forced to turn off the afterburner in order to withstand the formation, while the Americans took off at full afterburner ). Minimum speed F-15 - 210 km / h. This is significantly more than the Su-27 and MiG-29. However, the efficiency of the all-moving stabilizer "Needle" is maintained when running at speeds up to 100 km / h. The turning radius of the F-15 is greater than that of the Su-27. In general, according to Kharchevsky, the Eagle is inferior to the Su-27 and MiG-29 in terms of maneuverability. According to another pilot of the TsBPiPLS, the maneuvering capabilities of the Igla are most consistent with those of the MiG-23MLD aircraft.
According to the pilots of the Lipetsk center, the F100-PW-200 engines installed on the F-15C / D have worse throttle response compared to the AP-31F. Indirectly, this also manifested itself during flights to Langley: Mr. Karabasov, who was sitting in the front cockpit of the F-15D, drew attention to the fact that the American pilot was working the throttle too sharply.
In general, there were quite a lot of subjective moments in the perception of the American fighter by the Russians. The Igla cabin, which has a dark brown, almost black color of the dashboard and panels, with small, hard-to-read instrument indicators, even the delicate Kharchevsky called “terrible,” not to mention the more categorical Karabasov. The ejection seat seemed hard and uncomfortable. The lack of latches on the engine control knob also caused criticism. It seemed completely unexpected and inexplicable to the Russian pilots that there was no automatic belt tensioning system on the F-15 ejection seat (as, indeed, on other US Air Force fighters). While piloting, Karabasov brought his "Eagle" to a negative overload and watched how the American "surfaced" in the front cockpit (the poor fellow did not expect such a maneuver and did not tighten the waist belt that fixed the pilot in the seat).
However, attributing all this to the shortcomings of the F-15 is unlikely to be fair. Rather, these are features that Russian pilots are simply not used to. Americans perceive them absolutely naturally. So, small-format indicators were introduced on American fighters back in the 1950s. It can be assumed that the “Needle” hard seat also makes it possible to feel the aircraft better: after all, it is known that the pilot’s rear is the main organ for perceiving the spatial position of the aircraft. At the same time, the view from the cockpit of the American fighter, according to the Russians, turned out to be simply magnificent both forward and backward.
In publications devoted to the visit of Russians to the United States, there are statements with which it is difficult to agree at all. Thus, it was noted that the pre-flight preparation of the F-15 is longer than the Su-27, and requires more operations. This statement contradicts everything that is written in this book about the operational manufacturability of the aircraft in question. In any case, the time for replacing an engine on the F-15 is less, and the presence of the APU allows you to really save time when preparing for a flight. In addition, during maintenance of the Igla, the Armed Forces of Ukraine make it possible to work with less provision with airfield facilities.
As you can see, a modern aircraft is not only maneuverability and flight range. It is also important that the Su-27 significantly outperformed its American competitor in terms of armament. In particular, it can carry up to 10 missiles of the " air-air", While the F-15 - only 8. "Dry" is also equipped with a more powerful gun with a caliber of 30 mm versus 20 mm for the "Igla". In terms of the total mass of the combat load - 6 tons - the Su-27 also surpasses the F-15A, however, only by 9%. The presence of an optical-location station and a helmet-mounted target designation system (they are not on the Igla) allows the Su-27 pilot to use the available arsenal much more flexibly. The radar characteristics of both aircraft were generally comparable. As for other equipment, Sukhoi is equipped with a number of systems that are not on the F-15. This can be said, in particular, about the automated control system for the actions of a group of fighters and the system for mutual group electronic protection. All this is quite clearly reflected in the press, including the Western one.
The biography of the Su-27 is developing very peacefully, and the aircraft demonstrate their capabilities mainly during various air shows and exercises. In the photo: mirror aerobatics performed by a couple from the Russian Knights group. MAKS-2007, Zhukovsky, August 2007
At the same time, when it comes to the equipment of the Su-27, it is necessary to note (especially in the publications of the 1990s) the insufficient level of use of computer technology and the low level of integration of onboard systems. This puts the Sukhoi pilot in a worse position compared to his Western counterparts, in particular, in accurately understanding what is happening in and around the aircraft at any given time. In a difficult tactical situation, this inevitably leads to the loss of precious time and can negate the numerous advantages of this fighter. This is indeed a serious drawback, but it is typical only for the basic version of the Su-27, which remained in service only in the CIS countries, including Ukraine.
When creating subsequent versions of the aircraft, sent for export, the main emphasis was on improving the on-board equipment. This is how the Su-27SK, Su-27KI variants and the Su-30 family aircraft appeared. In a sense, the position that these machines occupy in relation to the original Su-27 is similar to that which the F-15C / D occupy in relation to the F-15A / B. Therefore, we will allow ourselves to continue the comparison of the heroes of this book, in terms of the characteristics of the Su-30 and F-15C/D. Certain food for this was given by the events of recent years in India, and in the first place - the joint US-Indian military exercises Sore lndia-2004, which took place from February 15 to 27, 2004 at the Indian Gwalior airbase.
In the Russian-language press, these exercises, in which the "Dry" directly opposed the "Needles", received a very powerful response. The general tone of the publications was not just victorious, but, one might say, capricious. Reason: "Dry" won about 75% of all training battles with American fighters. The Indian pilots acted extremely competently: often they did not turn on the radar at all, but used the OLS-30I optical-location station to detect the enemy, which allowed them to quietly approach the Americans at “the distance of an aimed shot from the onboard gun”. And in close combat, as we know, the F-15C had little chance. According to the Indian command, in this way the Americans were "shot down" at least 20 times. During the “battles”, another interesting discovery was made: Russian radars confidently detected the F-15C at a distance of up to 60 km, even against the backdrop of mountains, while the Eagles radar in such conditions could not distinguish the target due to multiple reflections from mountain ledges. It would seem that this is the answer to the question about comparing aircraft! But let's not succumb to mass hypnosis, no matter how pleasant it may be, but let's approach the assessment of these teachings in a more balanced way.
First, let's evaluate the composition of their participants. The India Cope 2004 involved MiG-27 strike aircraft, Mirage-2000, MiG-21 (modernized) and Su-30K fighters from the Indian side. A limited list of tasks was solved by several MiG-29s. From the American side, six F-15Cs, equipped with upgraded AN / APG-63 (V) 1 radars, from the 19th TS of the 3rd TFW located at Elmendorf, Alaska, one tanker and one transport C-5 participated Galaxy from the 60th TW. Such a composition of "opponents" from the very beginning caused deep disappointment on both sides. After all, the Americans flew to distant lands specifically to “feel” in a combat situation not so much the Su-30, but the Su-30MKI just purchased by India, which are still the most advanced of the entire Su-27/30 family. The Indians, on the other hand, cherished similar intentions in relation to the F-16C, which are also in service with neighboring Pakistan.
Secondly, "Cope India-2004" was a complex combat exercise, and not some kind of demonstrative duels in the air of aircraft of the American and Indian Air Forces. They provided for each side to simulate two types of operations: offensive and defensive. When the Indians advanced, the F-15Cs rose to intercept the Su-30Ks, which were covering the attack MiG-27s. When the Americans advanced, it was the other way around. That is, in achieving overall success, not only the individual flight characteristics of each aircraft played a role, but also the training of pilots and command personnel, and, of course, the perfection of the onboard equipment of combat vehicles. Since the overall score of the exercises turned out to be clearly in favor of the Sukhoi, there is no more reason to talk about their equipment as insufficiently perfect. At least starting with the Su-30 family.
The US is actively using the F-15 in various recent regional conflicts. In the photo: F-15E from the 492nd Expeditionary Fighter Squadron before the next sortie. Afghanistan, Bagram Air Base, June 9, 2007.
Thirdly, in order to more objectively approach the results of the exercises, let's try to understand at least a little the conditions for their conduct. It turns out that by mutual agreement of the parties, certain “restrictions” were introduced into the tactics of their actions. In particular, at the suggestion of the Indians, the air combat ceiling was limited to medium heights. The true essence of this, at first glance, innocent restriction is that it actually reduces the combat contact of the opposing forces to close maneuver combat. After all, if at high altitudes the launch range of an AMRAAM missile is more than 60 km (and at very high altitudes - more than 100 km), then at medium altitudes it decreases to 30-35 km. This, of course, leads to a decrease in the time of preemption of the enemy in the use of weapons. That is, the parties often simply do not have time to use ranged weapons and are forced to move to the near one. And here's another important thing: the importance of the aircraft's maneuverability in the transition from high to medium altitudes increases dramatically, and in combat at medium altitudes, an aircraft with higher maneuverability gains advantages, and its shortcomings in long-range missile combat are relegated, as it were, to the background - ideal conditions for "Dry"!
Another "limitation" was that the simulation of all air battles was carried out with the initial ratio of the number of Indian and American aircraft 3:1. Colonel G. Newback, who commanded the Americans, explained that "in each sortie, four F-15C fighters opposed 12 Indian Air Force fighters, usually Su-30K aircraft." That is, all the high-profile victories of the Indian "Dry" were achieved in the most favorable conditions for them and in the "three on one" scenario! This is the reason to treat the results of Cope India 2004 with a little more restraint. And we will evaluate the Su-30K as follows: a normal competitive fighter, having both its own strengths and weak sides. Its success in a real battle will depend on how well the tactics of application are chosen.
The question is, why did the Americans put themselves in such unfavorable conditions? After all, they perfectly understood what they were doing, agreeing with the proposals of the Indians. The only logical explanation for this phenomenon is the following: in those exercises, the Yankees did not need a victory at all, they planned their defeat in advance. Later, they used this fact to form a strong opinion in the US authorities about the lag of American fighters in service with the latest models of Russian combat aircraft. Thanks to this command, the US Air Force soon managed to “knock out” the necessary budgetary funds from the senators for the construction of fifth-generation F / A-22 fighters.
Be that as it may, the Cope India-2004 opened a series of exercises in which the Indian Sukhoi won confident victories not only over the F-15, but also over other modern fighters. So, in 2005, a two-week exercise was held with the participation of the Singapore Air Force F-16С. Training air battles between them and the Su-30MKI began with single duels of fighters, after which one aircraft from each side was introduced into the battle. As a result, up to 10 aircraft (5 vs 5) participated in the battles. According to media reports, the Indians won all 10 fights with the Singaporean pilots.
In June 2005, 18 Indian Su-30Ks flew to France at the Charles Monier airbase to take part in the Garuda II exercises. Accompanied by Il-76 transports and Il-78M tankers, Indian fighters reached France with an intermediate landing in Egypt. From the French side, 6 Mirage-2000S / R, 3 Mirage-2000-5, Mirage-200014, as well as a number of other aircraft took part in the exercises. From June 17 to June 28, in accordance with the developed tactical scenario, the Su-30 and Mirage-2000 carried out mutual "cleansing" of the airspace. Two to three missions per day were flown at medium altitudes in two training airspaces stretching from Marseille to Corsica. The tasks of air defense and refueling from tankers of both sides were also worked out. Mixed formations took part in close air battles, for example, two Mirages-2000S and two Su-30s against four Mirages-2000S and two Su-30s. The battles were carried out in visual visibility conditions with an imitation of the launch of short-range air-to-air missiles R-73 of Russian design and the French Mazhik-2. Some tasks included the defense of the AWACS aircraft and the control of the E-3S. In eight flight days, the Mirages completed 80 sorties, and the Sukhoi - 74. Despite the secrecy surrounding these exercises, it became known that the Su-30 made a great impression on the French pilots. One of the Mirage-2000 pilots said: “In close combat, the Mirage behaves more “nervously” than the Su-30. The decision to attack must be made in the first minute, because otherwise the Su-30, with its power and maneuverability, will definitely overwhelm you.”
From November 7 to 18, 2005, a new joint exercise of the Indian and US Air Forces "Cope India-2005" was held. From the American side, 12 F-16 fighters from the 13 TFS of the 35th TW, who flew over from Japan, took part in them. India was represented by 30 Su-30K and Mirage-2000 aircraft, as well as MiG-29s. This time, aviation actions were practiced in a full-scale military conflict, therefore, special training battles were not organized, and the fights took place as if by themselves during the performance of general exercises. In these operations, the mock enemy groups included both Indian and American fighters. In cases where Indian pilots fought F-16s, the latter, as a rule, lost. Journalists of the American newspaper Christian Science Monitor received this information from direct participants in the exercises.
In October 2006, the Indians conducted joint maneuvers with the British Air Force, during which the British pilots got the opportunity to pilot the Su-30. It is interesting that the British, first of all, drew attention to the high capabilities of the aircraft's on-board equipment, primarily the radar. There were even voices that the "board" of the Su-30 in a sense surpasses even the equipment of the latest Eurofighter Typhoon.
Of course, the exercises of 2005-2006. They are not directly related to the issue of comparing the Su-27/30 and F-15, but it is still worth mentioning them here. This firework of victories, about which the Western press spoke so loudly, served as an excellent advertisement for the Su fighters. Although the Su-27/30 family is already one of the best-selling in the world. However, the F-15 also does not graze the rear in this sense. If we summarize the information contained in the chapters on aircraft, we get the following picture. Until May 2007, 1625 copies of the Eagles of all variants were produced, of which 534 aircraft were exported and produced outside the States under license. Singapore is in a state of reflection, the order of which can be another two dozen cars. "Dry" until 1992 was released in the amount of about 900 copies: 800 Su-27 and 100 Su-27UB. In subsequent years, it was exported and sold licenses for the production of another 605 fighters. That is, in total, 1505 pieces are obtained. Plus, today they are studying the possibility of purchasing fighters of this family, including additional ones, Algeria, Venezuela, Vietnam, Libya and Malaysia. This is another 50 to 100 cars.
As you can see, in terms of the total number of copies produced, both heroes of this book are approximately equal to each other with an F-15 advantage of 9%, which is explained by the large volume of US domestic orders. However, if we consider the number of exported vehicles, then the advantage goes to Sukhoi and is approximately the same 9%. At the same time, the Su-27/30 family has prospects for obtaining new export contracts, while the Eagle has almost exhausted its export potential. Thus, another - economic - round of competition between American and Russian fighters ends in favor of the latter. I would like to emphasize that this is especially important for modern Russia, since it brings significant income. Their size can be judged by repeated statements Director General AHC "Dry" M.A. Pogosyan, who claims that during the period from 1996 to 2006, the total income from the export of these fighters and the sale of licenses for their production exceeded 15 billion USD.
Concluding the comparison of two outstanding aircraft of the late XX century, let's pay attention to one more important aspect. It is well known that an engineering product is the better, the more development potential it has. In other words, the more competitive products can be created on its basis. In this sense, the Su-27 not only left the brainchild of McDonnell Douglas far behind. On its basis, the following classes have been developed and are commercially produced. aircraft: air supremacy fighters, multifunctional tactical fighters, carrier-based fighters and attack aircraft, ground-based tactical and Euro-strategic attack vehicles, combat training aircraft - in total, not counting prototypes and experimental models, more than 15 options! This characterizes the Russian aircraft as an outstanding engineering product. The Igla has a similar list about two times shorter, and in terms of the depth of the changes made to the design, it is very far from the truly universal Su-27 family.
A further development of the Su-27 was the Su-34 front-line bomber, as well as the Su-33 carrier-based fighter and the Su-27KUB carrier-based combat training aircraft.
Finally, interesting information about the "Needle" appeared literally at the time of the delivery of this book to the press. On November 2, 2007, one of the F-15Cs of the Missouri Air National Guard broke up in the air during another training flight. As it turned out, at the moment of increasing overload, the longitudinal power elements of the fuselage collapsed in the area immediately behind the cockpit. Already on the 3rd, the Americans stopped the flights of all their Needles and began to inspect them technical condition. The latter revealed many cracks in the destruction of the fuselage structure on a large number of aircraft. Following the United States, Japan also landed its "Eagles". And while the Boeing specialists continue to develop a set of measures that would prevent the further development of the identified "disease", the Needles remain chained to the ground. Only a few F-15Es fly, doing combat work in Afghanistan and Iraq.
So, we have completed, and a rather versatile review of both fighters. It's time to move on to conclusions. It seems that after all that has been read, it is most logical to conclude that these aircraft belong to the same generation and have very close capabilities. In the case of their combat use, especially against each other, a lot will depend on the qualifications of the pilots, the tactics of actions and the effectiveness of all the necessary types of support. At the same time, the "Dry" has clearly expressed strengths - close combat, flight range, weapons and individual elements of on-board equipment. And, of course, the huge potential for modernization, which has not yet been exhausted - 30 years after the first takeoff. The last representatives of the family will remain competitive for a long time - at least 20 years, as evidenced by reports of new contracts for their sale and licensed production. And the Eagle is already gone, for whatever reason. Either the Americans have completely exhausted the possibilities inherent in the design, or they deliberately put an end to it so as not to block the way for the Raptor. In any case, in the historical confrontation between the two fourth-generation super fighters, the last word was left to Sukhoi.
A pair of Su-27s from the 4th Center for Combat Training and Retraining of Russian Air Force Pilots. Lipetsk, June 2006
Su-27 from the 831st Galatsky IAP of the Ukrainian Air Force during a flight to the British air base Fairford to participate in an international air show. August 1997
Landing Su-27UB from the 62nd IAP of the Ukrainian Air Force. Belbek airfield (Crimea), spring 2000. Later, this aircraft was based at the Ozernoye airfield near Zhitomir and crashed at the Lvov Sknilov airfield on July 27, 2002
1 Without fuel, ammunition and external pylons.
2 In shock version.
3 With conformal fuel tanks.
4 After upgrading under the MSIP program: + 9.0/-3.
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