When talking about the rivalry between the Su-27 and F-15, people often recall the results of various air battles between Sukhoi and Efok. And if adequate modeling (in sufficient degree of approximation to real combat) long-range air combat (CAC) is very difficult... close-in air combat (CAC) makes it possible to evaluate the potential of aircraft in a “dog dump”.
One of these episodes was a training air battle (modestly nicknamed by partners “joint maneuvering”) between pilots of the Lipetsk Air Force Combat Use and Retraining Center and pilots of the 1st Fighter Wing of the US Air Force during our visit to Langley Air Force Base in 1992.
America showed the plane to Russia
Magazine “Wings of the Motherland” No. 6, 1993
Recently, Langley Air Force Base (Virginia), where the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing of the US Air Force is based, received a friendly visit from military personnel from the Lipetsk Center for Combat Weapons and Air Force Transition. They flew to the eastern coast of the United States along the northern route, through Chukotka and Alaska, on two combat training two-seat fighters Sy-27UB and a military transport Il-76. This was the first visit of this kind: previously only top-class testers were sent to America in specially prepared vehicles. This time, the “combatants” Colonel A. Kharchevsky and Major E. Karabasov arrived (the delegation was headed by the head of the Lipetsk Center, Major General of Aviation N. Chaga), on serial (albeit thoroughly washed) fighters.
The fighter pilots could not deny themselves the pleasure of a little “fight”. Major E. Karabasov was the first to “challenge”. He proposed holding a demonstration air battle between the Cy-27 and the F-15 directly above Langley Airfield, with a wide participation of spectators. However, cautious Americans rejected this proposal. A message appeared in the local press: they say, we must maintain our commitment to peace. However, soon the Americans themselves volunteered to conduct “joint maneuvering” in the flight zone.
Three fighters flew into the zone, located in the ocean at a distance of 200 km from the eastern coast of the United States: Sy-27UB (in the front cockpit - E. Karabasov, in the rear - an American pilot), F-15D with an American pilot in the front cockpit and a Russian military - an air attaché who acted as a translator - in the back, as well as an F-15C escort aircraft. The range of permitted piloting altitudes was 2500-8500 m (civil air routes passed above and below).
According to the plan for joint maneuvering, the Sy-27 was initially supposed to stay on the tail of the F-15, and later it was planned to swap the planes.
On the command to begin joint maneuvering, the Eagle, turning on full afterburner, immediately tried to break away from the Sy-27, however, according to Karabasov, this task turned out to be impossible for the F-15D: using only the minimum afterburner mode or maximum (non-afterburning) thrust, Our fighter hung without much difficulty on the tail of the “American,” whose engines were constantly operating at maximum afterburner, while the angle of attack of the Sy-27 never exceeded 18 degrees.
After the planes swapped places, Karabasov switched the throttle to full afterburner and began to move away from the F-15D in an energetic turn with a climb. The Eagle followed, however, having turned 180 degrees, the Sy-27 pilot discovered to his surprise that he was already flying almost towards the F-15. Having completed one and a half full turns, the Sy-27 went to the tail of the F-15 and “caught” it in its sights. But Karabasov immediately discovered that he had “shot down” not an F-15D, but an F-15C flying from behind. Seeing his mistake, he left the single-seat Eagle alone and started working on the one, which by that time had lost sight of the Sy-27 and asked the observer: “Where is the Flanker?” “He’s behind you,” the wingman replied.
In fact, the Sy-27 took a position behind the F-15D, keeping it in sight and remaining invisible to the American pilots from the first vehicle. After this, the F-15D again tried to break away from the Cy-27, but, despite all efforts, nothing worked. At this point, the “air battle” ended (previously, Karabasov had to repeatedly conduct training air battles with MiG-29 aircraft, which, according to him, were much more difficult to cope with than with the F-15).
A similar “joint maneuver”, which ended with the same result, was carried out by Colonel Kharchsvsky with the F-15D.
Afterwards, the Americans, answering a correspondent’s question about which fighter turned out to be the best, answered with some embarrassment: the planes are approximately equal. However, in private conversations with Lipsk residents, they recognized the unconditional superiority of the Sy-27 (in general, our pilots noted some constraint in judgment shown by the owners, which is somewhat dissonant with the image we have of Americans as people free from the “secrecy complex” that is attributed to us) .
At Langley, ours were given the opportunity to fly the F-15D. In their opinion, the Eagle is a well-handled vehicle with excellent visibility. It practically does not fall into a tailspin (Igl has no restrictions on spinning). Karabasov tried several times to make the F-15D spin from different positions, however, it only moved its nose from side to side, not wanting to start spinning. Obviously, when creating the Igla, the Mavdonnell-Douglas company took into account the sad experience of its predecessor, the F-4 Phantom-2 fighter, which practically did not recover from a spin (although it was difficult to get into it), which caused the death of many dozens of crews . During maneuvering, the aircraft reached angles of attack of up to 30 units (which corresponds to 25 degrees).
The maximum operational overload at subsonic speed of the F-15D is limited to 9. The control of the aircraft, according to the Lipetsk pilots, is “soft”, the machine is perfectly controlled by the steering wheels, and the forces on the handle are much less than that of the Sy-27. However, the aerodynamics of the F-15 are less perfect. It accelerates more slowly when maneuvering and brakes faster; At the same time, the direct acceleration characteristics of the F-15D are not inferior to the Cy-27UB.
The stall on the F-15 begins a little earlier than on the Cy-27. Its approach can be judged, in particular, by the increasing noise in the cabin.
The F-15 takes off somewhat slower than the Sy-27 (during the takeoff of the four, consisting of two Sy-27s and two F-15s, our aircraft, in order to maintain formation, were forced to remove the afterburner, while the Americans accelerated at full speed).
The minimum speed of the F-15 is 210 km/h. This is significantly more than the Cy-27 and MiG-29. However, the effectiveness of the all-rotating stabilizer is maintained when driving at speeds of up to 100 km/h.
The turning radius of the F-15 is greater than that of the Cy-27. In general, according to Kharchevsky, the Eagle is inferior to the Sy-27 in terms of maneuverability characteristics and is closer to the MiG-29. At the same time, according to another pilot who tried the F-15D during the return visit of the Americans to Lipetsk in September 1992, the maneuvering capabilities of the Eagle are more consistent with the capabilities of the MiG-23MLD (this may seem somewhat unexpected to readers accustomed to critical estimates "twenty-third").
The Pratt-Whitney F100-PW-200 engines, upgraded to the F-15D, have worse throttle response compared to the AL-31F turbofan engines (this was indirectly manifested during the piloting of the Sy-27UB by the American pilot: sitting in the front cockpit of the "spark" Karaba Sov noted, that the American is working too harshly, obviously out of habit, as a steering wheel). The F-15 engine control lever does not have locking devices, which our pilots found not entirely convenient.
They also did not like the cockpit of the American fighter; the dark brown, almost black coloring of the instrument panels and small-sized instrument indicators are clearly inferior to the gray-painted cockpit of the Sy-27 with its huge, by Western standards, “alarm clocks.” pov (even Kharchsvsky, unlike the more harsh Karabasov, very delicate in his judgments, called the American cockpit “terrible”).
The seat of the McDonnell-Dugpass ACES-11 ejection seat seemed hard and uncomfortable (however, it can be assumed that the hard seat of a fighter has the advantage that it facilitates the process of “feeling” your aircraft, because it is known that one of the main organs of perception of the spatial position of an aircraft is the best place for a pilot). But what was completely unexpected was the absence of a winch for pulling the belt (during piloting, Karabasov put the F-15D into negative overload and watched as the American “hung” in the front cockpit, not expecting this and not tightening the waist belt in a timely manner). However, the visibility turned out to be excellent both forward and backward (the small headrest of the ejection seat practically did not interfere with it). Pre-launch preparation of the F-15 is longer than that of the Cy-27 and requires a significantly larger number of operations.
The F-15 is inferior to the domestic fighter in terms of practical range. Almost all flights (including aerobatic flights) are carried out by Iglas with a ventral drop-in fuel tank (the practical flight range of American fighters, contrary to our prevailing opinion, is not so long and amounts to a little more than 2000 km without PTB; the required ferry range is achieved in due to the use of external tanks, the total volume of fuel in which is almost equal to the volume of internal tanks).
During our return home, our vehicles were accompanied by F-15s. Their crews showed great concern because of the headwind on the route, although they were carrying three anti-tank tanks. Which, however, almost ended tragically: the Sy-27 in Langley was filled with American fuel with a specific density lower than that used by us. At an altitude of 13 km, where they “climbed” at the insistence of the Americans, who were afraid of the oncoming air flow that would “eat up” the range, cavitation arose, which led to the shutdown of all four Cy-27 engines. The planes began to “crumble” down, attempts to launch the turbofan engines turned out to be fruitless and the possibility of ejecting was already being considered. However, at an altitude of about 3 km, the engines started working.
It is worth adding that the pilots of the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing, who worked against ours, are not ordinary combatant “pants”, they are the American fighter elite, traditionally having high flying qualifications and excellent tactical training.
So the reference to the fact that two Soviet aces smashed ordinary American pilots will not work. No - the Americans were aces too.
Some comrades say that the article is nonsense, and Kharchevsky is a liar; they really don’t believe in this episode, citing various signs and graphs...
Well, the most advanced ones cite the American version of events that appeared 10 years later:
F-15 vs Su-27? (F-15 vs. Su-27?)
Tom Murphy
Twice in the last month there has been a discussion on the site about how Sushki dined on Iglami in the summer of 1992.
I was very surprised, first of all because I had never heard of this before. I flew Eagles with the 94th Fighter Squadron at Langley, the one that visited Russia and then hosted the Russian return visit to the US.
With my impeccable ability to miss important events, I, as always, managed to leave the squadron just before all this happened. But I personally knew and flew with 90% of the pilots who were then part of the squadron and with all 100% of the pilots participating in these mutual visits.
Somehow, in the 10 years that have passed, they have never mentioned in our many conversations on this very issue that any mock combat took place. I don't think it could have happened (I mean they would never mention it.). (DACT - Dissimilar Air Combat Training. That is, exercises with foreign equipment)
In addition, I still fly in the Air Force Reserve as an F-15 instructor at Langley, which means I am up to date with all the latest F-15 programs and how it performs.
Of course, there must have been some data (classified or unclassified) of such an outstanding event and conclusions drawn if the Needles were so badly beaten. But there are none. Absolutely. Dot. After reading the last thread, I decided to check it out.
Instead of relying on rumors, I spoke with three airmen I served with at Langley. These pilots flew in the backseat in Sushki, gave the Russians rides in Igla, flew with Sushki and are still flying the F-15.
I gave them the “story” from Air Force’s Monthly magazine, as it was quoted, and after their hysterical laughter stopped, they told me the following: the number of air battles between Igly and Sushki in the summer of 1992 was absolutely zero, there simply weren’t any. was in nature. Practice battles between them were not only seen as undesirable and not encouraged, but were absolutely prohibited. No one wanted the political problems that could arise if either car lost control and crashed, or worse, a collision occurred in air during intensive maneuvering, which a training battle involves. Secondly, despite the warm feelings that we Lately felt towards the Russians, no one would allow any secret information to become known to them, so the F-15s flew with their radar, electronic warfare and other equipment turned off. When all your weapon systems are disabled, mock combat becomes pointless unless you want to recreate combat from World Wars I and II or Korean War, fighting only with guns. But in this case, better give me an A-10, which can turn around on the spot and has a big gun.
What actually happened (and what probably became the basis of this dramatic story) is that in addition to flying in the backseat, the F-15 and Su-27 flew together (while being in a line, one or two miles apart and at a distance 2000 to 3000 vertical feet). During 90-degree turns, one aircraft turns and flies 3,000 to 4,000 feet from the other, at its 6 o'clock position, at which point the second aircraft begins its turn to stay in line with the first, making a 90-degree turn.
During one of these turns, Sushka, instead of continuing the maneuver expected of her, lingered at 6 o'clock on her Eagle (behind him), at a distance of 3000 feet. After several seconds of wondering what the Sushka pilot was doing, the F-15 pilot tried for 20 seconds to shake Sushka off his tail, but to no avail. What does this prove? Basically, nothing.
Among fighters, no one starts a fight starting directly behind the enemy 3,000 feet, because the difficulty level is equivalent to clubbing baby seals. Instead, the attacker moves to the 4 or 8 o'clock position at 3,000 feet before combat begins. But even then, in this more complex situation, the attacker remains in his offensive position 95% of the time (presumably meaning 95% of the time).
And those 5% when he loses his position from behind are the result of gross mistakes he himself made when maneuvering. It should also be emphasized that this was an isolated incident, unplanned, unexpected and done without much desire, and not at all a series of training battles.
As Paul Harvey says, "this is another part of the story" directly from those involved, rather than from a magazine article second, third or fourth hand, or an internet rumor repeating what someone else wrote.
In the future, if you want to argue about the qualities of these two aircraft, please spare us from repeating this non-event (which did not happen) as evidence, and compare them based on published data on their performance characteristics and weapons systems.
Proof in EnglishWhom to believe in this situation is up to you.
I think everyone knows how brazenly and shamelessly the representatives of the United States lie.
I believe more in Alexander Kharchevsky - an authoritative pilot even then... Well, and later in general - Major General, Honored Pilot of the Russian Federation, head of the 4th Center for Combat Use and Retraining of Flight Personnel and commander of the Falcons of Russia aerobatic team.
And we will return to “plates and graphs” later... In order to find out how crafty they can be.
P.S.
In connection with this “joint maneuvering” of 1992, it is worth mentioning another episode that characterizes the Americans well. Laconically and streamlinedly described in the last paragraph of the first article.
I have long wanted to know in detail about the little-known story that happened to Kharchevsky and his wingman in 1992 in the USA. And I couldn't stand it: Comrade General, tell me... He thought about it. The nodules on the cheekbones were slightly visible. He looked expressively. -...You can write anything you want, even lie beautifully to connect words. But I don’t want to tell it on camera. Alexander Nikolaevich stood up and, walking around the table, from somewhere behind our backs he suddenly took out a square bottle and three crystal shot glasses. From behind the bottle glass, the motionless eye of some strange snake stared at us, magnified by the refraction of the liquid. Vietnamese?.. – experience of service in Far East didn't let me seem like a complete ignoramus. My younger colleague smiled modestly. I, according to a long-established habit, briefly reported, naming the garrison and type of activity. From ours, that is,” Nikolaevich summed up with a slight smile, quickly pouring us a full glass with precise movements and splashing it into his glass to the very bottom. Although during the entire conversation I didn’t take a sip. We listened to his story, drinking vodka with an unusual Asian flavor, and snacking on sweets and cookies. ...Together with the then Major Karabasov, his wingman, and a group of superiors, they flew to America on a pair of Su-27UB combat training fighters. Now it is not only specialists who know how that business trip went in general. Upon arrival, on approach to the base, the Americans held our planes for 1 hour 10 minutes. in the holding area over the ocean until the amount of fuel on the dryers became close to the emergency balance, in order to prevent the guests from demonstrating their complex aerobatics over the airbase, in front of the American public. At that time, the Americans themselves demonstrated a demonstration battle in the airspace. It seems like a small thing, but such little things say a lot in public and, moreover, in international relations. Especially for pilots who, by definition, have not average abilities. It’s probably not worth telling everyone in detail the well-known fact that then our pilots, while jointly conducting several air demonstration battles, completely tore apart the best overseas aces. The superiority of domestic technology and the flying skills of our couple was so impressive that the American “eagles” stopped smiling and shaking hands when they met on the ground. All they could do was grind their teeth in impotent rage, wiping away their powder. At the end of the trip it almost turned into a tragedy. This is what I asked the general to talk about in detail. During the flight from Langley to the main flight airbase, the power plants simultaneously turned off on both “dryers”, controlled by Kharchevsky and his wingman Georgy Karabasov. As it turned out later, the Americans simply filled our cars with low-quality fuel. Although, when analyzing the incident, they blamed everything on the inattention of the personnel and the difference in fuel density. After the wingman’s emergency report and the immediate shutdown of his engines, Kharchevsky conveyed to the F-15 pilots accompanying them: “Don’t leave us! If we cannot start the engines, inform the rescuers where we will eject.” The best aces of the United States, who the day before had lost all air battles to our pilots, only laughed maliciously into the air and, stepping on the gas, flew away. I wanted to lie, but I couldn’t... Altitude - 14,000 meters. All four engines on both cars stopped. Below is the American desert. For a hundred kilometers around there was not a living soul. All electricity consumers, except the radio station, are turned off so as not to discharge the batteries. The planes glide in complete silence, falling towards the ground, only the hiss of oxygen in the mask can be heard. Seconds quickly pass, speed and altitude drop. And then Kharchevsky, having considered the deadlock situation, decides to take a risk. Gives the command to the wingman: “Zhora, we’re going into a dive, let’s try to launch. Do as I do!". Two sky-colored heavy fighters freely fall to the ground, resembling aerial bombs. Stalled turbines reluctantly pick up speed from the oncoming flow of increasingly dense surface air, pumping rotten American fuel from the fuel lines into the combustion chamber. The height decreases quickly and inevitably. And if it doesn't work out... There is no time to think about this. The rapid descent causes their ears to become blocked; the pilots, with their mouths open, try to equalize the intracranial pressure by shouting and taking deep breaths. Otherwise your eardrums will burst to hell! They don’t hear each other - what the hell kind of negotiations are there?!.. And suddenly, the wingman shouts into the air: “The right one has started! I’m leveling!” One of its engines started working at three and a half thousand, as they reported later. In fact, there were only two thousand, no more. The turbine howled, shaking the entire machine, vomiting some indigestible mold produced by his fierce friends, and the colonel pulled the control stick towards himself, losing his sight from the overload that had piled up... According to the report, he came out at two thousand. Really, I almost scooped up a couple of cacti with the air intakes. You shouldn’t scare your superiors, they are unlikely to appreciate it. Unless he later reported to his immediate superior, unofficially. It's amazing that we got through. They walked, or rather hobbled, to the base, each on the same engine. There was no guarantee that such madness could be repeated successfully. The devil knows what kind of moonshine is in the tanks! Slowly we gained a safe altitude, caught up with the Americans who were already slowly descending, and sat down after them at the base, without any hysteria. “Well, Russian Birds (Russian birds),” the US “eagles” accompanying them in flight said, approaching with an impudent grin, already in the parking lot, off the air, “have you had a hard time?” Okay, be glad you’re alive.” And one added, lowering his voice: “Did you piss yourself? Next time it will be worse!”... ...Alexander Nikolaevich pushed away the untouched glass and looked out the wide window at the sky. Outside, the brakes of an approaching command vehicle creaked. These are our overseas “friends”...
From an interview with A. Kharchevsky when he was a general:
- Iron. Agreed.
Kharchevsky quickly and intently looked across the table at me and looked into my eyes.
- Where did you serve?..
And Kharchevsky is still rushing towards the now so hated desert sand, furiously looking at the engine operation sensors.
Not made with fingers after all!..
Su-27 (according to NATO codification: Flanker, Flanke - English Strike to the flank) is a Soviet/Russian multi-role highly maneuverable all-weather fighter developed by the Sukhoi Design Bureau and designed to gain air superiority. The main designers of the Su-27 at different times were Naum Semenovich Chernyakov, Mikhail Petrovich Simonov, A. A. Kolchin and A. I. Knyshev.
The first flight of the prototype took place in 1977, and in 1984 the aircraft began to arrive in aviation units. Currently, it is one of the main aircraft of the Russian Air Force; its modifications are in service in the CIS countries, India, China and other countries.
A large number of modifications have been developed on the basis of the Su-27: the combat training Su-27UB, the carrier-based fighter Su-33 and its combat training modification Su-33UB, multi-role fighters Su-30, Su-35, front-line bomber Su-34 and others.
History of creation
Start of development
In the late 1960s, a number of countries began developing promising fourth-generation fighters.
The United States was the first to begin solving this problem, where back in 1965 the question of creating a successor to the F-4C Phantom tactical fighter was raised. In March 1966, the FX (Fighter Experimental) program was launched.
Design of the aircraft according to specified requirements began in 1969, when the aircraft received the designation F-15 Eagle. The winner of the competition to work on the project, McDonnell Douglas, was awarded a contract on December 23, 1969 to build prototype aircraft, and in 1974 the first production fighters F-15A Eagle and F-15B appeared.
As an adequate response, the USSR launched its own development program for a promising fourth-generation fighter, which was launched by the Sukhoi Design Bureau in 1969. It was taken into account that the main purpose of the aircraft being created would be the fight for air superiority. Air combat tactics included close combat
Prototypes
T-10
In 1975-1976, it became clear that the initial layout of the aircraft had significant shortcomings. However, a prototype of the aircraft (named T-10-1) was created and took off on May 20, 1977 (pilot - Honored Test Pilot Hero of the Soviet Union Vladimir Ilyushin).
In one of the flights, the T-10-2, piloted by Evgeniy Solovyov, fell into an unexplored area of resonant modes and collapsed in the air. The pilot died.
At this time, data began to arrive about the American F-15. Suddenly it turned out that the machine did not respond to a number of parameters technical specifications and is significantly inferior to the F-15. For example, developers of electronic equipment did not meet the weight and size limits allotted to them. It was also not possible to achieve the specified fuel consumption. The developers faced a difficult dilemma - either bring the car to mass production and hand it over to the customer in existing form, or undertake a radical redesign of the entire machine. It was decided to start creating the aircraft practically from scratch, without releasing a car that was lagging behind its main competitor in its characteristics.
IN as soon as possible a new machine was developed, the design of which took into account the experience of developing the T-10 and the experimental data obtained. And already on April 20, 1981, the experimental T-10-17 aircraft (another designation T-10S-1, that is, the first production one), piloted by V. S. Ilyushin, took to the skies. The machine has been significantly modified, almost all components were created from scratch.
The data obtained during testing showed that a truly unique aircraft had been created, which in many respects had no analogues in the world. Although this was not without disasters: in one of the critical flights, Alexander Komarov died due to the destruction of the airframe. Some time later, under the same regime, N. Sadovnikov found himself in a similar situation. Only thanks to the great skill of the test pilot, later Hero of the Soviet Union, world record holder, the flight ended safely. N. F. Sadovnikov landed a damaged plane at the airfield - without most of the wing console, with a chopped off keel - and thereby provided invaluable material to the developers of the aircraft. Measures were urgently taken to modify the aircraft: the structure of the wing and airframe as a whole was strengthened, and the area of the slat was reduced.
Subsequently, the aircraft underwent numerous modifications, including during mass production.
Adoption
The first production Su-27s began to enter service with the troops in 1984. The Su-27 was officially adopted by government decree of August 23, 1990, when all the main deficiencies identified in the tests were eliminated. By this time, the Su-27 had been in operation for more than 5 years. When adopted by the Air Force, the aircraft received the designation Su-27S (serial), and in air defense aviation - Su-27P (interceptor).
Design
Glider
Su-27 is made according to normal aerodynamic design and has an integral layout: its wing smoothly mates with the fuselage, forming a single load-bearing body. The wing sweep along the leading edge is 42°. To improve the aerodynamic characteristics of the aircraft at high angles of attack, it is equipped with highly swept root nozzles and automatically deflected noses. The swells also help to increase the lift-to-drag ratio when flying at supersonic speeds. Also on the wing are flaperons, which simultaneously perform the functions of flaps in takeoff and landing modes and ailerons. The horizontal tail consists of an all-moving stabilizer, which, with symmetrical deflection of the consoles, acts as an elevator, and with differential deflection, it serves for roll control. The vertical tail is two-finned.
To reduce the overall weight of the structure, titanium is widely used (about 30%).
Many modifications of the Su-27 (Su-30, Su-33, Su-34, Su-35, etc.) have a front horizontal tail. The Su-33, a variant of the sea-based Su-27, also has folding wing and stabilizer consoles to reduce its size, and is also equipped with a brake hook.
Su-27 is the first Soviet production aircraft with a fly-by-wire control system (EDCS) in the longitudinal channel. Compared to the booster irreversible control system used on its predecessors, the EDSU has greater speed, accuracy and allows the use of much more complex and effective control algorithms. The need for its use is due to the fact that in order to improve the maneuverability of the Su-27, it was made statically unstable at subsonic speeds.
Power point
The basic Su-27 is equipped with a pair of widely spaced AL-31F turbojet engines with afterburners located in engine nacelles under the rear fuselage. The engines developed by the Saturn design bureau are characterized by low fuel consumption both in afterburner and in minimum thrust mode. The engine weight is 1520 kg. The engines have a four-stage low-pressure compressor, a nine-stage high-pressure compressor and single-stage cooled high and low pressure turbines with an afterburner. The separation of the engines was dictated by the need to reduce mutual interference, create a wide internal tunnel for the lower weapon mount and simplify the air intake system; Between the engines there is a beam with a brake parachute container. The air intakes are equipped with mesh screens that remain closed until the nose wheel leaves the ground during takeoff. Concentric afterburner nozzles are cooled air flow, passing between two rows of “petals”. On some modifications of the Su-27, it was planned to install a rear-view radar in the tail boom (in this case, the braking parachute was transferred under the aircraft body).
The modernized Su-27SM2 fighters are equipped with more powerful and economical AL-31F-M1 engines equipped with thrust vector control. The engine thrust was increased relative to the base AL-31F engine by 1000 kgf, fuel consumption was reduced from 0.75 to 0.68 kg/kgf*h, and an increase in compressor diameter to 924 mm made it possible to increase air consumption to 118 kg/s . AL-31FP (on some modifications of the Su-30) and more advanced “Izdeliye 117S” (on the Su-35S), equipped with a rotating nozzle with a thrust vector deflected by ±15°, which significantly increases the maneuverability of the aircraft.
Other modifications of the fighter are also equipped with upgraded engines with thrust vector control AL-31F-M1, AL-31FP and Izdeliye 117S. They are equipped with deeply modernized Su-27SM2, Su-30 and Su-35S aircraft, respectively. The engines significantly increase maneuverability and, above all, allow the aircraft to be controlled at near-zero speeds and reach high angles of attack. The engine nozzles deviate by ±15°, which allows you to freely change the flight direction along both the vertical and horizontal axis.
The large volume of fuel tanks (about 12,000 l) ensures a flight range of up to 3,680 km and a combat radius of up to 1,500 km. The placement of external fuel tanks on base models is not provided.
Onboard equipment and systems
The aircraft's onboard equipment is conventionally divided into 4 independent, functionally related complexes - the SUV weapons control system, the PNK flight and navigation complex, the KS communications complex and the BKO onboard defense complex.
Optical search and aiming system
As part of the weapons complex of the base Su-27, the OEPS-27 electro-optical system includes a laser range finder (effective range up to 8 km) and an infrared search and targeting system (IRST) (effective range 50-70 km). These systems use the same optics as mirror periscopes, coupled with a coordinating glass ball sensor that moves in elevation (10° when scanning, 15° when aiming) and azimuth (60° and 120°), allowing the sensors to remain "directed". The big advantage of the OEPS-27 is the ability to openly target a target.
Integrated thrust vectoring and flight control system
AL-31FP engine nozzle control is integrated into the flight control system (FCS) and software. The nozzles are controlled through digital computers, which are part of the entire UPC as a whole. Since the movement of the nozzles is fully automated, the pilot is not busy controlling individual thrust vectors, which allows him to fully concentrate on controlling the aircraft. The SKP system itself reacts to any action of the pilot, who works, as usual, with the stick and pedals. During the existence of the Su-27, the SKP system has undergone significant changes. The original SDU-10 (radio-controlled system remote control), which was installed on early Su-27s, had restrictions on the angle of attack, and was distinguished by vibration of the thrust vector control handle. Modern Su-27s are equipped with a digital control system, in which the traction control functions are duplicated four times, and the yaw control functions are duplicated three times.
Cabin
The cabin has a two-section canopy, consisting of a fixed visor and a resettable part that opens up and back. The pilot's workplace is equipped with a K-36DM- ejection seat. In the base model SU-27, the cockpit was equipped with the usual set of analog dials and a small radar display (the latter was removed from the Russian Knights group). Later models are equipped with modern multifunctional liquid crystal displays with control panels and an indicator displaying navigation and targeting information against the background of the windshield. The steering lever has autopilot control buttons on the front side, trim and target joysticks, a weapon selection switch and a shooting button on the back side.
Weapons and equipment
The N001 airborne radar is equipped with a Cassegrain antenna with a diameter of 1076 mm and is capable of detecting light fighter class air targets at a distance of 60-80 km in the front hemisphere and 30-40 km in the rear hemisphere. The radar can simultaneously track up to 10 targets in the SNP (passage tracking) mode and control the guidance of two missiles at one target. In addition, there is a quantum optical location station (KOLS) with a 36Sh laser rangefinder, which tracks targets in simple weather conditions with great accuracy. OLS allows you to target a target at short distances without emitting radio signals or unmasking the fighter. Information from the on-board radar and from the OLS is displayed on the line-of-sight indicator (LOS) and the HUD frame (indication on the windshield).
The missile armament is located on the APU (aircraft launching device) and AKU (aircraft ejection device), suspended at 10 points: 6 under the wings, 2 under the engines and 2 under the fuselage between the engines. The main armament is up to six R-27 air-to-air missiles, with radar (R-27R, R-27ER) and two with thermal (R-27T, R-27ET) guidance. And also up to 6 highly maneuverable close-in missiles R-73 equipped with TGSN with combined aerodynamic and gas-dynamic control.
Comparison with other fighters
The comparative combat capabilities of the F-15 and Su-27 can be judged by the results of the visit to the United States to Langley Air Force Base in August 1992 by pilots from the Lipetsk Combat Operations Center and retraining of Air Force flight personnel and the return visit of American pilots to Lipetsk in September of the same year, as well as Savasleika airbase in 1996. “Joint maneuvers” of the F-15D and Su-27UB aircraft were organized (according to Russian pilots, the F-15 is inferior in maneuverability at subsonic speeds not only to the Su-27, but also to the MiG-29). , which, however, says little about the superiority of any of the vehicles, since close combat is now extremely rare and combat with the use of missiles and the advantage in detecting the enemy at long distances are becoming more important.
During joint US-Indian exercises in February 2003, several training air battles took place. Russian and French aircraft of the Su, MiG and Mirage families took part in the exercises from the Indian side.
During maneuvers in three of the four training air battles, Indian pilots flying the Su-30MKI (Su-30 modernized commercial Indian) managed to “defeat” the Americans.
Concerned about the growing number of sales of Russian Su-27 and Su-30 fighters around the world, the US military command acquired two Su-27 fighters from Ukraine Russian production. They will test the effectiveness of new American radars and electronic jamming systems.
Combat use
- On March 19, 1993, during the Abkhaz War, a Russian Air Force Su-27 took off from Gudauta airfield to intercept two air targets (presumably a pair of Georgian Air Force Su-25s), but the targets were not detected. While turning around to return, he was allegedly shot down by an anti-aircraft missile in the area of the village. Shroma, Sukhumi district. Pilot Shipko Vatslav Aleksandrovich died.
- In 1999-2000, several Su-27s took part in the Ethiopian-Eritrean war as part of the Ethiopian Air Force. In air battles, they shot down 3 Eritrean MiG-29s (another MiG may have been written off due to damage) without suffering losses.
- During the war in South Ossetia, the Su-27, together with the MiG-29, controlled the airspace over South Ossetia. There may have been several attempts to intercept Georgian attack aircraft. The results of these flights are not known with certainty. Perhaps in one of them, on August 10, 2008, a Georgian attack aircraft was shot down.
Exploitation
Countries using Su-27 and Su-30
In total, about 600 aircraft were produced.
In service:
Russia - up to 350 aircraft
China - 46 aircraft (purchased before 1996), in 1998 an agreement was signed to assemble 200 fighters under the J-11 brand. As of 2008, a total of 276 Su-27, Su-30 and J-11.
Ukraine - 27 aircraft as of 2010.
Kazakhstan - 25 aircraft for 2010.
Uzbekistan - 25 aircraft for 2010.
Belarus - 23 for 2010.
Angola - 14 aircraft in 2010.
Vietnam - 12 aircraft, delivery of 24 more is expected.
Ethiopia - 11 Su-27 as of 2010.
Armenia - 10 aircraft.
Eritrea - 10 aircraft as of 2010.
Indonesia - 2 Su-27SK, 3 Su-27SKM ordered (to be delivered in 2009).
USA - 2 aircraft, used for research purposes.
| LTH: |
| Modification | Su-27 |
| Wing length, m | 14,70 |
| Aircraft length, m | 21,935 |
| Aircraft height, m | 5,932 |
| Wing area, m2 | 62.037 |
| Wing sweep angle, degrees | 42 |
| Weight, kg | |
| empty plane | 16300 |
| normal takeoff | 22500 |
| maximum takeoff | 30000 |
| Fuel mass, kg | |
| normal | 5270 |
| maximum | 9400 |
| engine's type | 2 AL-31F turbofan engines. |
| Maximum thrust, kN | |
| afterburner | 2 x 74.53 |
| afterburner | 2 x 122.58 |
| Maximum speed, km/h: | |
| near the ground | 1380 |
| at high altitude | 2500 (M=2.35). |
| Maximum rate of climb, m/min | 18000 |
| Practical ceiling, m | 18500 |
| Dynamic ceiling, M | 24000 |
| Practical range, km | |
| on high | 3680 |
| near the ground | 1370 |
| Maximum turning speed, deg/s | |
| steady | 17 |
| unsteady | 23 |
| Run length, m | 450 |
| Run length, m | |
| without a drogue parachute | 620 |
| with drogue parachute | 700 |
| Max. operational overload | 9. |
| Weapons: | 30-mm cannon GSh-301 (150 rounds). Combat load - 6000 kg on 10 hardpoints: Can be installed: up to 6 medium-range air-to-air missiles R-27ER1, R-27ET1, R-27ETE and R-27ERE, up to 4 short-range missiles R-73 with thermal seeker. |
The conversation was conducted by a special correspondent of the magazine "Science and Life" T. Novgorodskaya
“I will never forget the first demonstration flight of the Su-27 in Paris, organized by British Aerospace together with the designers and test pilots of the Sukhoi Design Bureau,” these are the impressions of the “premiere” of the fighter from the British Air Force pilot John Farlight. Viktor Pugachev made a 360-degree turn in the Su-27 in 10 seconds, the average speed on the turn was 36 degrees/s. And then we only hoped that our next-generation fighter would be able to reach 25 degrees/s. This is the speed at which the pilot capable of turning the aircraft around so that the entire weapon system is ready for attack. If we assume that our new machine will meet in battle with a Su-27 in 10 seconds, it will only have to, if very lucky, lower its landing gear and land. Much of what we saw on an airshow can be used by a combat aircraft in a real air battle.For the average viewer, an airshow is only a superficial action, but if you belong to the specialists aviation industry, then based on the maneuvering of combat vehicles, fully determine the limits within which the aircraft can pilot. And naturally, when you see that there are no limits for the Su-27, or that the plane goes vertical, comes to a stop, falls back down, goes into normal flight and does this not once or twice, but over and over again, then you understand that This is not the exception, not a trick, but the norm. The difficulty of this maneuver is not how to enter the mode, but how to exit it. Usually we are not allowed to exceed angles of attack of 20-25 degrees: if we exceed them, we lose control of the machine... But the Russians perform their maneuvers by changing the angle of attack over a wide range, while remaining confident in controlling the aircraft with an absolutely symmetrical flow. The same goes for engines. Western engines suffer from strict restrictions on angles of attack. When flying our fighters, we have to think simultaneously about enemy maneuvers and about our own limitations from an aerodynamic point of view - about what the pilot should not do. Of course, this situation is not very comfortable for the pilot; it is much easier for him when he can do whatever he wants to be able to target the enemy and pursue him. What the Russians achieved amazed us to the core." The Su-27, with its revolutionary design and aerodynamics, set new standards in the production of fighter aircraft. The man with whose name the history of its creation is inextricably linked is the general designer of Sukhoi Design Bureau OJSC, Doctor of Engineering Sciences, full member of the International and Russian Engineering Academies of Aviation and Aeronautics, Hero of Russia, laureate of the Lenin and State Prizes Mikhail Petrovich Simonov. In 1995, he was awarded the gold medal named after V. G. Shukhov, and in 1998, the editors of the magazine "Aviation week and Space" Technology" named him "Legend of the Year." His name is included on the Hall of Fame Board of Honor at the National Air and Space Museum in Washington, along with the names of I. I. Sikorsky, S. V. Ilyushin and Wernher von Braun. Interview with "Science and Life" magazine “Mikhail Petrovich gave for the first time, although he has been reading our magazine since 1946. The general designer of Sukhoi Design Bureau OJSC M. SIMONOV answers the editor’s questions.
M. P. Simonov.
Cobra maneuver diagram.
Air combat in the "bell" mode (a - disruption of Doppler tracking, disruption of the enemy's radar lock and escape from attack; b - exit from the "bell" mode and attack of the enemy; c - capture and defeat of the enemy).
Su-27 performs Cobra. Angle of attack 110 degrees.
Su-30 MKI. The blue color of fuel combustion in the afterburner chamber of the engine indicates the high quality of the combustion process.
Air combat on a turn.
A Su-35 aircraft performs a cobra maneuver. The photo shows moisture condensation in the rarefied air zones above the front horizontal tail and the central part of the wing.
Experimental aircraft Su-47. At the moment of aerobatics, the vortices of the resulting moisture seem to flow down from the ends of the wings.
Mikhail Petrovich, everyone who has ever been to an air show and seen what Su aircraft can do, or at least, while sitting in front of the TV, watched reports from air shows, is interested in how and why such machines are created?
In 9th grade I read the book "Some Causes of Piloting Errors." Pilots are never immune from mistakes. Aviation has always been and remains very demanding of both pilots and designers. Due to equipment failure or crew error, not only the plane, but also the crew and passengers die.
The corkscrew is one of the most difficult and hazardous phenomena. This is an almost uncontrollable mode, oriented in space in the most unfortunate way: the plane rotates “nose” down. When it hits the ground, the “air packet” explodes and the plane is blown into small pieces. It would seem that to solve the problem, it would be enough to train all civil aviation pilots how to recognize the “stall edge”, after which the plane goes into a tailspin. It must be said that in aviation there are several similar phenomena that begin with the car giving a roll, but not all of them lead to a spin. However, although all military fighter pilots are trained in basic escape techniques, various types spin, not all of them manage to emerge victorious from a real-life situation (most often due to piloting errors, less often due to failures aviation technology). There are airplanes that, due to their design and aerodynamic features, cannot recover from certain types of spin at all.
In the operation of civil aircraft, extreme cases are not typical. But for combat aircraft, maneuverability is a condition for survival. Therefore, all design bureaus in the world are working on maneuverability characteristics. It is this, in combination with the weapons carried by the aircraft, that provides the solution to the assigned tasks.
-What tasks are set in this case?
Maneuverability is the ability of an aircraft to change its position in the airspace. Naturally, there must be a need to introduce the aircraft into the maneuver. In a combat situation, it arises by itself: you need to take a position in the airspace so that the enemy plane is in the range of your weapons, and your plane, on the contrary, does not fall into the aiming zone. It is clear that the winner will be the one who can turn his car around first and direct it to the target. Classic-type combat vehicles of the 40-60s of the last century experienced great difficulties in battles, since their maneuverability characteristics were quite limited. Usually air battles are fought in large groups - twenty aircraft: a huge “tangle” of machines spins in the air, and everyone wants to survive. The planes of the old classic designs differed little from the enemy planes, so the battles lasted quite a long time - 5-6 minutes. In this case, the engines operated at extreme conditions - accordingly, fuel consumption was high. And even after the victory, not everyone managed to fly home. Every fifth plane died after the battle due to the fact that the fuel ran out and they had to “plop down” wherever God sent. It’s good if the pilot ejected, but if he tried to land, for example, on a highway high speed- the outcome was predetermined. Pilots from some countries, entering battle, knew that they would not be able to get out of it. To fly away, it was necessary to “substitute” the “tail”, and it immediately fell under the gun. Therefore, they fought to the end, and when the red light came on, they ejected from a fully operational fighter.
-...Disposable aircraft?
The life of a pilot is more valuable... But one way or another, shortcomings in maneuverability are very costly. Therefore, a breakthrough into the field of super-maneuverability modes, when the risk to the life of the pilot and the vehicle becomes minimal, has become task number one.
-Is it possible to predict during the development of a fighter that it will have super maneuverability?
It is usually known “against whom” the aircraft is being created. At the time when the Su-27 was being developed, we were “friends” together with the Warsaw Pact against NATO countries. We needed to make an aircraft that would be significantly superior to their F-14, F-15, F-16 and F-18 fighters.
In our aviation industry we are represented by the Sukhoi Design Bureau and a large number of co-developers. For example, radars are made for us by research institutes and design bureaus. We do not develop an engine, we say what kind of engine we need, and it is created at the A. M. Lyulka Design Bureau. Such a scientific and technical union ensures the development of each component of the fighter at the highest level. After all, in order for a new aircraft to be better and able to defeat an enemy fighter, we must have the best engine in the world, the best radar station in the world, the best missile weapons in the world and everything else - also the best. While working on the SU-27, we made what seemed like a good aircraft, superior to the F-15, but by much? By "a little bit". Therefore, again, in the case of close combat, we can end up in a complex “spinner”, where the planes will have equal opportunities to die or win.
We realized that truly decisive superiority over the enemy can be achieved by allowing the pilot to maneuver not just better, but several times better. There is such a thing as the angular speed of turn towards the target. In combat, the advantage is realized by the fighter that manages to turn around earlier. We came to the conclusion that if we provide our aircraft with twice the speed of turning toward a target, its maneuverability can be called super-maneuverability.
Supermaneuverability is the ability of a fighter from any position in the air to turn towards a target with an angular velocity at least twice the angular velocity of the enemy aircraft.
-Probably, to ensure extreme conditions, special requirements are also placed on engines?
First of all, they should have better traction. A modern military aircraft engine is a turbojet, equipped with an afterburner. (Afterburner is an operating mode in which additional fuel is injected into the combustion chamber. This achieves a significant increase in thrust, however, at the expense of additional fuel consumption.) From the two engines installed on the Su-27, a stream of gases bursts out, which pushes the car with a force of 25 tons (12.5 tons - each engine). At the time the F-15 was created, similar engines of American fighters developed 10.8-11 tons of thrust. There are, of course, other requirements. It would be nice, for example, for engines whose nozzles can deviate by + 15 degrees. This is especially important when the aircraft hits supercritical angles of attack while piloting in combat. The critical angle of attack of the Su-27 is 24 degrees. And a combat situation sometimes requires that the aircraft turn to an angle of attack of 60-90 degrees, or even 120 degrees to the direction of flight. When the pilot gives a command to the engine turn control stick, the engine must instantly deviate to the required angle.
The nozzles of two AL-31FP turbojet engines of the Su-30 MK multirole fighter are capable of deflecting by 32 degrees horizontally and 15 degrees vertically. Thus, the aircraft can do something that is inaccessible to other machines of this class: “slow down” and then turn around on the spot, like a helicopter.
When in 1983 we first flew to an exhibition in Paris with the conclusion of the State Institute for Testing of Combat Aircraft that the Su-27 fighter was inferior in performance to the American F-15, we still believed that the Su-27 was superior to US aircraft. The customer considered our statement too presumptuous.
American fighters set a series of climb rate records. (Rate of climb is the time from the moment the aircraft takes off from a standstill until it reaches any altitude - 3000 m, 6000 m, 12,000 m, and so on.) That is, “from a standstill” it must reach altitude in the shortest possible time. World records were set then by the F-15 fighter.
We conducted a series of record-breaking flights on the Su-27 fighter and broke all the records of the F-15, thereby being able to prove that our aircraft is superior to the F-15 in terms of climb rate.
-How did this happen?
The plane must stand still at the start, like a sprinter. But in order to ensure the adhesion of tires to concrete, no brakes are enough. To keep the fighter in place, they tried to use a tank. They attached it with a cable to a lock on the lower surface of the plane, but they were not happy for long. The full afterburner lasted exactly a second, then a grinding sound was heard, and the Su-27 dragged the tank along the runway. I had to look for another way out. A nearby runway was being repaired and a huge Caterpillar industrial bulldozer was working on it. They drove a bulldozer, attached a tank to it, and then attached an airplane to the tank. The launch of the Su-27 "from a standstill" was ensured.
The engine operates in maximum mode at the moment of start. After the lock opens, the plane takes off, takes off and goes vertical. While in a vertical climb, it accelerates to supersonic speed. Not one device, not one space rocket at low vertical altitudes the speed of sound does not exceed. This occurs only at high altitudes, where the density of the atmosphere is low. And already at an altitude of 2000-3000 m we switch to supersonic speed.
Then, in flights at the air show, performance was obtained that was better than the American ones.
In a classic battle, two fighters spin the wheel until one of them is in position to hit the target. But if we enter into battle and at the very first moment turn the plane 90 degrees towards the flow, the target is sighted, it is captured, a missile is launched and it is defeated. Thus, due to super-maneuverability, you can radically improve close combat and guarantee yourself victory within ten seconds (not minutes).
-They say that at first they thought that the Su-27 would not come out of a tailspin?
Yes, this was the conclusion of TsAGI based on wind tunnel tests: the plane does not come out of a spin. And if a combat aircraft does not come out of a spin, something needs to be done. A limiting system was developed that prevents the aircraft from exceeding an angle of attack of 24 degrees.
Not a single model of the Su-27 aircraft in the TsAGI wind tunnel came out of a tailspin. We fought honestly, so we made a 10-meter half-life model of our aircraft, hung it from a Tu-16 bomber and dropped it from a height of 10,000 m. The model was equipped automatic system control and reached the stalling angle, and if it did not come out of the spin, the landing parachute opened. However, it turned out that in half of the modes the large, free-flying model came out of the spin, but in half it did not. We could not tell the pilot: “Fly, everything is fine.” Therefore, TsAGI agreed to install a limit limiter on the aircraft. This was, of course, strange: we want to work at high angles of attack, but we are not able to make an airplane for this.
The most interesting thing happened during the tests. Testing an aircraft is a huge job, about 5 thousand flights, in which the aircraft is tested for aerodynamics, strength, rocket launches and bombing, and much more. Even before the Cobra, V. G. Pugachev achieved high angles of attack. I was very worried, since by that time the American F-16 fighter had several cases when the plane reached an angle of attack of 60 degrees, but could not “get off” from it - it’s good that it had an anti-spin parachute, with the help of which it was possible to escape from this angle. We conducted the tests differently. We were very worried when Pugachev reached a high angle of attack, but he managed to return the plane to its original mode - everything ended well.
Subsequently, flight experiments showed that when reaching high angles of attack, the development of spin motion does not occur. The results indicated that it is fundamentally possible for the aircraft to reach extremely high angles of attack and then return to the so-called operational flight modes. This opened up prospects for super-maneuverability. But 20 years ago we did not know this yet. Only the first experimental flights were underway.
And so, in one of the flights, test pilot V. Kotlov flew a Su-27 with a faulty air signal system (the air pressure receiver was depressurized), having incorrect information about the Mach number M (equal to the flight speed measured in the speed of sound) and trying to compensate for the "mach" " the angle of climb, "balanced" at an altitude of 8000 m vertically and began to fall on its tail. He believed that the plane would settle into some kind of normal flight mode - instead, it was “suspended” between heaven and earth. It was so unusual and incomprehensible: the speed dropped to zero, and the altitude was 8000 m. He began to rush around the cabin, removed the afterburners, and “gave it” again. The plane began to fall on its tail, weightlessness appeared - this technique was later called the “bell.”
-And all this happened in a matter of seconds?
20 seconds. In the air - that's a lot. At an angle of attack of 60 degrees (and we only had permission for 24 degrees), the plane fell into a tailspin, became nose down and began to rotate. The pilot then realized what had happened and reported to the control tower: “Spin!” Since it was believed that the Su-27 aircraft did not come out of a spin, the set of commands on the control center was “carved in granite”: “Eject at an altitude of no lower than 4000 m.”
In general, ejection cannot be called a favorite pastime of pilots, so in order to avoid serious consequences, the pilot released control and began to carefully prepare for the ejection. But in last moment I saw that the plane came out of the spin on its own and began to come out of the dive. The Su-27 was left to its own devices and came out of the dangerous mode on its own. After checking the aircraft's controllability, Kotlov made a safe landing at the airfield.
-Maybe it was an accident?
That's what they decided at first. After all, out of 1000 application situations, only one such case occurred. By and large, this did not change anything. But soon an even more incredible incident occurred in the Far East. The Su-27 pilot carried out an intercept mission in automatic mode. He exceeded the permissible angle of attack, as a result the plane fell into a tailspin. On command from the ground, the pilot ejected, after which the Su-27 not only came out of the spin on its own, but also continued to fly in automatic mode until it ran out of all fuel. Soon, a third case occurred in Lipetsk, like two peas in a pod similar to the first. This has already forced us to develop a special research program. As it turned out during testing, the Su-27 was distinguished by a certain “instability” when entering and exiting spin modes. It was found that the use of the most “strong” aerodynamic methods for recovering from a spin does not always lead to its termination. And at the same time, in a number of situations the plane itself came out of the spin when the stick and pedals were in a neutral position. This was explained by the peculiarities of the vortex aerodynamics of the Su-27 at various angles of attack and glide.
A significant contribution to the “victory” over the spin was made by the famous spin specialist, Honored Test Pilot of the USSR, cosmonaut, Hero of the Soviet Union Igor Petrovich Volk. He conducted spin tests and found that the Su-27 exited all spin modes.
-Why, after all, when testing the models, was the opposite conclusion made?
It turned out that it was not the layout of the aircraft that mattered, but the scale of the model (the Reynolds number Re, which relates flight speed, aircraft size and air viscosity, is much larger for real aircraft than for models, especially small ones).
-Super-maneuverability leads to a decrease in the “visibility” of the aircraft on radar. How?
Supermaneuverability is a system of close-in air combat techniques. If a pilot receives a signal that he is in the irradiation zone of an enemy radar, the first thing he needs to do is go vertical. Gaining altitude and losing speed, it leaves the “visibility” zone of radars operating on the Doppler effect. (The Doppler effect is a change in wave frequency observed when a wave source moves relative to its receiver. - Note ed.) But the enemy is not a fool: he can also turn around. But our plane moves vertically (a “bell” shape), while its speed tends to zero. And all locators see the target precisely by the change in speed (they work on the Doppler principle). If the measured speed drops to zero, or at least to such a small value that enemy radars cannot calculate the Doppler component, we are lost to the enemy. He sees us visually, but not on the radar spectrum. This means that if the enemy has a missile with a radar (semi-active, active) guidance head, he will still not launch it, because the missile will not be able to lock on to the target.
-Are there any other known ways to make an airplane “invisible”?
Such “ghost” planes are just beginning to appear. The greatest effect from the new technology is expected for all so-called fifth generation aircraft. The first aircraft created using stealth (ghost) technology was the F-111A fighter-bomber. True, it never turned out to be a fighter. The plane had very low visibility, but poor flight properties - a kind of “faceted iron” (faceted shapes were needed so that the radar rays would be reflected from the surface and directed in a completely different direction).
I read that in the process of creating a new fighter, the need arose for a radical improvement in avionics. How reliable is it in super-maneuverability modes?
In fact, the world believes that “Russian” electronics do not deserve attention. I have a different opinion. We order radars from our co-developers exactly as we need them. If the locator that is on the F-15 weighs 244 kg, then our similar one weighs several times more. But this does not upset us very much. We want the locator to provide target detection at a certain range. And we set this range to be large. The same can be said about the optical-electronic target detection and aiming system.
When American strategic reconnaissance aircraft (SR-71) began to fly towards us “from around the corner” (from Norway. - Note ed.) along the entire coast to Novaya Zemlya, Su-27 and Su-30 fighters were assigned to guard the northern borders. When the SR-71 “surfaced” once again, ours were already in the air. We decided to outsmart them and gave the command not to turn on the radar, but to turn on the electro-optical system, which “sees” in the infrared spectrum and at a great distance. When the SR was flying at a high altitude, and our planes were heading towards it, we saw it at a great distance. Since the “American” did not violate the borders, it was impossible to do anything with him, but we kept him at gunpoint.
So it’s impossible to say that our radio-electronic equipment is worse. It is exactly what we ordered, focusing on the vehicles of a potential enemy. But making an airplane that can lift our electronics is not a problem.
Is it true that a new wing design has been used to improve aerodynamic qualities in new generation aircraft?
In order to reduce the wave drag of an aircraft wing when moving at supersonic speeds, it is necessary to give the wing a sweep, that is, deflect it relative to the velocity vector (place it at an angle). If the wing is placed in such a way that during “bumpiness” (disturbance of flows), the wing twists at negative angles during its deformation, then the lift force drops, but this is not dangerous from the point of view of wing destruction. If you make a backward sweep, a gust of air deflects the wing upward - the lift immediately increases. And if the force increases, the wing deviates further, the angle increases again. Despite the risk of destruction, aircraft with forward-swept wings have very good aerodynamic characteristics.
The Americans had such an experimental X-29 fighter, for some reason they considered its design solution unprofitable. We consider the creation of such an aircraft to be a technically solvable task using composite materials. A metal wing cannot withstand divergence - destruction of the wing due to twisting. We have had cases where, during purging in wind tunnels, the steel wings of a model with a forward-swept wing were destroyed. Today we can create a special composite structure based on carbon fiber, epoxy resin, and organic materials with a high modulus - in particular, from the very fabrics from which body armor is made.
-What hopes do you have for fifth-generation fighters in terms of super-maneuverability?
Big ones. If our “competitors” make fifth-generation aircraft, we need them too. We can say that there is a certain law of maintaining equilibrium at work here. Recently we were at a foreign exhibition, and there the commander of the Air Force of one of the countries said: “We need your plane. We have different fighters, but we want a Russian one standing next to them, and with such characteristics that the enemy will be afraid.” This means that he did not enter into conflict. This is the goal of creating a new fighter that would ensure political balance in the world.
So, the previous page completed our acquaintance with two, without a doubt, outstanding fourth-generation fighters. As is easy to see from the biographies of the Su-27 and F-15 families, these combat vehicles were created and then improved over the decades, mainly to fight each other. Therefore, any normal reader inevitably has a question: which fighter actually won this mostly absentee (one would like to say - fortunately!) duel? Who was better and in what respect? After all, as we remember, the Eagle was created to confidently fight Soviet maneuverable fighters, which showed very high efficiency during the Vietnam War. And from the very beginning, the Su-27 was made with the goal of surpassing the F-15. To what extent did Soviet designers manage to solve this complex problem?
It is quite natural that when comparing aircraft, the first instinct is to look at the performance characteristics tables. Firstly, it is immediately clear from them that these machines are really close in size. Thus, the maximum take-off weights of purely fighter variants of aircraft differ by less than 10%: for Sukhoi it is from 28,000 kg for the basic Su-27 to 33,000 kg for the Su-27SK, for Eagles - from 25,400 kg for the F-15A up to 30850 kg for the F-15C. The maximum speeds are also very close: 2650 km/h for the F-15A and F-15C and 2500 km/h for the Su-27. As you can see, here the difference is about 9%. The maximum available overloads for the latest options are completely the same - 9 d each. The practical ceiling is also the same - 18300-18500 m.
Secondly, it is easy to notice that the F-15 family is slightly smaller in geometric dimensions than its competitors: fuselage length by 2.5 m, span by 1.65 m, height by 0.7 m (compared to from Su-27UB). Accordingly, the Needles have a slightly lighter design: the empty weight of the F-15A is 12,700 kg versus 16,380 kg for the Su-27. Therefore, the Soviet aircraft is equipped with more powerful engines. If the AP-31F has a thrust at full afterburner at the ground of 12,500 kgf, then the F100-PW-200 has 10,630 kgf.
Thirdly, the performance characteristics tables contain a number of lines that clearly indicate certain advantages of the Sukhoi. For example, in terms of flight range without PTB, the Su-27 is almost 2 times superior to the F-15A (3900 km versus 1970 km). The same can be said about takeoff and landing characteristics (“Sukhi” fit into a runway less than 700 m long, while “Igla” needs more than 1100 m). That, in fact, is all that can be said based on the analysis of the tables. The question “who is the best?” remained without a convincing answer. Well, what did we want by comparing a dozen and a half numbers? After all, a modern combat aircraft is a complex means of armed warfare and is characterized by many hundreds of different parameters. These include not only performance characteristics, but also indicators of on-board radio-electronic complexes and weapons systems, information on visibility and survivability, various operational and technological characteristics, data on the cost of production, operation and combat use. The effectiveness of the aviation complex as a whole depends on how well the set (let us emphasize - precisely the set) of these parameters meets the specific conditions of production and use of the aircraft. Therefore, by the way, aircraft with any one outstanding parameter, for example, the fastest or highest altitude, very rarely turn out to be successful. After all, to dramatically improve a single indicator, designers inevitably have to worsen many others. From this point of view, both aircraft in question may well qualify for the honorary title.
By the way, when studying tables, you should always remember that in modern world an airplane is a product, and the numbers in the tables are its advertising, so they always give a slightly more optimistic picture. Of course, there should be no doubt about the integrity of respected aircraft manufacturing companies. You can trust these numbers one hundred percent. You just need to know what they actually mean. For example, the maximum speed of a fighter is indicated. But at the same time it is silent that this speed was achieved on a specially prepared specimen, as a rule, without external suspensions and with a minimum fuel supply, piloted by a highly qualified test pilot during a specially organized flight. And what speed will a combat vehicle of this type develop after 10 years of operation, with weapons and a tank on an external sling, under the control of a young lieutenant, if the engines have already undergone two repairs, and the tanks are filled with low-grade kerosene? There is no such data in such tables. But it is the real operational characteristics that should interest us in the first place if we want to more or less correctly compare two aircraft.
These general remarks are intended to give an idea of how difficult and thankless the task of comparing aircraft according to their official characteristics is. It’s another matter to analyze real air battles involving competing aircraft during military conflicts. In this case, the picture turns out to be close to reality. But here, too, an important role is played by factors not directly related to the aircraft, such as the qualifications of the pilots, the degree of their determination to fight, the quality of the work of the supporting services, etc. There have not yet been any real battles between the Sukhoi and Iglas, but, to We are glad that these planes nevertheless met several times in the sky during various types of training matches. This happened during mutual visits of pilots from Russia, Ukraine, India and the USA.
The first such visit took place in August 1992, when Langley Air Force Base (Virginia), where the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing of the US Air Force, then armed with F-15C/D, is based, was visited by pilots from the Lipetsk Center for Combat Use and Retraining of Flight Personnel of the Russian Air Force : Major General N. Chaga, Colonel A. Kharchevsky and Major E. Karabasov. They arrived on two combat Su-27UBs, the escort group arrived on an Il-76. After a friendly meeting and a short rest, E. Karabasov proposed holding a demonstration air battle directly above Langley airfield in the presence of spectators. However, the Americans did not agree to this show, which was too militaristic, in their opinion. In return, they proposed to conduct “joint maneuvering” in the flight zone over the ocean (200 km from the coast). According to the scenario, first the F-15D had to escape the pursuit of the Su-27UB, then the planes should have swapped places, and the Sukhoi had to “throw the Eagle off its tail.” E. Karabasov was in the front cockpit of the Su-27UB, and an American pilot was in the rear cockpit. An F-15C flew out to observe the battle.
On the command to begin joint maneuvering, the Eagle, turning on full afterburner, immediately tried to break away from the Su-27UB, but this turned out to be impossible: using only the minimum afterburner mode and maximum non-afterburner thrust, E. Karabasov easily “hung on the tail” of the American. At the same time, the angle of attack of the Su-27UB never exceeded 18*. As we remember, in combat units the angle of attack on the Su-27 is limited to 26", that is, in that fight, the Russian pilot not only confidently held the F-15D in his sights, but he still had a solid margin of available overload! After the planes switched places, E. Karabasov switched the throttle to full afterburner and began to move away from the F-15D with an energetic turn and climb. “Eagle” followed, but immediately fell behind. After one and a half turns, the Su-27UB came to the tail of the F-15, however The Russian pilot made a mistake and “shot down" not an F-15D, but an F-15C observer flying from behind. Realizing the mistake, he soon caught a two-seat Eagle in his sights. All further attempts by the American pilot to get rid of the pursuit led to nothing. At this point, " the air battle was over.
So, in close maneuver combat, the Su-27 convincingly demonstrated complete superiority over the F-15 thanks to smaller turning radii, higher roll and climb rates, and better acceleration characteristics. Note: no maximum speed and other similar parameters provided these advantages, but other indicators that more deeply characterize the aircraft. According to A. Kharchevsky, the reasons for such a clear victory of the Su-27 lie in its high thrust-to-weight ratio: the Russian aircraft picked up speed along an upward trajectory faster than the F-15. The latter had to first make a kind of “step” - fly a little horizontally to gain speed, and only then begin to climb. The Russian pilots took advantage of this, not giving the Americans time for horizontal acceleration, and immediately carried them into a vertical maneuver.
Let's try to analyze this version more deeply - let's calculate the thrust-to-weight ratio of the fighters on that flight. Since the thrust of the engines is known, for this we can only estimate the weights of the aircraft. For F-15D: 13240 kgf – empty weight; plus 290 kgf – the weight of the equipment, including two pilots; plus 6600 kgf - the weight of the fuel consumed (for a flight to the flight zone and back with a range reserve of 25%, maneuvering for half an hour, of which 5 minutes in full afterburner mode); plus 150 kgf – the weight of the PTB structure, since the required amount of fuel exceeds the capacity of the internal tanks; in total, without combat load (cannon shells and missiles), the takeoff weight of the F-15D was approximately 20,330 kgf. At the time of the start of “joint maneuvering”, due to fuel consumption, the flight weight decreased to approximately 19,400 kgf. When determining the appropriate values for the Su-27UB, we will proceed from the fact that the empty weight of the aircraft is 17,500 kgf, as indicated in many publications. Carrying out a similar calculation for the Sukhoi, we get its take-off weight of 24,200 kgf, and the weight of the “battle” is about 23,100 kgf.
If we now divide the table values of engine thrust by the resulting weights, it is easy to see that at the beginning of the fight the thrust-to-weight ratio of the Su-27UB at the ground in full afterburner mode was 1.08, and the F-15D was 1.11, that is, for the Igla it was more. So Kharchevsky’s version does not stand up to criticism. The point is different - thrust per 1 m 2 midsection of the aircraft, the Su-27 is almost 20% larger than the Igla (respectively, 6330 kgf/m G and 5300 kgf/m 2 ). In combination with the better throttle response of the AL-31F engine, this provides an advantage in acceleration characteristics. According to David North, deputy editor-in-chief of Aviation Week & Space Technology, which performed a familiarization flight on the Su-27UB at the Farnborough-90 air show, accelerates the Russian fighter from 600 km/h to 1000 km/h at full afterburner in just 10 seconds. In his report, North especially notes the good throttle response of the Sukhoi engines.
It is known that the degree of maneuverability of an aircraft is expressed numerically by the amount of available overload, i.e., the ratio of the maximum lift force developed by the aircraft to its weight in this moment. As we remember, the maximum available overloads for the Su-27 and F-15 are equal. However, in the events described, Sukhoi demonstrated a constant advantage in maneuver. So it's not a matter of absolute value overload, but in something else, for example, in the time of its achievement. And this time depends on the efficiency with which an aircraft of one or another aerodynamic configuration is able to generate lift. Unlike its competitor, the Su-27 is designed using an integrated design, in which the fuselage and wing form a single load-bearing system, which ensures high lift coefficients during maneuvers and low drag, especially at trans- and supersonic speeds. In addition, the integral layout, characterized by a smooth transition of the fuselage into the wing, compared to the traditional layout, provides a significantly larger volume of internal fuel tanks and makes it possible to abandon the use of PTB. This also has a positive effect on the aerodynamic quality of the Su-27.
The positive aspects of the Sukhoi integrated layout are significantly enhanced by its careful development. Thus, the pointed root swells of the Su-27, in contrast to the blunted swells of the F-15, not only create a positive increase in load-bearing properties at angles of attack greater than 10", but also provide a reduction in pressure pulsation on the upper surface of the wing, which causes the aircraft to shake and limits it maneuverability. Important Feature The Su-27 has a wing with a deformed middle surface, giving it a characteristic “snake-like” appearance. This wing is “tuned” to provide maximum lift-to-drag performance in the middle of the close combat maneuvering area. In these modes, the quality of a deformed wing is 1.5 times higher than the quality of a flat wing, and the gain occurs in a fairly wide range of angles of attack. As for the maximum aerodynamic quality of the aircraft as a whole, it is known that with M = 0.9, the quality of the F-15A can reach a maximum of 10, and the Su-27 - 11.6, which is a record figure for fourth-generation fighters. Thus, the aerodynamic configuration of the Su-27 provides not only an increase in lift, but also a decrease in drag, which has a positive effect on the acceleration characteristics of the aircraft.
I would like to emphasize once again that the better maneuverability characteristics of the Su-27 compared to the F-15 were achieved due to a better aerodynamic configuration, and not by reducing the load on the load-bearing area. This is proven by simple calculations of the specific load on the load-bearing surface (due to the fact that for both aircraft the fuselage and tail play a significant role in creating lift, we will relate the flight weight not to the wing area, but to the entire area of their plan projections, which we will calculate using the data given in book of drawings). We find that at the beginning of the fight the load on the planned projection of the Su-27UB was 220 kgf/m 2 , and F-15D – 205 kgf/m 2 , that is, almost the same (difference in the order of calculation error).
Another important characteristic on which the maneuverability of a fighter depends is the speed of roll entry and the speed of rotation around the longitudinal axis. The higher these speeds, determined by the efficiency of the lateral controls and the mass-inertial characteristics of the machine, the faster the aircraft turns into a turn and goes into a counter-rotating turn. The ability to quickly change the direction of a turn is the most important tactical advantage, since it allows you to effectively escape from an enemy attack and launch an attack yourself.
D. North, citing Viktor Pugachev, claims that the angular roll rate of the Su-27 is close to 270 degrees / s. This value is higher than the F-15 and is approximately equal to the F/A-18.
Fully positive sides aerodynamic layout and power plant The Su-27 manifests itself due to its static instability. Unlike the stable F-15, the Sukhoi seems to independently strive to change the direction of flight, and only the constant operation of the fly-by-wire control system keeps it in a balanced position. The essence of controlling a statically unstable fighter is that the pilot does not “force” him to perform this or that maneuver, but “allows” him to perform it. Therefore, the time required to exit any steady flight mode and begin maneuvering is significantly less for the Su-27 than for the F-15, which was also one of the components of the Sukhoi’s success in the duel with the Eagle. Thus, the outstanding maneuverability characteristics of the Su-27, so convincingly demonstrated in the American skies, are a completely logical result of a set of design solutions that distinguish this fighter from the F-15.
In 1993, a return visit to Lipetsk by the Iglov group from the 1st TFW took place. When he was preparing, a very significant incident arose that made it possible to draw a conclusion about the airfield serviceability of an overseas fighter. The advance group of Americans who arrived in Lipetsk, with the task of resolving all issues regarding the reception of the F-15, was horrified by the state of the local runway, which was considered quite prosperous by Russian standards. In any case, Sukhoi aircraft flew from it regularly. The guests said that it was simply impossible to fly the F-15 from such a runway. Ultimately, the visit did take place, but the Americans taxied, took off and landed extremely carefully. They can be understood: the Igla wheels are inferior to the Su-27 wheels both in diameter and in tire width, and the air intakes, unlike their competitor, are not protected from foreign objects. However, it is believed that with a minimum load on the external suspension units, the F-15 can be operated from unpaved runways with a strength of about 12-14 kgf/cm 2 . True, the author is not aware of any cases of Eagles flying from the ground.
Of interest is the assessment given to the F-15 by Russian pilots who had the opportunity to fly the Eagle in America and in their homeland.
The Su-27 became the first Soviet fighter capable of carrying 10 air-to-air missiles
Here is the opinion of A.N. Kharchevsky: “The F-15 is a well-controlled vehicle with excellent visibility and no restrictions on spin. When you try to force it to spin from various positions, the plane only moves its nose from side to side, not wanting to start rotating. During maneuvering, the Eagle reaches angles of attack of up to 25°, while maintaining controllability. The control of the aircraft is soft, the car responds perfectly to the rudders, and the effort on the stick is significantly less than that of the Su-27. However, the aerodynamics of the F-15 are less advanced than those of the Sukhoi: it accelerates more slowly during maneuvering and decelerates faster... The stall on the F-15 begins a little earlier than on the Su-27. Its approach can be judged, in particular, by the increasing noise in the cabin. The F-15's takeoff is slower than that of the Sukhoi (during a group takeoff of the four, consisting of two Su-27UBs and two F-15s, the Russian aircraft were forced to turn off the afterburner in order to maintain formation, while the Americans took off with full afterburner ). Minimum speed F-15 – 210 km/h. This is significantly more than the Su-27 and MiG-29. However, the effectiveness of the all-moving Igla stabilizer is maintained when driving at speeds of up to 100 km/h. The turning radius of the F-15 is greater than that of the Su-27.” In general, according to Kharchevsky, the Eagle is inferior in maneuverability to the Su-27 and MiG-29. According to another TsBPiPLS pilot, the maneuverability of the Igla most closely matches the similar capabilities of the MiG-23MLD aircraft.
According to the pilots of the Lipetsk center, the F100-PW-200 engines installed on the F-15C/D have worse throttle response compared to the AP-31F. This was indirectly evident during the flights to Langley: Mr. Karabasov, sitting in the front cockpit of the F-15D, drew attention to the fact that the American pilot was operating the throttle too harshly.
In general, there were quite a lot of subjective aspects in Russians’ perception of the American fighter. Even the delicate Kharchevsky called the “Igla” cabin, which has a dark brown, almost black coloring of the instrument panel and panels, with small, hard-to-read instrument indicators, “terrible,” not to mention the more categorical Karabasov. The ejection seat seemed hard and uncomfortable. The lack of locks on the engine control handle also caused criticism. The absence of an automatic belt retraction system on the ejection seat of the F-15 (as well as other US Air Force fighters) seemed completely unexpected and inexplicable to Russian pilots. While piloting, Karabasov brought his Eagle to negative G and watched as the American “floated up” in the front cockpit (the poor fellow did not expect such a maneuver and did not tighten the waist belt securing the pilot in the seat).
However, it would hardly be fair to attribute all this to the shortcomings of the F-15. Rather, these are features that Russian pilots are simply not used to. Americans perceive them absolutely naturally. Thus, small-format indicators were introduced on American fighters back in the 1950s. It can be assumed that the hard “Igla” seat allows you to better feel the aircraft: after all, it is known that the main organ for perceiving the spatial position of the aircraft is the pilot’s backside. At the same time, the view from the cockpit of the American fighter, according to the Russians, turned out to be simply excellent, both forward and backward.
In publications devoted to the visit of Russians to the United States, there are statements with which it is completely difficult to agree. Thus, it was noted that the pre-flight preparation of the F-15 is longer than the Su-27 and requires a greater number of operations. This statement contradicts everything that is written in this book about the operational manufacturability of the aircraft in question. In any case, the time required to replace an engine on the F-15 is shorter, and the presence of an APU allows you to really save time when preparing for a flight. In addition, during maintenance of the Igla, the APU makes it possible to operate with less airfield facilities.
As you can see, a modern aircraft is not only about maneuverability and flight range. It is also important that the Su-27 significantly outperformed its American competitor in terms of armament. In particular, it can carry up to 10 missiles of the " air-air", while the F-15 has only 8. The Sukhoi is also equipped with a more powerful 30 mm cannon compared to the 20 mm of the Igla. In terms of the total mass of the combat load - 6 tons - the Su-27 also surpasses the F-15A, although only by 9%. The presence of an optical location station and a helmet-mounted target designation system (Igla does not have them) allows the Su-27 pilot to use the existing arsenal much more flexibly. The radar characteristics of both aircraft were generally comparable. As for other equipment, the Sukhoi is equipped with a number of systems that are not found on the F-15. This can be said, in particular, about the automated control system for the actions of a group of fighters and the system of mutual group electronic defense. All this is reflected quite clearly in the press, including the Western one.
The biography of the Su-27 is developing very peacefully, and the aircraft demonstrate their capabilities mainly during various air shows and exercises. In the photo: mirror aerobatics performed by a couple from the Russian Knights group. MAKS-2007, Zhukovsky, August 2007
At the same time, when it comes to Su-27 equipment, an insufficient level of use is always noted (especially in publications of the 1990s). computer equipment and low level of integration of on-board systems. This puts the Sukhoi pilot in a worse position than their Western counterparts, particularly in understanding exactly what is happening in and around the aircraft at any given time. In a difficult tactical situation, this inevitably leads to the loss of precious time and can negate the numerous advantages of this fighter. This is indeed a serious drawback, but characteristic only of the basic version of the Su-27, which remained in service only in the CIS countries, including Ukraine.
When creating subsequent versions of the aircraft for export, the main emphasis was on improving the on-board equipment. This is how variants of the Su-27SK, Su-27KI and aircraft of the Su-30 family appeared. In some ways, the position that these vehicles occupy in relation to the original Su-27 is similar to that occupied by the F-15C/D in relation to the F-15A/B. Therefore, we will allow ourselves to continue comparing the heroes of this book, based on the characteristics of the Su-30 and F-15C/D. Certain food for this has been provided by the events of recent years in India, and first of all by the joint American-Indian military exercises Sore India-2004, which took place from February 15 to February 27, 2004 at the Indian Gwalior airbase.
In the Russian-language press, these exercises, in which the Sukhoi directly opposed the Needles, received a very powerful response. The general tone of the publications was not just victorious, but, one might say, sarcastic. Reason: Sukhoi won about 75% of all training battles with American fighters. The Indian pilots acted extremely competently: they often did not turn on the radar at all, but used the OLS-30I optical-location station to detect the enemy, which allowed them to quietly approach the Americans within “the distance of an aimed shot from an onboard cannon.” And in close combat, as we know, the F-15C had little chance. According to the Indian command, the Americans were “shot down” at least 20 times in this way. During the “battles”, another interesting discovery was made: Russian radars confidently detected the F-15C at a range of up to 60 km, even against the backdrop of mountains, while the Iglov radar in such conditions could not distinguish the target due to multiple reflections from mountain ledges. It would seem that this is the answer to the question about comparing aircraft! But let’s not succumb to mass hypnosis, no matter how pleasant it may be, but let’s approach the assessment of these teachings in a more balanced way.
First, let's evaluate the composition of their participants. MiG-27 attack aircraft, Mirage-2000, MiG-21 (modernized) and Su-30K fighters were involved in Cope India 2004 from the Indian side. Several MiG-29s also performed a limited list of tasks. The American side was represented by six F-15Cs equipped with modernized AN/APG-63(V)1 radars from the 19th TS of the 3rd TFW located at Elmendorf, Alaska, one tanker and one C-5 transport. Galaxy from the 60th TW. This composition of “opponents” caused deep disappointment on both sides from the very beginning. After all, the Americans flew to distant lands specifically to “test” in a combat situation not so much the Su-30, but the Su-30MKI just purchased by India, which is still the most advanced of the entire Su-27/30 family. The Indians cherished similar intentions in relation to the F-16C, which are also in service with neighboring Pakistan.
Secondly, Cope India 2004 was a complex combat exercise, and not some kind of exhibition duel in the air between American and Indian Air Force aircraft. They provided for each side to simulate two types of operations: offensive and defensive. When the Indians advanced, the F-15Cs rose to intercept the Su-30Ks, which were covering the attack MiG-27s. When the Americans attacked, everything was the other way around. That is, in achieving overall success, not only the individual flight characteristics of each aircraft played a role, but also the training of pilots and command staff, and, of course, the perfection of the on-board equipment of combat vehicles. Since the overall score of the exercises was clearly in favor of the Sukhoi, there is no longer any basis to talk about their equipment as not being perfect enough. At least starting with the Su-30 family.
The United States is actively using the F-15 in various recent regional conflicts. Photo: F-15E from the 492nd Expeditionary Fighter Squadron before another combat mission. Afghanistan, Bagram Air Base, June 9, 2007
Thirdly, in order to take a more objective approach to the results of the exercises, let’s try to understand at least a little about the conditions under which they were conducted. It turns out that by mutual agreement of the parties, certain “restrictions” were introduced into the tactics of their actions. In particular, at the Indian proposal, the ceiling for air combat was limited to medium altitudes. The true essence of this, at first glance, innocent restriction is that it actually reduces the combat contact of opposing forces to close maneuver combat. After all, if at high altitudes the launch range of an AMRAAM-type missile is more than 60 km (and at very high altitudes - more than 100 km), then at medium altitudes it decreases to 30-35 km. This naturally leads to a reduction in the enemy’s lead time in using weapons. That is, the parties often simply do not have time to use ranged weapons and are forced to switch to melee weapons. And here’s another important thing: the importance of the maneuverability of an aircraft when moving from high to medium altitudes increases sharply, and in combat at medium altitudes, an aircraft with higher maneuverability gains advantages, and its shortcomings in conducting long-range missile combat are relegated to the background - ideal conditions for "Dry"!
Another “limitation” was that the simulation of all air battles was carried out with an initial ratio of the number of Indian and American aircraft of 3:1. The American commander, Colonel G. Newback, explained that “in each combat mission, four F-15C fighters opposed 12 Indian Air Force fighters, usually Su-30K aircraft.” That is, all the high-profile victories of the Indian Sukhoi were achieved in the most favorable conditions for them and in a “three against one” situation! This is a reason to treat the results of Cope India 2004 with a little more restraint. And let’s evaluate the Su-30K this way: a normal competitive fighter, which has both its own strengths and weak sides. Its success in a real battle will depend on how well the tactics of use are chosen.
The question arises: why did the Americans put themselves in such unfavorable conditions? After all, they understood perfectly well what they were getting into by agreeing with the Indians’ proposals. The only logical explanation for this phenomenon seems to be the following: in those exercises, the Yankees did not need victory at all; they planned their defeat in advance. Later, they used this fact to form a strong opinion in the US government that American fighters in service were lagging behind the latest models of Russian combat aircraft. Thanks to this, the US Air Force command soon managed to “wrestle” from the senators the necessary budget funds for the construction of fifth-generation fighters F/A-22.
Be that as it may, Cope India 2004 opened a series of exercises in which the Indian Sukhoi won decisive victories not only over the F-15, but also over other modern fighters. Thus, in 2005, a two-week exercise took place with the participation of the F-16C of the Singapore Air Force. Training air battles between them and the Su-30MKI began with single fighter duels, after which one aircraft from each side was introduced into the battle. As a result, up to 10 aircraft (5 vs 5) took part in the battles. According to media reports, the Indians won all 10 fights with the Singaporean pilots.
In June 2005, 18 Indian Su-30Ks flew to France to the Charles Monier airbase to participate in the Garuda II exercise. Accompanied by Il-76 transport aircraft and Il-78M tankers, the Indian fighters reached France with an intermediate landing in Egypt. On the French side, 6 Mirage-2000S/R, 3 Mirage-2000-5, Mirage-200014 fighters, as well as a number of other aircraft, took part in the exercises. From June 17 to 28, in accordance with the developed tactical scenario, the Su-30 and Mirage-2000 carried out mutual “cleaning” of the airspace. Two to three missions per day were carried out at medium altitudes in two training airspace zones stretching from Marseille to Corsica. Air defense and refueling tasks from tankers of both sides were also practiced. Mixed formations took part in close air battles, for example, two Mirage-2000S and two Su-30 against four Mirage-2000S and two Su-30. The battles were carried out in visual visibility conditions with simulating the launch of short-range air-to-air missiles R-73 of Russian design and French Magik-2. Some tasks included the defense of AWACS aircraft and E-ZS control. Over eight flight days, the Mirages completed 80 missions, and the Sukhoi - 74. Despite the secrecy surrounding these exercises, it became known that the Su-30 made a great impression on the French pilots. One of the Mirage-2000 pilots said: “In close combat, the Mirage behaves more nervously than the Su-30. The decision to attack must be made in the first minute, otherwise the Su-30 with its power and maneuverability will definitely overwhelm you.”
From 7 to 18 November 2005, a new joint exercise between the Indian and US Air Forces, Cope India 2005, took place. On the American side, 12 F-16 fighters from the 13 TFS of the 35th TW, flying from Japan, took part in them. India was represented by 30 Su-30K and Mirage-2000 aircraft, as well as MiG-29. This time, aviation actions were practiced in a full-scale military conflict, so no special training battles were organized, and the fights took place as if by themselves during general exercises. In these operations, the mock enemy groups included both Indian and American fighters. In those cases when Indian pilots entered into fights with F-16 aircraft, the latter, as a rule, lost. Journalists from the American newspaper Christian Science Monitor received this information from direct participants in the exercises.
In October 2006, the Indians conducted joint maneuvers with the British Air Force, during which British pilots had the opportunity to fly the Su-30. It is interesting that the British, first of all, paid attention to the high capabilities of the aircraft’s on-board equipment, primarily the radar. There were even voices that the “board” of the Su-30 was in some sense superior even to the equipment of the latest Eurofighter Typhoon.
Of course, the exercises of 2005-2006. They are not directly related to the issue of comparing the Su-27/30 and F-15, but they are still worth mentioning here. This fireworks display of victories, which the Western press spoke so loudly about, served as excellent advertising for the Su fighters. Although the Su-27/30 family is already one of the best-selling in the world. However, the F-15 also does not herd the rear in this sense. If we summarize the information contained in the chapters on aircraft, we get the following picture. Until May 2007, 1,625 Iglov aircraft of all variants were produced, of which 534 aircraft were exported and produced outside the States under license. Singapore is in a state of contemplation, its order could amount to two dozen more cars. Until 1992, Sukhoi were produced in the amount of about 900 copies: 800 Su-27 and 100 Su-27UB. In subsequent years, another 605 fighter aircraft were exported and licensed. That is, the total is 1505 pieces. Plus, today Algeria, Venezuela, Vietnam, Libya and Malaysia are studying the possibilities of purchasing fighters of this family, including additional ones. This is another 50 to 100 cars.
As you can see, in terms of the total number of copies produced, both heroes of this book approximately correspond to each other with an advantage of the F-15 of 9%, which is explained by the large volume of US domestic orders. However, if we consider the number of vehicles delivered for export, the advantage goes to Sukhoi and is approximately the same 9%. At the same time, the Su-27/30 family has prospects for receiving new export contracts, while the Eagle has almost exhausted its export potential. Thus, another - economic - round of competition between American and Russian fighters ends in favor of the latter. I would like to emphasize that for modern Russia this is especially important, as it brings significant income. Their size can be judged by repeated statements General Director AHC "Sukhoi" M.A. Poghosyan, who claims that during the period from 1996 to 2006, the total income from the export of these fighters and the sale of licenses for their production exceeded 15 billion USD.
Concluding the comparison of two outstanding aircraft of the late 20th century, let us pay attention to another important aspect. It is well known that the better an engineering product is, the greater the development potential it has. In other words, the greater the number of competitive products that can be created on its basis. In this sense, the Su-27 not only left the brainchild of McDonnell Douglas far behind. Based on it, the following classes have been developed and mass-produced: aircraft: air superiority fighters, multirole tactical fighters, carrier-based fighters and attack aircraft, tactical and Euro-strategic ground-based attack vehicles, combat training aircraft - in total, not counting prototypes and experimental models, more than 15 options! This characterizes the Russian aircraft as an outstanding engineering product. Igla has a similar list that is approximately half as long, and in terms of the depth of changes made to the design, it is very far from the truly universal Su-27 family.
Further development of the Su-27 was the Su-34 front-line bomber, as well as the Su-33 carrier-based fighter and the Su-27KUB carrier-based combat training aircraft.
Finally, interesting information about “The Needle” appeared literally at the moment this book went to press. On November 2, 2007, one of the F-15Cs of the Missouri Air National Guard broke up in the air during another training flight. As it turned out, at the moment of increasing overload, the longitudinal power elements of the fuselage collapsed in the area immediately behind the pilot’s cabin. Already on the 3rd, the Americans stopped the flights of all their Eagles and began inspecting them technical condition. The latter revealed many cracks in the fuselage structure on a large number of aircraft. Following the United States, Japan also landed its “Eagles”. And while Boeing specialists continue to develop a set of measures that would prevent the further development of the identified “disease,” the “Needles” remain chained to the ground. Only a few F-15Es are flying, doing combat work in Afghanistan and Iraq.
So, we have completed a rather comprehensive review of both fighters. It's time to move on to conclusions. It seems that after everything we have read, it is most logical to conclude that these aircraft belong to the same generation and have very similar capabilities. In the event of their combat use, especially against each other, a lot will depend on the qualifications of the pilots, tactics of action and the effectiveness of all necessary types of support. At the same time, the Sukhoi have clearly defined strengths - close combat, flight range, weapons and individual elements of on-board equipment. Well, and of course, the huge potential for modernization, which has not yet been exhausted - 30 years after the first takeoff. The last representatives of the family will remain competitive for a long time - at least 20 years, as evidenced by reports of new contracts for their sale and licensed production. And “Eagle” has already faded away - no matter for what reasons. Either the Americans have completely exhausted the capabilities inherent in the design, or they deliberately put an end to it so as not to block the path of the Raptor. In any case, in the historical confrontation between two fourth-generation superfighters, Sukhoi had the last word.
A pair of Su-27s from the 4th Center for Combat Training and Retraining of Flight Personnel of the Russian Air Force. Lipetsk, June 2006
Su-27 from the 831st Galati IAP of the Ukrainian Air Force during a flight to the British Fairford airbase to participate in an international air show. August 1997
Landing of a Su-27UB from the 62nd IAP of the Ukrainian Air Force. Belbek airfield (Crimea), spring 2000. Later, this aircraft was based at the Ozernoye airfield near Zhitomir and on July 27, 2002 crashed at the Lvov Sknilov airfield
1 Without fuel, ammunition and external suspension pylons.
2 In the shock version.
3 With conformal fuel tanks.
4 After modernization under the MSIP program: + 9.0/-3.
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