Tactical level control system of the way of improvement. Combat command and control system of the US ground forces in the link "brigade and below" Operative tactical command link of the RF Armed Forces

The tank support combat vehicle should significantly increase the combat potential of the Ground Forces units. Photo from www.wikipedia.org

An analysis of the nature of the combat operations of subunits, units and formations of the Ground Forces (SV) in the conditions of modern armed conflicts shows that significant changes are required in the tactics of their combat use in comparison with the combat operations of past wars (conflicts).

The military doctrine of the state is defensive in nature, therefore, the development of the theory and practice of building ground forces must be viewed through the likely nature of the hostilities of the initial period, in which the main burden will fall primarily on the Ground Forces.

It is gratifying to see that this problem was raised by the Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army V.V. Gerasimov in the article “Preparing for conflicts along the borders”, which corresponds to the defensive doctrine and precisely the initial period of the war (NVO No. 20, 2014).

TACTICAL LINK

It can be assumed that the basis strategic planning defense of the state based on the idea of defensive operations of ground forces in theaters of operations (theater of operations) in the most threatened areas, summed up in a single strategic plan for the defense of the state. At the same time, the lack of a military ideology and theory of wars of the future and, accordingly, a new quality of the combat use of tactical formations, views on the tactics of interacting combat arms of the ground forces, and, if necessary, aviation as one of the most important participants in success, and not only in battle, but also in operations, do not give a complete picture of combined arms combat of various scales.

You can rely only on the experience of military exercises and combat operations of various scales of our time, creatively analyzing the experience of the Great Patriotic War. The battles of the 53rd Guards Tank Brigade are especially well told in the memoirs of its commander, at that time Colonel, twice Hero of the Soviet Union Vasily Sergeevich Arkhipov, later Colonel General of the Tank Forces, commander of the armored personnel carrier of the military district, “Time of Tank Attacks”, (Moscow , Yauza; Eksmo, 2009). Using this book, even now you can teach tankers the tactics of combined arms combat!

Deficiencies in assessments lead to errors in the organization of tactical formations, their weapons, all types of support, stocks of materiel, their accumulation and expenditure in various types actions and, consequently, separation of stocks. At the same time, with such an approach to tactics, the question involuntarily arises: what equipment and with what tactical and technical characteristics will be required for these same defensive actions, which will also have counterattack actions (strikes) in the course of defensive combat operations of various scales?

At the same time, the scale of hostilities varies in depth and width of the front in relation to the theater of operations, while the operational directions on them have different military capacities, which makes it possible to determine the possible composition of enemy troops and the necessary need for forces and means to defend their own territory, as well as the nature operating theater equipment, which are largely not equipped to date. We do not set ourselves the task of determining the nature of full-scale operations in strategic theaters, especially since wars are now being unleashed and waged on other principles for the use of modern weapons than it was in the last wars of the 20th century.

Our view is focused on the tactical actions of ground forces units, units and formations in the platoon-corps link, if we consider a company as a primary tactical unit capable of acting as a company tactical group (RTG) both independently and as part of a battalion, forming the basis of a battalion tactical group ( BTG) to perform combat missions both independently and as part of several similar combat groups. In this case, the battalion should be considered the main tactical unit, and the brigade - the main tactical unit, leaving the status of the highest tactical unit of the SV behind the corps.

In my opinion, it is a mistake to consider a corps as an operational-tactical formation, and this is an artificial definition, since the corps does not have combat capabilities for conducting an operation, however, under certain conditions, the results of its actions may be of operational significance. Example: military operations of the 24th shopping mall of the South-Western Front under the command of Major General V.M. Badanov in the Stalingrad offensive operation, when at the Tatsinskaya station, in the depths of the German defense, at the airfield, the corps destroyed about 300 Yu-52 transport aircraft that supplied the encircled German troops by air.

Supreme Commander I.V. Stalin personally demanded from the commander of the South-Western Front, Lieutenant-General N.V. Vatutina: "Remember Badanov, help Badanov ..." Subsequently, for military success, the corps was transformed into the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps. As for the exact definition of the status of the corps and its purpose as a tactical unit, I recommend that the reader refer to the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, p. 898 (Moscow, Eksmo, 2007).

In our opinion, it is precisely such a gradation of the tactical link of the ground forces that at the present time most closely matches the nature of possible military operations in the initial period of the war. It seems that it is expedient to have regular structures of the tactical level of troops in pairs.

This is expedient also because in the conditions of independent, autonomous actions, interaction, mutual assistance and mutual assistance are even more important, which contributes to the fulfillment of a combat mission and strengthens the morale of personnel. Considering that the combined arms combat of tactical military formations is the sum of the success of the interacting branches of the troops participating in the battle, and knowing their combat capabilities, it is already possible today to determine the organization, weapons, tactics of actions, and as weapons improve, improve the combat capabilities of the formations.

This approach will allow more confident determination performance characteristics promising weapons and on their basis to form tasks for manufacturers.

This will also require a qualitatively new view, which professes the principle that everything is done in the interests of carrying out combat missions by crews (crews) in conditions of maximum convenience of operations with weapons.

I am sure that tankers will support such an approach to the design of military equipment, and one cannot expect a different approach. When you shoot for a quarter of a century, you drive tanks from T-34-85 and self-propelled gun mounts SU-100 based on this tank to T-64A and B, day and night, in winter and summer from Far East and before the Group of Forces in Germany, at exercises of various sizes, then you will inevitably come to such conclusions.

WAITING FOR THE "THIRD GENERATION"

Now, when the development of weapons is changing in the direction of increasing the accuracy, range, power of ammunition, the quality of reconnaissance and munitions guidance on the principle of "shot and forget" (VZ), the massive use of unmanned reconnaissance and strike systems, as well as artillery and aviation cluster munitions, which strike targets from above, in the least protected part of the armored vehicle, it is required to completely change the design of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers in the direction of destroying enemy weapons on the approach, before their direct impact, both on the hull and on the armor of the roof of the hull and turret, especially from the upper hemisphere.

Thus, the airborne control principle is currently applied on the AN-64 "Longbow Apache" helicopter of the American army, which is not on our helicopters, including new models.

In addition, it is required to revise the gun barrels of tanks and anti-tank artillery, tank and anti-tank ammunition, since, according to available information, the quality of the barrels does not provide the required accuracy and accuracy, and anti-tank BPS (armor-piercing sub-caliber shells) "Lead", "Vant" and "Mango" do not have the required armor penetration, as well as PTR "Kornet".

I draw the reader's attention to the article by Ph.D. MM. Rastopshin (NVO No. 11, 2014) "Punch through the armor with the first shot", which provides "Comparative estimates of the defeat of the Abrams by the 9M119M missile, made by Academician Shipunov" with one missile: M1A1 - 0.47; M1A2 - 0.2. Accordingly, the consumption of missiles for their reliable destruction will be 3 and 5 units. The assessment of the probability of hitting the frontal zones of these tanks from the 125 mm Sprut-B gun with the Lead projectile is M1 - 0.30, M1A1 - 0.15, M1A2 - 0.09 and the consumption for reliable destruction, respectively: 4, 7, 12 units. At the end of the article, the author writes: “It is high time for high-ranking officials to figure out the effectiveness of such weapons and not to deceive the Supreme Commander.”

As for the Kornet, I draw attention to another article by the same author, “Russian Kornet vs. American General Abrams”, (NVO, No. 21, 2014) which explains the problems of all types of tank protection, the enemy and ours.

Obviously, the changed conditions of the battle require a new type of tank, which would fully correspond to future battles and campaigns, since we are talking about the autonomy of actions in battle under conditions of simultaneous enemy action throughout the theater and all its important objects.

At the same time, it is advisable to consider the issue of placement power plant tank in its bow.

Then the vacated reserved volume can be used to place means of destruction of attacking enemy ammunition, to increase the stocks of ammunition, fuel, water, products, and in the most protected part of the tank. This design of the tank will provide the crew with the convenience of interacting with weapons in battle, the convenience of loading ammunition, getting the crew into the tank and disembarking from it under the cover of armor, and, if necessary, placing several shooters. But for this it is necessary to remove the automatic loader from the fighting compartment, which, according to the standard, takes about 30 minutes to load, and through the hatches of the tower!

It is necessary to put "specialists", starting with the GABTU and GRAU and further down the list, to load ammunition under enemy machine-gun fire, and through the hatches of the tower. And then those who remain will quickly make a new tank.

Already now there are technical possibilities for loading a 125 mm tank gun with a unitary shot, without an automatic loader and without impairing the fire capabilities of the tank. This is well shown in the article by retired Colonel-General Y. Bukreev (“VPK” No. 7, 2014). "Troops need feedback from industry."

ERROR CORRECTION

The author correctly raises the question that the command of the ground forces should be given the right to develop and approve plans for scientific, practical and experimental design work on the subject of the ground forces. I’ll add on my own: the Commander-in-Chief of the SV should be in the rank of Deputy Minister of Defense, and without his consent, not a single sample can be accepted into service and for production for the SV, especially when the Ministry of Industry and Trade is headed by a sociologist! Then there will be no dictatorship of industrialists to the troops: “Take what we give,” and prices will not rise uncontrollably. In general, the Main Command of the SV has not yet had its own scientific base, its own testing centers and has no influence on production workers. At the same time, the Deputy Defense Ministry for armaments, together with his apparatus, does not provide the required quality of weapons for the SV.

An analysis of the state of affairs with weapons and equipment of the ground forces shows that a power vertical is required to correct the state of affairs on this issue, namely:

The Commander-in-Chief of the SV should be in the rank of Deputy Defense Ministry for the Ground Forces, and he should be subordinate to: his own scientific bases, test centers for types of weapons. And it is not the GRAU with the GABTU MO that should act as customers of weapons for the SV, but the one who is directly responsible for the state and combat capability of the Ground Forces, that is, the Main Command of the SV.

To develop a new type of tank for the SV, not excluding the production of the T-90 and the development of "Armata", create new institute armored vehicles, where to give work to the new Koshkins and comrades, who, with a fresh look, will give a new tank.

For the production of a new tank, build a new tank plant, since the monopoly of Uralvagonzavod does not contribute to a qualitative leap in tank building.

Create a new test center for armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons with subordination to the High Command of the SV.

Create a new ammunition business on a similar principle: a scientific base, pilot production, a testing center, mass production.

Everything must be concentrated and subordinated to the command of the SV!

Until now, it has not been possible to obtain a tank project that would harmonize all the requirements for a tank as a combat tracked vehicle with reliable armor protection, active and passive, powerful weapons, high-quality fire control systems and unitary loading ammunition in an amount of at least 60 pieces per ammunition and in the presence of a loader in the crew. Unless, of course, we are talking about a tank as a combat tracked vehicle that allows the crew to conduct autonomous combat in the convenience of operating with weapons and with high results.

As an example: during the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the T-34-76 crews spent up to two, and sometimes up to three rounds of ammunition (AM) of shells (there were 100 shells in the AM). And they did not choose targets, but hit all targets with a cannon.

As for the versatility of tank weapons, it is necessary to abandon the missile weapons of tanks and transfer these functions to the BMPT tank support combat vehicle. Have a pair of them for a tank platoon of five vehicles: two combat pairs and a platoon commander's tank. It only seems that the combination of a projectile and an ATGM in one tank is a big deal, but only an amateur who has never fired from a tank and does not know everything that happens in the fighting compartment of a tank and what it is like to operate with a weapon in tightness and closeness, in conditions of limited visibility of the battlefield.

Tanks fire direct fire at ranges of up to 2-2.5 km, since it is difficult to find a long range in the western theater of operations, and BMPTs fire at the same ranges or more, but more efficiently, since dust and smoke from cannon shots do not interfere with them, and also destroy air targets, covering battle formations company and the battalion as a whole.

During tank battles in the Second World War, firing was carried out mainly at a distance of 1 km, since the terrain did not allow aimed fire at a long range, and only on the Kursk Bulge the German "menagerie" fired at 1.5-2 km at our thirty-fours, punching right through them. Armor-piercing shells for 88 mm guns were sub-caliber, for the KwK 43 gun -1125 m / s initial speed and at a distance of 2000 m they pierced 106/90 mm armor. In this case, the field of view of the sights was 25-28 degrees, and the sight had a cutting range scales along the perimeter of the field of view.

The quality of tanks was mentioned not only in documents, but also in the stories of front-line tankers: “We were afraid of the Tigers - he would come out from behind a hillock, put out a cannon, burn 20 tanks and leave, and you wouldn’t do anything to him!” The superiority of German tanks over Soviet ones was revealed during the Battle of Kursk, when German tank formations, which had already gone over to the defense, thwarted the counterattack of the 5th Guards Tank Army with fire from the spot.

At the end of the fighting, the army commander, Lieutenant General P.A. Rotmistrov turned to the First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Union - Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov with a letter dated 08/20/1943 with comparative analysis the combat qualities of our and German tanks based on the results of hostilities and with the conclusion that our tanks lost superiority over enemy tanks in armor and weapons. This letter has been published and the reader can read it.

METHODOLOGY OF INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

The proposed design of the Armata tank does not correspond to the nature of future hostilities and cannot be used as the main tank, since any combat situations can arise on the battlefield, and it is not possible to foresee their occurrence and development, and a significant retention of crews is most likely cannot be provided. Therefore, there is no need to flatter yourself on this score and rub glasses on the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, society and tankers.

It is advisable to use it as the basis of tactical formations for sudden strong and short strikes in order to destroy command posts, communication centers, air defense systems, missile systems of various types in positions, and stockpiles of materiel. Strong and effective raiding actions will not only inflict material damage, but will also have a great moral effect!

In 2013, in tank biathlon shooting, they could not hit the target with cannon fire from a place on a stationary target for 2 km. What can we say about firing on the move at a moving target, but in conditions of direct fire confrontation and air strikes?

It is necessary to teach firing and solving fire tasks individually, as the author practiced while serving in a training tank regiment, and not by increasing the number of firing from a regular gun, as some military leaders suggest.

An example for me was Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov, when I was looking for an answer to the question of how to improve the fire skills of tank commanders and battalion gunners. In his work “Memoirs”, I found the answer, and this is how it sounds: “Our company got to shoot at a 12-figure target in growth with a single fire from a prone position from an emphasis on a distance of 1400 steps. Shooting was difficult: it was necessary to follow the wind and, in accordance with it, take out the aiming point, aiming not even at the target, but two or four figures to the right of the target, since the wind blew from the right ... The company commander and I gave aiming points and watched every shot. Rota gave a super-excellent result.

I think that our commanders and military leaders would do well to read this work of a great military theorist and practitioner, which was B.M. Shaposhnikov (“Memoirs. Military Scientific Works”, Military Publishing House, 1974, p. 140). These classes took place in 1904, and the method of individual training in shooting, but from tanks, came in handy in 1974. However, it was necessary to create a training class for fire control and combat of a tank platoon, split the two-hour tank-shooting training into two parts: the first hour - classes in the classroom, where fire was simulated on various targets and the fire task was solved, and the second hour - classes at the tank firing camp with practical shooting with a propeller cartridge, and later - shooting on a tank directrix with a 23 mm projectile at actual ranges. And the fire training was completed with regular firing of 100 mm practical shot in the firing exercise "3a".

This method of individual training in fire training was applied in the battalion, and this improved the results of firing from tanks by one and a half times. I think that some military leaders should use this experience, and not increase the consumption of regular shots by 5-6 times.

One can speak of a change in the spatial nature of combat actions towards an increase, of the autonomy of the actions of subunits, but one cannot lead troops into battle with models of equipment developed half a century ago. Tanks don't need maximum speed 90 km / h, if the average combat and marching speeds are more than 20-30 km / h, it is very difficult to give.

I know this from my own experience. And even more so in the initial period of hostilities, when the uncertainty of the situation, losses, fires around, just human fear will lead to a violation of peacetime plans, since the enemy will fight according to his plans, and not according to ours. And he, the enemy, will immediately strive to seize the initiative in hostilities. Hence the large losses of personnel and equipment, especially since large-scale military operations have not been conducted by the troops for 70 years.

As an example, I would like to cite the combat report of the 202nd motorized rifle division of the 12th microdivision of 07/03/1941 No. 069 to the commander of the 8th Army, Lieutenant General Sobennikov.

“3. The division has almost completely lost its manpower - there are 200-250 people in the regiments. Heavy machine guns and anti-tank artillery destroyed by the enemy, the existing artillery has no shells. There are no explosives (explosives), engineering equipment, mines, land mines, etc. have been missing since the very beginning of the war, and it is not known where this can be obtained. There are no means of communication, gasoline and food have to be obtained on the spot. Where to send the wounded is unknown, and where to get medicines is also unknown.

4. The 202nd MD has completely lost its combat effectiveness, and when the enemy attacks the occupied line, the division cannot continue to linger for defense. (VPK No. 36, 2013)

WE MAKE CONCLUSIONS

The means of defeating a potential enemy are improving qualitatively, and we need to reconsider all approaches to equipping troops in the direction of increasing their autonomy and combat qualities. And disperse them in operational directions to repel the enemy's first strike in accordance with the country's defense plan, otherwise the troops may end up in the position of the 202nd MD, which is unacceptable!

What conclusions can be drawn from this brief analysis?

1. It is required to determine the combat composition of the units, units and formations of the Ground Forces, having formations in an even number, two or four branches (platoons, companies, battalions, brigades), while the battalions must be completely autonomous, separate military units and be the combat basis of brigades . Have in the composition of all types of military branches of the SV and create combat tactical formations in advance, before the start of hostilities. At the same time, the battalions are built on the principle of strict subordination of subunits, and the battalions themselves are under the operational subordination of brigades and are transferred to the direct subordination of brigades on a signal. The completeness of brigades in battalions determines their combat ability, combat mission - shock (counter-attack) or defensive (counter-offensive) character.

2. To have all brigades and corps, as mechanized (mechanized brigades - MBR, mechanized corps - MK), of the same type, but differing in a set of combat battalions (brigades) in accordance with the decision of the senior commander for a battle (operation), and they should be concentrated on the principle of "go apart, but fight together!”

All fire weapons of brigades and corps are subordinate to their commanders in peace and war time and are used to support the battle of combat battalions (brigades).

3. Engineering support is becoming more important, for example, in a battalion, each company should have a tank bridge-laying machine, an engineering barrier vehicle, a trench vehicle, and mining (demining) equipment; camouflage with standard-issue and improvised means, both camouflage and special masks, inflatable models of equipment, is becoming important, and all of them must be consolidated into regular platoons of the battalion. The battalions must have a full-time anti-aircraft missile and artillery battery.

4. Armament should provide a combination of flat fire from tanks and mounted fire from mortars.

5. A higher quality of training of headquarters, their coherence and coherence will be required, but this is a separate special conversation.

6. Particular, if not exclusive, attention should be focused on the training of officers, which should be based on training in the ability to quickly assess the situation, make decisions and assign tasks to subordinates. Initially - for your unit, and later - to teach you to assess the situation one step higher than your position. Candidates for command and staff positions should be selected on the basis of their diligence, respect for subordinates and comrades in the service, balance of mind and character, and fulfill their official duty with honor and dignity. Candidates must be discussed at a meeting of officers, and the decision of the meeting is binding on the command. Then there will be no negativity in the appointment to a higher position, and we can expect the appearance of new Suvorovs, Kutuzovs, Shaposhnikovs, Rokossovskys, Katukovs and other military leaders loyal and devoted to the Fatherland.

7. The organization of command and control of battalion units should be carried out by all types of communication: before the start of hostilities - through personal communication and using coded cards, and with the start of hostilities using radio communications and coded cards, in defense (when located on the spot) by wired telephone and by coded cards. This experience was tested in 1982 in the 12th Guards Tank Division, was approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the GSVG, General of the Army M.M. Zaitsev, after which it was proposed "to do everything as in the 12th division."

8. As of now, the commander and chief of staff of the battalion must be provided with ZAS equipment and a satellite communication channel.

9. In all cases of actions in the battalion, there must be a completely autonomous communication system, interfaced with the ICBM communication system and not interfering with the electronic warfare of the brigade and corps. At the same time, speaking about the automated command and control system for troops and weapons (ACCS), it should be divided into ACCS of platoon and company commanders (batteries) and combat Information Systems(BIS) of line tanks, otherwise neither the ACS, nor the BIS, nor the radio will work. The crews of combat vehicles will be disoriented, which will lead to loss of control.

10. In the conditions of conducting hostilities in disparate areas of theater of operations Special attention should focus on the material support of battalions, brigades and corps for conducting autonomous operations and have strong units of all types of support in their composition.

In conclusion, I would like to say the following: the result can be achieved only if complete solution problems of the Ground Forces and only a systematic approach to them, transforming the troops along the entire vertical - command, command and control (headquarters and communications), organizational measures, logistics, mobilization measures, theater equipment and, of course, re-equipping the ground forces with new weapons systems and military equipment.

At the same time, the support of society should be carried out - as necessary condition success, as the unity of the army and the people!

There was the smallest combat unit "Patrol Link", it was allocated for guard duty, performing tasks of marching security and, in part, for reconnaissance. During the march of a military unit (cavalry regiment), for reconnaissance, inspection of the area, timely warning of the appearance of the enemy ahead in the direction of movement of the unit, sentinel link. When the unit is located on the terrain for recreation sentinel link also conducted inspection of the area and observation of the enemy. In the late 1930s, the term "Patrol Link" lost its meaning due to the emergence of a new term for these tasks.

Crushing tactical units

Counts [by whom?] that combat units smaller than a squad were introduced by the Chinese Communists during the 1927-1950 war. This tactic was borrowed from the Chinese by Evans Carlson (later General of the US Marine Corps). The tactic was tried during the Nicaraguan War [ ] and later adopted by the US Army.

In this case, the department consists of two or three links. Some of the soldiers (driver, gunner, sniper) are not included in any link. population link(3 - 4 people) is connected, in particular, with the fact that in link out of 2 people with the death of one fighter, the second remains alone. Also, when a fighter is wounded, it is easier to take him out of the battlefield together.

The division of the department into links allows the soldiers themselves to take the initiative [ ] on the battlefield, which boosts army morale and prevents trench warfare. [ ] This concept is especially useful in mercenary (non-draft) armies. [ ]

In the armed forces of the post-Soviet states, the division of the department into links officially absent due to the lowest number of branches of all the armies (8 - 9 people). [ ] However, there is often the formation of machine gun and grenade launcher crews by giving machine gunners and grenade launchers second numbers from among submachine gunners. In addition, the Combat Charter of the Russian Armed Forces in terms of combat by a motorized rifle squad provides for the division into two combat groups, maneuverable and fire, where the maneuver group, leading an active offensive and capturing enemy positions, consists of 2-3 shooters led by a senior shooter, and a fire - from the squad leader, grenade launcher and machine gunner. In this case, the composition of combat groups can be arbitrary. This approach is somewhat similar to the practice of using links(fireteams) in the US Armed Forces in terms of mutual maneuver and fire cover links.

Compound link(Fireteam) in the US Armed Forces

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Notes

Literature

Soviet military encyclopedia: [in 8 volumes] / chairman. Ch. ed. commissions A. A. Grechko [vol. eighteen], N. V. Ogarkov [vol. 2-7]. - M. : Military publishing house of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1976-1980.
The Great Soviet Encyclopedia (BSE), Third Edition, published by the Soviet Encyclopedia publishing house in 1969-1978 in 30 volumes;
st.st. 10-12.
Military Encyclopedic Dictionary (VES), M ., VI, 1984, 863 pages with illustrations (ill.), 30 sheets (ill.);
"Military Encyclopedic Dictionary" (VES), M ., VI, 2007;
Warhead // Naval Dictionary / Chernavin V.N. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1990. - S. 51. - 511 p. - ISBN 5-203-00174-X.
Military Encyclopedic Dictionary of Strategic Missile Forces / Ministry of Defense Russian Federation(Ministry of Defense of Russia).; Chief editor: I. D. Sergeev, V. N. Yakovlev, N. E. Solovtsov. - Moscow: Great Russian Encyclopedia, 1999. - 632 p. - 8500 copies. - ISBN 5-85270-315-X.

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An excerpt characterizing the Link (tactical unit)

Having passed with hungry, barefoot soldiers, without a road, through the mountains, on a stormy night forty-five miles, having lost a third of the backward ones, Bagration went to Gollabrun on the Vienna Znaim road a few hours before the French approached Gollabrun from Vienna. Kutuzov had to go for another whole day with his carts in order to reach Znaim, and therefore, in order to save the army, Bagration, with four thousand hungry, exhausted soldiers, had to hold the entire enemy army that met him in Gollabrun for a day, which was obviously , impossible. But a strange fate made the impossible possible. The success of that deception, which without a fight gave the Vienna bridge into the hands of the French, prompted Murat to try to deceive Kutuzov in the same way. Murat, having met the weak detachment of Bagration on the Tsnaim road, thought that it was the whole army of Kutuzov. In order to undoubtedly crush this army, he waited for the troops that had lagged behind on the road from Vienna and for this purpose proposed a truce for three days, on the condition that both troops did not change their positions and did not move. Murat assured that peace negotiations were already underway and that therefore, avoiding the useless shedding of blood, he proposed a truce. The Austrian general Count Nostitz, who was standing at the outposts, believed the words of Murat's truce and retreated, opening Bagration's detachment. Another truce went to the Russian chain to announce the same news of peace negotiations and offer a truce to the Russian troops for three days. Bagration replied that he could not accept or not accept a truce, and with a report on the proposal made to him, he sent his adjutant to Kutuzov.
A truce for Kutuzov was the only way to gain time, to give Bagration's exhausted detachment a rest and to skip the wagon trains and loads (the movement of which was hidden from the French), although there was one extra transition to Znaim. The offer of an armistice provided the only and unexpected opportunity to save the army. Having received this news, Kutuzov immediately sent Adjutant General Wintsengerode, who was with him, to the enemy camp. Winzengerode had not only to accept the armistice, but also to offer terms of surrender, and meanwhile Kutuzov sent his adjutants back to hurry the movement of the carts of the entire army along the Kremsko-Znaim road as much as possible. The exhausted, hungry detachment of Bagration alone had to, covering this movement of carts and the entire army, remain motionless in front of the enemy eight times stronger.
Kutuzov's expectations came true both that the non-binding offer of surrender could give time for some of the transports to pass, and that Murat's mistake should have been discovered very soon. As soon as Bonaparte, who was in Schönbrunn, 25 versts from Gollabrun, received Murat's report and the draft of a truce and surrender, he saw the deceit and wrote the following letter to Murat:
Au Prince Murat. Schoenbrunn, 25 brumaire en 1805 a huit heures du matin.
"II m" est impossible de trouver des termes pour vous exprimer mon mecontentement. Vous ne commandez que mon avant garde et vous n "avez pas le droit de faire d" armistice sans mon ordre. Vous me faites perdre le fruit d "une campagne . Rompez l "armistice sur le champ et Mariechez a l" ennemi. Vous lui ferez declarer, que le general qui a signe cette capitulation, n "avait pas le droit de le faire, qu" il n "y a que l" Empereur de Russie qui ait ce droit.
“Toutes les fois cependant que l" Empereur de Russie ratifierait la dite convention, je la ratifierai; mais ce n "est qu" une ruse. Mariechez, detruisez l "armee russe ... vous etes en position de prendre son bagage et son artiller.
“L "aide de camp de l" Empereur de Russie est un ... Les officiers ne sont rien quand ils n "ont pas de pouvoirs: celui ci n" en avait point ... Les Autriciens se sont laisse jouer pour le passage du pont de Vienne , vous vous laissez jouer par un aide de camp de l "Empereur. Napoleon".
[Prince Murat. Schönbrunn, 25 Brumaire 1805 8 o'clock in the morning.
I cannot find words to express my displeasure to you. You command only my vanguard and have no right to make a truce without my order. You make me lose the fruits of an entire campaign. Break the truce immediately and go against the enemy. You will announce to him that the general who signed this surrender had no right to do so, and no one has, except for the Russian emperor.
However, if the Russian emperor agrees to the mentioned condition, I will also agree; but this is nothing but a trick. Go, destroy the Russian army... You can take its carts and its artillery.
The adjutant general of the Russian emperor is a deceiver ... Officers mean nothing when they do not have authority; he also does not have it ... The Austrians allowed themselves to be deceived when crossing the Vienna bridge, and you allow yourself to be deceived by the emperor's adjutants.
Napoleon.]
Adjutant Bonaparte galloped at full speed with this formidable letter to Murat. Bonaparte himself, not trusting his generals, with all the guards moved to the battlefield, fearing to miss the ready victim, and the 4,000th detachment of Bagration, cheerfully laying out fires, dried, heated, cooked porridge for the first time after three days, and none of the people of the detachment knew and did not think about what lay ahead of him.

At four o'clock in the evening, Prince Andrei, insisting on his request from Kutuzov, arrived in Grunt and appeared to Bagration.
Bonaparte's adjutant had not yet arrived at Murat's detachment, and the battle had not yet begun. The Bagration detachment knew nothing about the general course of affairs, they talked about peace, but did not believe in its possibility. They talked about the battle and also did not believe in the proximity of the battle. Bagration, knowing Bolkonsky as a beloved and trusted adjutant, received him with special superior distinction and indulgence, explained to him that there would probably be a battle today or tomorrow, and gave him complete freedom to be with him during the battle or in the rear guard to observe the order of retreat , "which was also very important."
“However, today, probably, there will be no business,” said Bagration, as if reassuring Prince Andrei.
“If this is one of the ordinary staff dandies sent to receive a cross, then he will receive an award in the rearguard, and if he wants to be with me, let him ... come in handy if he is a brave officer,” Bagration thought. Prince Andrei, without answering anything, asked the prince's permission to go around the position and find out the location of the troops so that, in case of instructions, he would know where to go. The duty officer of the detachment, a handsome man, smartly dressed and with a diamond ring on his index finger, speaking French badly but willingly, volunteered to see Prince Andrei off.
From all sides one could see wet officers with sad faces, as if looking for something, and soldiers dragging doors, benches and fences from the village.
“We can’t get rid of these people, prince,” said the staff officer, pointing to these people. - The commanders are disbanding. And here, - he pointed to the spread out tent of the shopper, - they will huddle and sit. This morning he kicked everyone out: look, it's full again. We must drive up, prince, to frighten them. One minute.
“Let’s go and I’ll take cheese and a roll from him,” said Prince Andrei, who had not yet had time to eat.
Why didn't you say, prince? I would offer my bread of salt.
They got off their horses and went under the marketer's tent. Several officers, with flushed and exhausted faces, were sitting at tables, drinking and eating.
“Well, what is it, gentlemen,” said the staff officer in a tone of reproach, like a man who has already repeated the same thing several times. “Because you can’t go away like that. The prince ordered that there be no one. Well, here you are, Mr. Staff Captain, - he turned to a small, dirty, thin artillery officer, who, without boots (he gave them to the sutler to dry), in stockings, stood in front of the newcomers, smiling not quite naturally.
- Well, how are you, Captain Tushin, are you not ashamed? - continued the staff officer, - it seems to you, as an artilleryman, you need to show an example, and you are without boots. They will sound the alarm, and you will be very good without boots. (The staff officer smiled.) If you please, go to your places, gentlemen, everything, everything, ”he added bossily.
Prince Andrei smiled involuntarily, glancing at Captain Tushin's staff. Silently and smiling, Tushin, stepping from bare foot to foot, looked inquiringly with large, intelligent and kind eyes first at Prince Andrei, then at the officer's headquarters.
“The soldiers say: wiser more dexterously,” said Captain Tushin, smiling and shy, apparently wanting to go from his awkward position into a joking tone.
But he had not finished yet, when he felt that his joke was not accepted and did not come out. He was confused.
“Please leave,” said the staff officer, trying to keep his seriousness.
Prince Andrei glanced once more at the figure of the artilleryman. There was something special about her, not at all military, somewhat comical, but extremely attractive.
The staff officer and Prince Andrei mounted their horses and rode on.

Topic No. 2 Organization of communications at the tactical level of command Lesson No. 7 Control of the communications system and platoon during preparation and during the battle

Training questions: 1. Liaison officers in SMEs (tb) and their responsibilities 2. Content of communications management

Literature: 1. Manual on communications of the Ground Forces (Communications in formations, units and subunits of the Ground Forces). - M.: Military Publishing House, 1985. 2. Fundamentals of organizing communications in the Ground Forces. Part III. - St. Petersburg. : VUS, 2003. 3. Fundamentals of the organization of communications in the Ground Forces. Part III. Schematic album. - St. Petersburg. : VUS, 2003

Training Question No. 1 Liaison Officers in SMEs (TB) and ADN and their Responsibilities

In accordance with the requirements of the charter of the internal service, the chief of staff is personally responsible for organizing command and control in the battalion. Art. 131. The chief of staff of the battalion in peacetime and wartime is responsible: ... for organizing and maintaining a stable and continuous management of the battalion units; Art. 135. The chief of staff of the battalion is obliged: ... - to organize communications in the battalion, check the condition and combat readiness of communications, develop covert control measures and monitor their implementation; ... (Chapter 2 of the UVS of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation)

The "Combat Charter for the preparation and conduct of combined arms combat" says: "Art. 41. The chief of staff of the battalion is the direct organizer of the work of the headquarters and is personally responsible ... for organizing and ensuring the continuous management of units; Art. 52. ... Responsibility for organizing communications, deploying a communications system and automated system command and control of troops and their condition is assigned to the chief of staff of the battalion. The direct organizer of communications is the chief of communications - the commander of the communications platoon. »

The main document regulating the activities of all communications officials in the TKU is the MANUAL ON COMMUNICATIONS OF CONNECTIONS AND UNITS OF THE GROUND FORCES

Responsibilities of battalion communications officials: The Chief of Staff directs communications through the Chief of Communications. He must: - install general order the use of means of communication and the mode of operation of communications according to the stages of hostilities; - determine the procedure for establishing and maintaining communication between subordinate, attached, supporting and interacting units (subdivisions); - set the task for the head of communications to organize and ensure communications; - approve the communication plan; - give orders on communications to subordinates; - organize control over the work and security of communications.

Responsibilities of the battalion's communications officials: When assigning a task to the communications chief, the chief of staff indicates: - formation of the battalion's combat (marching) order; - tasks of the battalion and units, the order of interaction between them; - organization, placement, places and time of launcher deployment, order and directions of their movement; - with whom, by what time, by what means to establish contact and to which areas to pay special attention; - the procedure for using communication facilities and the mode of operation of communications according to the stages of hostilities; - the procedure for restoring communication in case of failure of the PU; - communication readiness time.

Responsibilities of battalion officials on communications: Art. 50 "Instructions ...": The head of communications is the direct head of all personnel of the communications units. In peacetime and wartime, he is responsible for the combat and mobilization readiness of subordinates, communications units, the timely organization of communications and the state of communications, and the stable functioning of the communications system.

Responsibilities of the battalion's communications officials: The chief of communications is obliged to: constantly know the tactical and radio-electronic situation and the communications situation, as well as the state of communications in subordinate units; make timely decisions on the organization and provision of communication; manage communications planning and communications system deployment; develop a communication order and set tasks for communication officials; participate in the development of a combat training plan, a battalion mobilization plan; ensure and control the timeliness of the passage of information in the communication system; provide for measures to ensure communications in the event of a failure of the battalion launchers and taking control of subordinate authorities; develop and implement measures for the security of classified communications and for the protection of the communications system from technical intelligence, the effects of electronic warfare and weapons of mass destruction;

Responsibilities of battalion officials on communications: The chief of communications is obliged to: organize control over compliance with the procedure for using communications equipment, automated control systems and established operating modes of the RES; organize the reception and delivery of secret and postal items; to carry out planning and organization of technical support for communications and automated control systems in a timely manner; exercise control over the course of combat training of the communications platoon and ensure its constant high combat readiness; study and generalize the experience of organizing communications, combat training and bring it to the attention of subordinates; know the degree of training of personnel; know the losses of personnel and means of communication of units and take measures to replenish them; submit communication data in a combat report in a timely manner; keep a worksheet.

Responsibilities of battalion communications officials: The communications chief is also the head of the battalion's KNP communications center. The duties of the head of communications as the head of the service are defined in the Charter of the internal service of the RF Armed Forces. The head of the communication center is responsible for the constant readiness and stable operation of the node. He is obliged: - to know the combat situation and the state of communications in the battalion; - manage the deployment (folding) and movement of the communication center and ensure the timely establishment and maintenance of stable communications; - ensure the timely transmission (delivery) of combat documents, commands, combat control and warning signals passing through the communication center, and control their accounting; - exercise control over the technical condition and proper operation of communication facilities and timely maintenance;

Responsibilities of battalion officials on communications: Head of the communications center. . . is obliged to: - organize and ensure accurate duty and compliance with the requirements of the operational and technical service manuals at the node; - in case of violations of communication, immediately take measures to restore it; - ensure the uninterrupted operation of communications with the higher headquarters, know the location and procedure for moving its communication nodes (stations), detour directions for communication with them; - to ensure the implementation of the established modes of operation of various means of communication, measures to protect communications from technical reconnaissance and electronic warfare of the enemy, the requirements for the security of communications and electromagnetic compatibility of all RES located on the KNP (KP); - organize engineering equipment, camouflage, protection against weapons of mass destruction, security and defense of the communication center.

Responsibilities of battalion officials on communications issues: The unit commander (department, head of the station, control room ...) is responsible for the combat and mobilization readiness of the unit entrusted to him, the timely and high-quality fulfillment of the assigned tasks, combat training, the moral and psychological state and military discipline of the subordinate personal composition. He is obliged to: - know the data on the situation and the state of communications provided by the unit, as well as the state of his subordinates; - make decisions in a timely manner, manage the planning and combat use of the unit; organize interaction and maintain it with other communication units of the unit; - organize and control the operational and technical service on the communication lines deployed by the unit, the technical operation of communication equipment and automated control systems.

Responsibilities of the battalion's communications officers: The head of the communications direction is subordinate to the head of communications and is responsible for the timely establishment and provision of communications in the direction. He is obliged: - to know the location and direction of movement of the command posts of his headquarters and the unit (unit) with which communication is provided; - know the call signs of the communication centers of the command posts of their headquarters and units with which communication is provided, the signals for controlling the communication system and units, the procedure for maintaining communication with communication control points; - conduct reconnaissance of the direction of deployment (laying) of the communication line; - timely deploy and organize operational maintenance, security and defense of communication lines; - provide camouflage and protection of communication lines from fire, means of technical reconnaissance and electronic warfare of the enemy;

Duties of battalion officials on communications: The head of the communications direction ... is obliged to: - report to the chief of communications (communications officer) on the progress of the assigned task, on the readiness of communications and on the movements of control points of the unit (unit) with which he provides communications; - report to the commander of the unit with which he provides communication on his task, on the readiness of communication and constantly take care of timely receipt of data from him on the direction, procedure and timing of the movement of control points; - know the radiation, chemical and biological situation in the direction of laying a wire communication line and, if areas of contamination are found, report to the head of communications (communications officer) and look for ways to bypass; - keep an accounting card (working card), on which to apply the direction of laying a wire line, the location of communication nodes (stations), control posts, the calculation of forces and means of communication.

Responsibilities of battalion officials on communications issues: The head of the relay point (station) reports to the head of communications and is responsible for the smooth operation of the point (station) and ensuring relaying in the designated radio networks.

Management This is a conscious human impact on various objects and processes occurring in the surrounding world, which is carried out in order to give the processes a certain direction and obtain the desired results.

The control cycle is a complete set of periodically following each other components of the control process: - obtaining information by the control link, - processing information in order to develop a decision, - transferring data for implementation, - collecting information about the result of control.

General scheme control Program, indication Environment direct connection Control subject Control action Control object feedback Information about control result Control result

The control system must have high survivability, noise immunity. reliability and provide the possibility of both centralized and decentralized management of departments. Control facilities include communication facilities and an automated control system, technical means of covert command and control of troops, information processing and calculation, registration and reproduction. The communication system and the automated control system are the main means and the material and technical basis for the control of units (forces and means).

Communications management consists in the purposeful activity of the chief of communications, unit headquarters, unit commanders, other communications management bodies to create (develop) and comprehensively prepare the system, communications units of the unit in constant readiness to ensure the management of units, as well as to manage the system and communications units in fulfilling the set tasks. Communications management should ensure: - timely and covert deployment of a communications system and its build-up in the course of hostilities; - stability and continuity of the communication system; the implementation of flexible maneuver lines, channels and means of communication in accordance with the evolving situation; - timely passage of all types of information in command and control systems; - implementation of measures to protect the communication system from technical means reconnaissance, destruction and electronic suppression of the enemy; - combat and mobilization readiness of communications units, effective use of their capabilities; - operational restoration of communications, as well as the combat capability of communications units; - fulfillment of communication security requirements.

Communication management includes: - continuous acquisition, collection, processing, study, analysis, evaluation and display of data on the situation and the state of communication; - making a decision on the organization of communication; - bringing tasks to subordinates; - communication planning for combat operations, other types of combat activities of the “unity (unit); - organization and maintenance of interaction; - organizing and carrying out activities for all types of ensuring the use of the system, parts and subdivisions of communications; - management of the preparation of subordinate communications control bodies, units and subdivisions of communications for use; - organization and implementation of control and assistance to subordinate units and communications units; - direct management of the actions of communication units and subunits in the performance of their assigned tasks; - maintaining the moral and psychological state of communication units and subdivisions; - organization and control of communication security and information protection; other activities.

Kostyaev Nikolay Ivanovich- Senior Researcher of the Research Department of the ACS of the Center for Scientific Research of Systemic Operational and Tactical Research of the Military Educational and Scientific Center of the Ground Forces "Combined Arms Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation", candidate of military sciences, retired colonel.

Kucharov Vladislav Nazarovich- Head of the ACS Laboratory of the Center for Scientific Research of Systemic Operational and Tactical Research of the Military Educational and Scientific Center of the Ground Forces "Combined Arms Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation", candidate of military sciences, lieutenant colonel.

The last decades all over the world have been accompanied by the emergence of new military threats, a change in the nature of wars and military conflicts. In the same years, the armed forces of the majority developed countries of the world are moving from the concept of "platform-centric war", in which the main emphasis was placed on the number and power of weapons and military equipment, to the concept of "network-centric warfare" (NCW). The main content of the concept of NCW is the conduct of hostilities in a single information space.

The introduction of network technologies in the military sphere is aimed at increasing the combat capabilities of the armed forces, but not so much by increasing the fire, maneuverability and other characteristics of weapons and troops (forces), but primarily by reducing the combat control cycle. These circumstances are forcing the military leadership of a number of advanced countries, including Russia, to carry out a purposeful large-scale reform of the national armed forces.

The main content of the reform process is the transformation of heterogeneous forces and means, inherited, in particular, by Russia from the Soviet Union and intended mainly for conducting military operations with mass armies, into more flexible and mobile formations of the information age. Using modern systems communications and command and control, reconnaissance and WTO, such formations must be able to perform tasks of a different nature and achieve military-political goals in an acceptable time frame in the course of confrontation with any enemy.

At the same time, without stopping scientific and technical research and development aimed at equipping the armed forces with new means of armed struggle, the scientific community of the United States and other NATO countries attaches paramount importance to research in the field of increasing the effectiveness of command and control of the armed forces. To this end, there are active Scientific research, aimed not only at improving the organizational structure, but also at clarifying the actual functions and processes necessary for a promising system of command and control of the armed forces, the main element of which, according to the terminology of American military science, is command and operational control (COC).

World experience and research by domestic scientists show that it is impossible to solve the problem of improving management efficiency through partial organizational and technical improvements in existing management systems. A breakthrough in this direction can only be achieved through innovative development the entire command and control system and its constituent elements, starting with the search for structures of points and command and control bodies adequate to the new conditions, principles and methods of their application in the combat activities of troops, tactics and equipment, technologies for command and control and organization of communications.

With regard to the technical aspect of military activity, innovation is a new or improved (modernized) model of weapons, military and special equipment (AMSE), or a new way of interaction between AMSE models in solving combat missions, providing in both cases an increase in the efficiency of solving these problems. And not just an increase, but a sharp jump in efficiency, obtaining a new quality in the implementation of the requirements for the weapons system. Such an innovation is the materialization of new ideas and knowledge, discoveries, inventions and scientific and technical developments in the process of performing research and development work.

The urgency of the problem of improving command and control in modern conditions was raised back in 2000 at the scientific and practical conference of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, in particular, in the speech of General of the Army M.A. Along with the improvement of communications, automatic control systems, mobile command posts, especially from the point of view of their security and suitability for work in the field, it is desirable to give priority to improving the organizational structure, working methods of commanders, headquarters, officer training, taking into account modern requirements for command and control ". ( Gareev M. M. Actual problems of improving the management of troops (forces). // Military thought. 2000. No. 2. )

The military operations in the armed conflict in the North Caucasus, the military operation to force Georgia to peace clearly showed that the command and control system at the tactical level, created in accordance with the current guidelines, turned out to be practically unable to provide such important components of battle management as: continuous data collection and analysis of the situation, adoption (clarification) of the decision and setting of tasks in the course of hostilities within the allotted time, that is, there is a lack of a timely and objective response to a change in the situation. And although the system of control points as a whole ensured the work of the control bodies, their poor technical equipment at all levels made it difficult to solve control problems to a large extent. In addition, it was noted that under conditions of active enemy influence, the survivability and mobility of command posts, especially in the lower levels of command, do not at all correspond to modern requirements.

The practical implementation of the requirement to improve command and control was approved on August 30, 2000 by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, the Concept of creating a Unified system for command and control of troops (forces) and weapons at the tactical level for the period up to 2010. The automated control system (ECU TK) created in accordance with this concept was designed to provide a qualitative breakthrough in command and control of troops and weapons, to bring it at least to the level of similar systems of our potential opponents, to bring it into line with the requirements for control in all types of modern combined arms combat, taking into account prospects for its development.

The simplest, at first glance, the solution to the problem of bringing the control system to the level of modern requirements is seen in equipping the controls computer technology and digital means of communication with their combination into single system. However, as the experience of developing on the basis of this approach ACS "Maneuver" has shown, the desire to automate the existing control system has not led to a significant increase in control efficiency.

A. Litoshenko in the article “ACS: Choosing a Development Vector” explains this phenomenon, which is typical for all works related to the development of automated systems: “... Even the founders of cybernetics formulated the most important postulates of the success of control automation. The first of them is that automation of control will be successful only if it is directly involved in the person in whose interests the ACS is created and who will work on the means of this system. In theory, this is called the decision maker. And the second postulate: it is impossible to automate the mess (this is the term used by one of the luminaries of the Russian school of cybernetics, Academician V. M. Glushkov). Since both postulates are often ignored in our country, one should not be surprised (to put it mildly) with the low success of automation. ( Litoshenko A. ACS: choice of development vector.//VKO. 2007. No. 6 (37) )

In reality, the development of ESU TK took place in violation of these fundamental postulates. The reasons for this, as noted in the article by A.P. Tsarev, were that “... Attempts to implement the main cornerstone postulate of cybernetics “the system is created for the task” ran into direct prohibitions or a complex of financial and organizational slingshots. The management system did not want to change ... Thus, for many years we were forced to "automate" existing structures management without the required restructuring of problem solving methods. ( Tsarev A.P. Informational Priorities in Armed Struggle: Tribute to Fashion or Necessity? // Military parade. 1998. No. 3 (27 ).

In the Ground Forces, the development of automated control systems began in the late 50s of the last century. The operational-tactical foundations for the construction and functioning of the control system of the operational and tactical levels were developed at the MV Frunze Military Academy by a military scientific group specially created for this purpose. On the basis of its theoretical developments, the industry created prototypes of the Manevr automatic control system.

After state tests of the tactical level ACS in the early 80s, it was accepted for trial operation in the troops, which showed that, despite a number of obvious advantages, it also has serious drawbacks that did not allow for any significant effect in command and control. Along with reasons of a purely technical order (low reliability of the equipment, complexity in its use, imperfection of special mathematical software, etc.), experimental operation showed its fundamental drawback and the following obvious (from today's standpoint) conclusion: an attempt to automate the existing control system without restructuring its structure and methods for solving management problems is doomed to failure from the outset.

Unfortunately, the developers of the ESU TZ went along the beaten path of the creators of the Manevr automated control system, aggravating the situation by the fact that the design began immediately with the development of operational-tactical initial data. The necessary and obligatory stage of the analysis of possible concepts for building a system and choosing the most rational one for the given conditions of its functioning was ignored. In fact, the initial data that was issued to the developers was a set of information from the existing Combat Manual and the Staff Manual, other similar documents without taking into account the new capabilities of a potential enemy to counteract our control systems, as well as global trends in the development of control systems, modern advances in methods and technologies for solving control problems. The technical issues of developing automated control and communication tools were solved in a similar way, when existing devices were mainly used, which were often outdated and did not meet modern requirements.

Based on these initial data and technical solutions, by the end of 2009, the so-called ESU TK delivery set was developed and manufactured. The battalion and brigade exercises conducted with this kit revealed numerous shortcomings of a systemic and technical nature, in mathematical and software.

Not the last role in the current situation, along with the customers of the system, developers terms of reference and the initial data for the design also belongs to the inertia of thinking of the teams of performers of these works, their inability to go beyond the established ideas based on the experience of developing the Maneuver automated control system, the stereotypes of building non-automated control systems, the known algorithms and methods of operation of the controls in them, and sometimes even rejection of automation as such.

One of the significant shortcomings of the ESU TK being developed is that it, like the Maneuver automated control system, is built on a hierarchical basis. By itself, this type of organization cannot be considered "good" or "bad", but only adequate or inadequate in relation to the tasks being solved. And if half a century ago this principle corresponded to the military operations of that period, then in modern conditions the features inherent in a hierarchical organization are already positioned as systemic shortcomings. These include:

Lack of independence of the managed sublevels of the system;

The low speed of information passing through the structure of the hierarchy itself, that is, a slow response to control actions and feedback;

Loss of information within the hierarchical structure, which leads to the loss of control of some elements of the system and often to the complete loss of feedback from lower levels of the organization.

According to American military science and domestic scientists, in modern conditions the traditional hierarchy can no longer be considered as the optimal model for organizing military formations. It was also found that one of the most important characteristics of control systems in the modern information age is their ability to quickly adapt structurally and functionally to changes in combat conditions.

Simultaneously with foreign military specialists, research on improving control systems was also carried out in the Armed Forces of Russia. Thus, since the mid-90s of the last century, the Frunze Military Academy has carried out initiative research to improve the tactical level command and control system. The direction of these works, as it turned out now, lay in line with modern trends in improving control systems, namely, giving the control system the ability to functionally and structurally adapt (transform) to changes in the conditions of its functioning in combat conditions. ( Sapozhinsky V. A., Kostyaev N. I. On the improvement of the automated control system of the tactical level. // Military thought. 2002. No. 5 )

The study of the control system was based on a functional-structural approach based on the following premises: the structure of the system is determined by the totality of the functions of the system being implemented; the functional and structural organization of the system adapts to the changing conditions of its existence; a change in the conditions of existence of the system (the external environment) causes a change in its functions and leads, accordingly, to a change in the structure. An analysis of the operating conditions of the command and control system in combat conditions shows that it practically solves two groups of tasks in their respective conditions: a) in preparation for combat operations (planning and organization) - in areas of concentration; b) when commanding troops in battle - on the battlefield. This implies the conclusion that an innovative control system in modern combined arms combat, designed to function in significantly different conditions and to solve various tasks, must be able to adapt (transform) in such a way that its structure, composition of elements and the relationship between them (configuration) provide to the maximum extent effective solution management tasks specific to these conditions.

Therefore, the configuration of the system must correspond to each group of conditions and it must naturally transform from the configuration that has the maximum set of elements that form the system. Obviously, such a set will have a system configuration designed to solve problems in the most difficult conditions, i.e. in combat. For a successful system transformation within a given time frame, its elements must have the necessary independence in solving particular management problems, for which they need to have an appropriate set of technical means, as well as a permanent staff of performers. The importance of this requirement is especially relevant during the transition from the stage of preparation for combat operations to the stage of command and control of troops in battle, i.e., when it is necessary to ensure the continuity and continuity of command and control processes.

These requirements are met by an automated control system of a transformable type. A control system that implements such a concept, as research results show, can provide a combination of methods of dispersal, separation and duplication of the main elements of the control system, which in turn will increase the survivability of the control system and efficiency. management activities commanders and staffs, and will also reduce the management cycle.

The main essence of this system lies in the fact that in the initial area (concentration area) it can function in the structure of the current, so-called classical command and control system, which provides the best conditions for the operational headquarters for planning and preparing combat operations, and for command and control of troops during combat operations. it is transformed (transformed) into a distributed type control system with redundancy of its main elements or control loops.

The construction of such a system is based on the modular principle, according to which its structure is a set of control modules combined into a single system, each of which performs completely certain function control of troops or weapons. Each of the modules must correspond to any control body (point) or its structural (functional) subdivision and have independence sufficient to solve the control tasks assigned to this module.

The modular structure makes it possible to build a control system in such a configuration that will best correspond to the conditions and tasks that it must solve in a real combat situation. It also matches current trends in creating flexible, adequate organizational structures having in each period of its existence a structure that meets the conditions in which it functions. A transformable type management system has a dynamic structure, in which changes occur not only in the number of individual organizational elements, but also in their composition, relationships and functions. Systems with a changing structure, adapting well to environmental conditions, provide a potential opportunity for high efficiency in achieving their goals. The realization of this possibility will essentially depend on the psychological aspects of building such systems.

The fact is that the constant movement of officials in various combinations with the change of their functions bring to the fore the problem of their psychological compatibility, quick organization mutual understanding in solving new problems.

Each of the modules is located in one or several special vehicles equipped with automation and communications equipment (command and staff vehicle, command control vehicle, etc.) and has the ability to move freely and, depending on the situation, occupy a position on the ground in the brigade lane, convenient to perform their functions in solving management problems.

The conducted studies have shown that in a transformable type control system in a brigade level, when it functions in a distributed form, it is possible and advisable to have the following elements: a command post, three mobile combat control posts, a fire control post, an air defense control post, control posts for types of combat and material -technical support, information and analytical center (IAC) of the brigade ( rice. one ).

The command post (CP) of the brigade is the main control body from which the brigade commander manages military units and subunits during preparation and during the battle. It is deployed behind the combat formations of military units (subunits) of the first echelon, at a distance that ensures reliable control of subordinates. The main task of the command post is to ensure the conduct of ongoing hostilities. In addition, together with the IAC KP, it analyzes the necessary information in the interests of the commander, prepares reports to the higher command, and plans upcoming military operations. It is advisable to place the CP in armored cross-country vehicles with a wheel arrangement of 6x6. The internal volume of the functional protected module of such machines can be 18.0 cubic meters. m. with a usable area of 14.0 sq. m. Such a volume will allow to place in it 2-3 workstations (with a chair), a radio post for 4-5 radio stations of the R-168 type. Body equipment (air conditioner, heater, filter-ventilation device, bathroom) will provide sufficiently comfortable conditions for the work of the operational staff.

The combat command post (PBU) is the main element of the command and control system. It is intended for the operational command and control of troops during the battle, similar to the forward command post (PPU) of the existing command post. It consists of: a commander, an officer of the operational department, an officer of the intelligence department and an officer-operator of the automated control system. A characteristic feature is that it is placed in one armored KShM, thereby forming a kind of mini-PPU. Such placement can provide the PBU with high mobility, the ability not to stand out from the main mass of combat vehicles, and to successfully use natural shelters and the protective properties of the terrain.

These properties of the PBU will increase its survivability, and the commander's ability to operate in close proximity to the battlefield and personally observe the actions of the troops and make decisions on their adjustment almost in real time, which can also significantly increase the efficiency of control.

The limited number of PBU operational staff is supposed to be compensated by the widespread use of computer technology and digital communication systems, rational organization based on new information technologies information process in the control system and algorithms of actions of commanders and staff officers in solving the tasks of command and control of troops and weapons, as well as in the widely developed infrastructure of ACS subsystems that provide control processes.

In order to increase the survivability of the entire command and control system, it is proposed to have three such points, headed by the first persons of the brigade command: commander, chief of staff, deputy commander.

At all KShM PBU should be provided with an indication mode on the status of each PBU and information about which of them is in this moment is basic. Such a mode of informing will make it possible, in the event of failure of the main point, to immediately transfer control to a spare or reserve one, thereby ensuring continuous command and control of troops.

For the normal functioning of the PBU in combat conditions, it is advisable to equip it with security and support units. Since the PBU has only one KShM, in which the operational staff is located, as well as combat vehicles with security and support units, then, in our opinion, there is no need to allocate a separate area for its deployment. It may well be located in the area of deployment of one of the battalions, and its protection and defense can be carried out in the general system of security and defense of the brigade. A security unit consisting of one squad on a combat vehicle is necessary only for the direct protection of the PBU. A variant of the possible placement of workplaces for PBU and AWP officials in the KShM is shown in rice. 2 .

It is advisable to include three workstations in the complex of PBU automation tools: commander, operator and reconnaissance. At the same time, it is assumed that the commander, due to intense intellectual and psychological stress, especially during the battle, does not work directly at the AWS. These functions are performed by the ACS operator-operator in accordance with the instructions of the commander. Workplace commander in the KShM should only have a means of displaying operational-tactical information against the background of an electronic map, which is part of the automated workplace, i.e. a kind of analogue working card, with the ability to display on it in a separate window confidential information received by the commander personally.

As such a tool, it is advisable to have a touch-type liquid crystal screen, on which the commander, using an "electronic pencil" (stylus), could apply conventional signs of a tactical situation, designations and texts for setting tasks for subordinates, reports to superiors and other purposes. An obligatory element of the commander's workplace should be a secret telephone with guaranteed durability.

The ACS operator-operator can communicate directly with the commander's workstation. At his direction, he generates and transmits signals, commands, orders, and other messages to subordinates; receives information incoming to the commander’s workstation, enters it into the ACS database or documents it in the prescribed manner, transmits to the addressees graphic information applied by the commander on his liquid crystal screen, etc. The brigade commander, based on the data on the situation, his troops and the enemy displayed on his electronic map in real time, as well as reports from officers of the operational and intelligence departments that are part of the PBU, manages the troops by making decisions, issuing orders and instructions, and monitoring their implementation.

The data of the operational-tactical situation are sent to the workstations of officials of the command post, PBU and other command and control bodies of the brigade as they come from information sources from the subsystem of information management support specially created in the ACS, which functions in the structure of the information and analytical center of the brigade.

The modular design of the PBU, their ability to independently make decisions (if necessary) based on the real situation displayed in real time, provide the possibility of their flexible use in combat conditions, depending on the current situation.

So, if the enemy is not able to influence control points during the period of preparation for combat operations, then all control modules can function, forming the structure of the command post of the existing system. At the same time, the operational composition of the command post and PBU forms the basis of the combat control center ( rice. 3 ).

In the course of hostilities, PBUs, depending on the type of combat and the situation, can be located within the zone of operations and occupy different positions. So, for example, in the defense of the PBU, the brigade commander can be located in the direction of concentration of the main efforts, directly in the combat formations of the battalions of the first echelon or forward detachments, in places from where the commander can personally observe their actions and quickly influence the course of the battle; PBU of the deputy commander - in the area where the forces and means allocated for combating enemy airborne assaults and sabotage and reconnaissance formations are located in readiness to control antiamphibious combat. The chief of staff of the brigade with a group of officer-operators is located mainly at the command post.

In an internal armed conflict ( special operation), when brigade units are located in base areas and will conduct combat and other actions with reinforced units (military maneuver groups, raid detachments) and simultaneously solve several diverse non-specific tasks, in the absence of neighbors and the constant threat of influence from the enemy, using guerrilla and terrorist actions , their management can be entrusted to one, two or all of the brigade's PBU.

The presence in the control system of three PBUs, practically equivalent in their capabilities, in conditions of intense hostilities, including at night, will provide the necessary rest for command staff by organizing their shift work.

A fire control point (PUOP) is created by combining in a single regular formation the control bodies of all fire weapons involved in the fire engagement of the enemy in order to more effectively realize their combat capabilities. The main tasks of the PUOP are:

When preparing for combat operations - planning the use of artillery, aviation and other means of fire and electronic destruction of the enemy;

During the battle - control (coordination) of fire and electronic defeat of the enemy.

In our opinion, the head of the PUOP should be the chief of artillery with the rank of deputy commander for fire damage.

The air defense command post, as well as the command posts for the types of combat, material and technical support, are created by functional and informational unification of the corresponding command posts of the chiefs of the combat arms and services and the command posts of their subordinate units and subunits.

The Information and Analytical Center of the brigade (IAC) is designed to collect and process information about the enemy, friendly troops, the conditions of warfare, and distribute it according to its intended purpose to officials of the brigade's command and control bodies. Given the exceptional importance of information for effective management troops and weapons, ensuring its functioning, in contrast to the temporarily created information groups at the command post, should be carried out within the framework of a permanent staff structure. The IAC is located in the brigade's command post deployment area.

In conclusion, it must be emphasized once again that the implementation of an automated control system of a transformable type is possible only on the basis of automation and communication tools. latest generation and developed infrastructure of control support subsystems.

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