Transaction costs within a firm: influence costs (Milgrom)

Let's take a closer look at what transaction costs arise within the company (we called them managerial or bureaucratic costs). Two interrelated problems arise within the company: coordination and motivation.

The essence of the coordination problem is to coordinate the division of labor within the firm. It is necessary to determine what should be done and how and who should do it. The survival and success of an organization depends on how well it can coordinate the actions of a large number of people and groups, develop a realistic plan and direct the actions of people towards its implementation. It is necessary to decide who makes decisions, which of them need to be made centrally and which should be made decentralized; what information should be passed up to those who make decisions, and what information should be sent down to those involved in implementing the plan, i.e. organize a communication system within the company. Therefore, coordination costs consist of the following components:

• management costs (distribution of tasks);
• costs of collecting and processing information;
• communication costs (this includes time lost from delays in information during communication; costs caused by inaccurate or insufficient information, concealment of information).

The motivational problem is related to the coordination problem; it affects the solution of coordination problems. The essence of mochi

The fundamental problem is to ensure that employees willingly complete tasks and to interest them in accurately and accurately providing the information necessary to develop plans. Workers may have incentives to misprovide private information so that higher authorities make decisions that benefit these workers. To solve the motivational problem and prevent opportunistic behavior of employees, complex and expensive structures appear in companies, the tasks of which include monitoring the behavior of employees and establishing punishments - sanctions, fines. Part of the management apparatus is exclusively occupied with reducing the costs of opportunistic behavior. So, the costs arising from the motivational problem include the following components:

• losses from employee shirking;
• the costs of measuring individual workers' contributions;
• costs of employee control.

Trying to determine the boundaries of the company and answer the question about the possibility of overcoming one of the shortcomings of the company as a mechanism for coordinating the activities of people, which is associated with the absence within the company of strong economic incentives characteristic of the market mechanism, the American scientist P. Milgrom proposed the idea of ​​“costs of influence” ( influence costs). He suggested that bureaucratic rules are a rational way to curb activities harmful to the organization aimed at influencing management in order to obtain certain benefits from it ( influence activity).

Milgrom, like Williamson, tried to answer the question of whether it was possible to make sure that independent divisions operated within the firm, and their actions were coordinated by a mechanism with strong incentives, similar to the market, and the central management of the firm would implement a policy of selective intervention where there was a need to correct the market mechanism. Like Williamson, Milgrom gives a negative answer to this question: such a policy of selective intervention is impossible due to the fact that the internal life of the company is politicized and active activities begin to influence management.

Activities aimed at influencing management in order to obtain certain benefits from it ( influence activity always occurs in organizations when organizational decisions affect the distribution of wealth or other benefits among members of the organization or groups within the organization.

The more power the management has, the more intense the attempts of subordinates pursuing their own selfish goals to influence it can become. Why should management pay attention to these attempts to influence him by subordinates?

First, the manager must evaluate the job in order to make good decisions about the match between the employee's skills and the work assigned to him. He must pay attention to signals about workers' abilities. As a result, employees, not constrained by the means to achieve goals, can direct their efforts to prove their abilities in less productive ways: flattery, yessing to superiors, personal favors, creating alliances with other employees. The market, of course, is also subject to a similar flaw: career considerations can distort behavior in any situation where some assessment of economic agents is made (for example, in the labor market for managers, which we will discuss below). But inside the firm, the employee is observed more closely, and the benefits of the employee signaling his value are greater. In the market, it is more difficult to determine the goals for such influence activities, so the losses from these activities within the company will be more significant.

Secondly, the manager may even like such activities, since he may be offered a bribe. Of course, this is not a bribe in the form of a certain amount of money, it manifests itself in the form of personal favors and flattery. Mutual exchange increases with time and with the intensity of contacts. The owner of the company does not need to worry about bribes of this kind from the employee. If he accepts personal services, then it will simply be a mutually beneficial exchange. But when the person exercising control does not bear all the financial consequences of his actions, then such an exchange may become redundant.

The costs of this activity are called “influence costs.” Any structure with elements of centralized decision-making is subject to these costs. The following components of influence costs can be distinguished:

• loss of efficiency due to agents distorting the information they provide to higher authorities, thus trying to influence management decisions; agents may also withhold information in an attempt to become indispensable;
• time and effort wasted trying to influence decisions made by management in their favor;
• The company's costs include preventing the politicization of its internal life and reducing the costs of influence.

To prevent or limit the politicization of internal life and the growth of the costs of influence of the company:

• – hide information (for example, employees’ wages are transferred to bank card and they don't know about the size wages your colleagues);
• – smooth out differences in wages;
• - establish a strict relationship between wages, length of service and the task performed;

introduce “objective” criteria for promotion (age or education of employees);

• – establish strictly formalized decision-making procedures;
• – create special regulatory bodies;
• – limit communication between managers and lower-level employees.

All these restrictions are associated with direct costs, but they also have a negative indirect impact - they lead to a decrease in efficiency due to weakening incentives. For example, limiting communication between a manager and lower-level employees, although it reduces the opportunity for politicking and supplying management with strategic information, leads to the fact that some information important to management does not reach him.

Rules and bureaucratic restrictions may prevent activities that are exceptional in nature. Requests for funds must be approved by many authorities before they reach the person who can make the final decision, making it less likely that an unusual and innovative project will be accepted. In addition, managers at various levels will protect their investments in specific human capital, and new products and production methods may be a potential threat to their position as managers.

When two organizations merge into one, the costs of influence increase dramatically. Employees of each division will try to influence senior management so that it transfers resources to this new division (investment, the most talented employees). Many acquisitions fail due to influence costs. An example is the 1980 takeover of Tenneco Inc. Houston Oil and Minerals Corporation, which was engaged in the exploration, development and production of oil and other minerals. Prior to the acquisition, Houston had been quite successful and aggressive, and Tenneco wanted to maintain that entrepreneurial style of operation of the company. In hopes of retaining Houston's skilled workforce, Tenneco offered it a special compensation system that it did not use for its employees.

However, difficulties arose in implementing this plan, and within a year, former company Houston lost most of its employees. The reason for this was the bureaucratic difficulties encountered in obtaining the remuneration package assigned to him and the bureaucratic restrictions on the amount of these payments. It proved impossible to maintain a different status for the new division than other divisions, and a differentiated approach to determining remuneration levels could not be implemented. The remuneration policy pursued in relation to the former Houston Company came into conflict with Tenneco's desire to follow a policy of fair wages, applying uniform remuneration standards to all employees of the company. This policy of rewarding the new division could have disastrous consequences for Tenneco, it would lead to attempts by other divisions to take over most of the funds, an increase in the number of employee complaints, i.e. the costs that Milgrom calls the costs of influence would increase significantly

14. In number transaction costs not included:

1. Costs of choosing transaction partners

2. Negotiation costs

4. Transportation costs

5. Costs of improper execution of a transaction or costs of avoiding them

Sample answer: 4

15. Supreme body joint stock company is:

1. Meeting of shareholders

2. CEO

3. Board of Directors ( Supervisory Board)

4. Executive agency

5. All listed bodies resolve all issues collectively.

Sample answer: 1.

16. The rights of the owner of an ordinary share do not include:

1. Receiving a dividend

3. Familiarization with company documentation

4. Redemption of shares at par value upon first request

5. All listed rights are typical for ordinary shares

Sample answer: 4

17. B joint stock company:

1. Ownership and control are separated

2. The sole owner is the board of directors

3. Management is in the hands of shareholders

4. There is no need to publish results economic activity

5. All of the above are false.

Sample answer: 1

In which industries in a market economy is state ownership most likely?

1. In the production of shoes and clothing

2. B retail trade

3. In infrastructure sectors

4. B agriculture

5. In production building materials

Sample answer: 3

20. The functions of the exchange are all except:

1. accumulation of capital,

2. ensuring intersectoral capital flows,

3. creation of an effective owner,

4. information support.

Sample answer: 3

21. Hierarchy is:

Sample answer: 2

22. Characteristics of spontaneous order include everything except:

1. coordination of actions through the market,

2. subordination of individual actions of individual participants to the orders of the center,

3. making decisions based on one’s own motives and available information,

4. Subordination of one’s actions to price information.

Sample answer: 2

23. The boundaries of a firm’s efficiency are determined by the growth of transaction costs associated with:

1. the phenomenon of loss of control,

2. the effect of information distortion,

3. increase in accounting costs,

4. weakening of motivation,

5. all of the above are true.

The concept and meaning of a transaction.

Transaction is a human activity in the form of alienation and appropriation of property rights and freedoms accepted in society, which are carried out in the process of planning, monitoring the fulfillment of promises, as well as adaptation to unforeseen circumstances.

Freedom rights are considered as a separate category. In this case, the legal point of view is used. This is due to the fact that freedom rights do not belong to the category of property rights in the legal sense, even if we do not limit ourselves to the continental legal tradition and take into account the peculiarities of customary law. At the same time, within the framework of the new institutional economic theory, freedom rights may well be considered as a subtype of property rights. This is due to the emphasis on incentives in determining the meaning of rights to explain the actions of economic agents and the interaction between them regarding limited resources.

There is another aspect to the definition of a transaction. Institutions ensure the extension of the will of an individual beyond the area within which he can influence the environment directly through his actions, that is, beyond the scope of physical control. This distribution turns out to be transactions as opposed to individual action as such (stock) or exchange of goods.

When a transaction is considered, the restrictions, social background, or context in which they (the actions) are considered must be explicitly defined. Thus, the transaction turns out to be an action based on the interaction between people.

In economic theory, interaction between people is considered against the backdrop of such key assumptions as limited resources and following one's own interests. That is why the transaction contains in implicit form three moments, which at the same time are a reflection of three types social relations: conflict, dependence and order16. First approximation conflict can be defined as a relationship of mutual exclusion regarding the use of a limited resource. Interdependence- an attitude reflecting a mutual understanding of the possibilities for improving well-being through interaction. Order- a relationship through which not only the total gain is determined, but also its distribution between interested parties.

The proposed definition of a transaction allows us to analyze various forms of economic activity within the same system of concepts. Thus, this definition is an element of general economic theory from the point of view of the possibilities of analyzing alternative and/or complementary economic systems.

The definition of a transaction and comments to it make it possible to formulate the sequence of further presentation. First, we need to consider the types of transactions. Secondly, to find out what determines the coexistence of different types of transactions and the process of replacing one type with another.

Types of transactions. The importance of classifying transactions is that it shows the possibilities comparative analysis discrete institutional alternatives that mediate exchanges between economic agents. Discrete institutional alternatives are a set of systemically closed (indivisible, complementary) sets of rules that mediate interaction between people regarding limited goods.

One of the options for classifying transactions was proposed by J. Commons. He identified three types of transactions: trading, rationing and management17. As noted above, this section will only focus on pure types of transactions.

In a trade transaction to carry out the actual alienation and appropriation of property rights and freedoms, mutual consent of the parties is necessary, based on the economic interest of each of them in accordance with the relative bargaining power, legal status, etc. Thus, in this transaction, the condition for the appropriation of a good is the recognition by the counterparty of the presence the value in a thing is no less than that which the thing at his disposal has for him.

A trade transaction is the only form in which it is possible to comply with the conditions of symmetry of legal relations between counterparties.

Examples of transaction transactions include the actions of the employee and the employer (or their unions) in the labor market, the behavior of legislators in the political market, the actions of the lender and borrower in the temporarily free market. Money. Each party independently accepts the final

16Commons John R. (1931), Institutional Economics, 21 American Economic Review, 656.

decision to participate in the exchange, although the latter may be asymmetrical if, say, disparate entrepreneurs are opposed by a strong trade union, or vice versa. From this point of view, the transaction of the transaction is carried out between parties that are equal in legal terms, but not necessarily equal in bargaining power, de facto.

However, in any case, the essence of a trade transaction is the exchange of property rights on the basis of a voluntary agreement between the exchanging parties, which is a consequence of the symmetry of the legal relations in which these economic agents find themselves. A legislator may vote in support of a project in which his interests are relatively weak, in exchange for similar support from another legislator for a project in which the first is interested. Thus, from the point of view of modern economic theory, logrolling, the essence of which comes down to support for one bill in exchange for support for another, is one of the forms of trade transactions in the political market.

In a control transaction the key is the management-subordination relationship, which involves such interaction between people when the right to make decisions belongs to only one party (due to delegation, usurpation, acquisition, etc.). This type of transaction exists in intra-company relations, in bureaucratic organizations, and, more broadly, in intra-hierarchical relations. Management transactions exist due to the fact that the right to make decisions (respectively, the right of freedom, according to J. Commons) is exchanged for income, the expected utility of which must exceed that corresponding to the market wage rate in the market. Due to this condition, employment contracts work force radically different from other voluntary contracts, making it necessary to highlight freedom as a special right.

Typical examples of management transactions are the behavior of a slave and a slave owner, a worker and a master, a superior and a subordinate in accordance with formal rules. In a control transaction, behavior is clearly asymmetrical, which is a consequence of asymmetry legal status parties and, accordingly, the asymmetry of legal relations. The objects of the transaction are the rights to the goods exchanged. The object of the management transaction is the behavior of one of the parties to the legal relationship.

If the transaction corresponds to its concept, the slave owner, master or boss gives commands, thereby directly expressing their will, and the slaves, workers or subordinates carry them out, regardless of whether it coincides with their interests or not. Team- unilateral restriction of the set of permissible actions that slaves, workers and subordinates, etc. can take.

In this case, the differences between the types of commands are not significant. In terms of the problem of choice, this means that the procedure for evaluating alternatives as a means of selecting them is supplanted by constraints that leave only one alternative available. At least this is how the simplest version of a pure control transaction can be represented. In turn, the effectiveness of restrictions is determined by the effectiveness of the existing system of sanctioning behavior, which determines not only the structure of rewards and penalties, but also their intensity. Uncertainty

does not allow us to absolutely accurately specify a person’s actions, as well as to model mental procedures for their implementation for him, that is, to completely “program” him. And from this point of view, a real transaction is a combination of elements of pure types of transactions.

In the rationing transaction the asymmetry of the legal position of the parties remains, but the place of the managing party is taken by a collective body that performs the function of specifying rights. In particular, the preparation of the company's budget by the board of directors, as well as the federal budget by the government and the approval by the body of representative power, the decision of the arbitration court regarding a dispute arising between existing entities through which wealth is distributed, are rationing transactions. One party (board of directors, court) determines the rights of the other (heads of departments, plaintiff and defendant).

At the same time, there may be appeals from one party to the other, which may outwardly resemble negotiations: to prove the possibility of appropriation or the need to alienate a good, it is necessary to present sufficient grounds. However, only one party has the exclusive (formally) right to make the final decision. The rationing subject does not necessarily have the ability to determine the actions of the rationed (as happens in a control transaction).

In contrast to management transactions, applicants for the corresponding share of wealth play an active role in the implementation of freedom rights. In contrast to the transaction of a deal, negotiations are carried out in the form of putting forward arguments, filing a petition, and eloquence. Thus, the order of actions in management and rationing transactions of each party determines the characteristics of the result obtained.

The same operations can be mediated by different types of transactions, depending on the rules that regulate the relationships between economic agents. So, for example, if there are no restrictions on the level of interest charged by commercial banks, then the provision and receipt of credit is primarily a transactional transaction on both sides. Moreover, if a sufficiently large number of economic agents act on the demand and supply sides, then the resulting price will be perceived by each of them as something external.

If the state sets the maximum level of the interest rate and it turns out to be effective (below the potential equilibrium), then losses in the bank’s monetary income can be compensated by the opportunity to impose its will in decision-making, that is, to use a management transaction or to establish the rules that determine the rights of one or another. other category of borrowers. Thus, elements of a rationing (or management) transaction are “incorporated” into a transaction that, at first glance, is a transaction transaction.

When analyzing the relationship between a slave and a slave owner, a boss and a subordinate, the transaction of management is supplemented by the transaction of a deal, which allows us to talk about the existence of an, albeit implicit, contract. In fact, on

18 Ibid., 648–654.

In this approach to the analysis of intra-hierarchical relations within the framework of a forced (centrally managed) economy, the concept of the administrative market, the economics of coordination, was built, which was used to explain the organization of exchange within the framework of an economic system, formally characterized by a strictly centralized decision-making order.

Determining the content of a transaction and clarifying its relationship with the rules as key components of the institution make it possible to present one of the most interesting problems of modern economic theory - the problem of transaction costs.

The types of transactions considered make it possible to distinguish between the concepts of “transaction” and “exchange of goods”. The key to distinguishing between these two concepts is the abstraction from space and real time in which economic processes take place. Pure exchange is instantaneous and has no space-time component.

Strictly speaking, only a trade transaction is “similar” to the exchange of goods. The difference between a trade transaction and the exchange of goods becomes more obvious if they are separated not only in time (according to the principle of “legal control - future physical control”), but also in the nature of reproducibility. If a trade transaction is the appropriation of some rights through the alienation of others, then exchange presupposes a transaction in physical terms, that is, the movement of goods, the significance of which is expressed in the value of the rights to them. Futures transactions are the purest example of a transaction, in contrast to exchange, when only the right to purchase or sell a product in the future is sold and purchased, although the latter may not yet exist, for example grain (if the transaction is concluded in the spring of the N-ro year for the delivery of the corresponding batch of grain harvest N-ro year in the fall at a pre-agreed price).

When distinguishing between the exchange of goods and transactions, the double meaning of the concept of “good”, which J. Commons put into it19, can also be used - technological and proprietary (proprietary). In accordance with common sense, based on the direct perception of the interaction between economic agents, only a certain amount of good X is transferred from hand to hand in exchange for a certain amount of money M. Meanwhile, the most important moment of this process is double alienation and assignment of property rights. Thus, strictly speaking, it is not goods that are offered for purchase and sale of property rights, but not directly objects of property rights. Accordingly, the price of a good reflects not only its value based on physical characteristics, but also the value associated with a set of alienated and assigned rights. The formulated approach to the distinction between a trade transaction and the exchange of goods corresponds to the concept of a Buchanan good, which is defined as a pair consisting of an “ordinary” good (good) and a certain contract form its purchase or sale20.

19Commons, John R. (1950), The Economics and Collective Action, N.Y.: Macmillan, 44.

20Tambovtsev V.L. (2001a), Institutional market as a mechanism of institutional change// Social Sciences and Modernity, No. 5, p.34.

2.2. Transaction costs

The ability to extract benefits from an exchange is influenced not only by the total value of transaction costs, but also by the distribution of their burden among the participants in the exchange. The efficiency of resource allocation depends not only on the general level of transaction costs and distribution between interested parties, but also on the structure determined by the directions of potential and actual agreements between economic agents.

Transaction costs are not the only component of production costs. Thus, it is necessary to determine the relationship between transaction and transformation costs.

Transaction costs: definition, conditions of occurrence, meaning. The first, most general definition that could be given is based on the definition of transaction:

transaction costs are the value of resources (money, time, labor, etc.) spent on planning, adaptation and ensuring control over the fulfillment of obligations undertaken by individuals in the process of alienation and appropriation of property rights and freedoms accepted in society.

Production costs, in accordance with the new institutional economic theory, consist of two parts - transformation costs associated with changes or reproduction of the physical characteristics of goods, and transaction costs reflecting changes or reproduction of “legal”, and more in general terms- institutional characteristics.

If we imagine the economy as a life support system, then transaction costs can be considered as operating costs economic system. When defining the content of the concept of “transaction costs,” an analogy proposed by Kenneth Arrow is sometimes used: transaction costs in an economic system are similar to the phenomenon of friction in the world of physical objects. This analogy allows us to talk about the universal distribution of transaction costs.

The concept of transaction costs is of key importance in the new institutional theory, since institutions are explained not through the prism of a conflict of class interests, but from the point of view of the possibilities of saving on transaction costs.

To explain the phenomenon of transaction costs, two points are most significant: the discrepancy between the economic interests of agents interacting with each other and the phenomenon of uncertainty. Uncertainty is determined not only through the fragmentation (and, as a rule, distortion) of the information available to individuals, but also through the limited possibilities of processing it that they (the agents) have.

Considering the presence of two aspects in explaining transaction costs, they can be interpreted as the costs of coordinating the activities of economic agents and eliminating the distribution conflict between them. Since coordination is a key component of any organization, without taking into account transaction costs (explicitly or implicitly), economic analysis would be unproductive

The significance of transaction cost analysis will become clearer if we offer a historical illustration given by D. North:

“Trade, as theory teaches us international trade, always promised benefits, but there were also obstacles that prevented this benefit from being realized. Moreover, if the only obstacle to the development of trade were transport costs, then there would be an inverse relationship between transport costs, on the one hand, and trade, exchange and the welfare of states, on the other. But let us remember that already at the dawn of our era, as the experience of the Roman Empire of the 1st–2nd centuries shows, it was possible to cover vast territories with trade ties, despite all the transport costs of that time, and with the decline of the Roman Empire, trade declined, and along with it, in all likelihood, decreased the well-being of society and individual social groups. And the reason was not that transport costs increased, but that with the expansion of the trading region, transaction costs increased, and holistic political systems capable of effectively protecting law and order and compliance with laws disappeared”21.

The lack of a direct connection between effective institutions and their existence, which is explained using transaction costs, is an important direction in the study of the evolution of institutions. It becomes possible to explain evolution as changes that depend both on the trajectory of previous development and on the imperfection of the mechanism feedback and selection, through which decision-makers learn, and the external environment determines the survival and development of the most “successful”, or rather, the most adapted, which, in turn, determine the course of further development.

This interpretation of transaction costs allows us to identify the relationship between them and institutions, and through them, between institutions and welfare. The dual basis of transaction costs is due, on the one hand, to the problem of coordination due to the existence of uncertainty, and, on the other hand, to the problem of distribution conflict due to the conflicting interests of economic agents in a world of limited resources. This circumstance indicates the possibility of an ambiguous relationship between them and institutions, since the interests of one group may lie, firstly, in increasing the level of uncertainty for others, and secondly, in gaining an advantage in power at the expense of others. The latter allows increasing the well-being of this group without increasing the size of the product release.

If transaction costs were zero, then, following the premises of the new institutional (and neoclassical) theory, resources would be allocated

21 North D. (1993a), Institutions and economic growth: a historical introduction// THESIS, vol. 1, issue. 2, p.70.

and would be used where they have the greatest value (if the income effect is not taken into account) regardless of the initial distribution of property rights among economic agents. In accordance with the premise of zero transaction costs, the interpreters of R. Coase formulated a theorem that bears his name. A shortened version of it can be presented in the following form: with zero transaction costs and income effect, as well as exogeneity of prices in relation to the actions of economic agents, the initial distribution of property rights does not affect the efficiency of their final allocation.

This is why, in neoclassical economics, institutions do not matter in terms of the efficiency (Pareto optimality) of the final allocation of resources. As a comment to this definition It must be emphasized that R. Coase himself never spoke about a model of the world with zero transaction costs in a positive way. The term “Coase world” is misleading because it implies a model with zero transaction costs.

R. Coase's first work, which received worldwide recognition several decades later, “The Nature of the Firm” (1937), is based precisely on the premise of non-zero transaction costs. The formulated theorem is significant in the sense that it indirectly shows: positive transaction costs matter for various options for the initial distribution of property rights from the point of view of the efficiency of the final allocation of resources.

Taking this circumstance into account, firstly, we get the opportunity to explain the existence of various regimes of property rights (private, state, communal, free access) from a functional point of view, and not just from a moral and ethical point of view, which has both independent and derivative functional basis meaning. Second, accounting for transaction costs helps explain comparative efficiency. in various ways internalization of external effects as a way to fully take into account in the decision-making process the costs and benefits arising from their (decisions) implementation. Thirdly, it becomes possible to explain the emergence and limits of spread of various forms of institutional agreements, or institutional arrangements. Fourthly, the analysis of transaction costs is also important in the interpretation of institutional transformation, expressed, in particular, in the restructuring of property rights regimes, for example, in the transition from free access to private, state or communal property, changing the rules that form the institutional environment. In addition, with the help of this concept it is possible to determine the conditions of emergence and the relationship between various institutional agreements in economic history.

Transaction and transformation costs. Transaction costs are an element of production costs along with transformation costs, which are the object of analysis in traditional

onic neoclassical theory22.

There is not only complementarity of transaction and transformation costs, but also their substitutability. The proposed approach makes it possible to explain the existence of forms of economic activity or interaction between economic agents that do not ensure the minimization of average transformation costs in the long term (if we are talking about the competitive mode of functioning of the economic system), and vice versa.

Let's consider this issue in more detail. It is known that limited goods have a set of characteristics that can be divided into two groups: physical and legal. The first group includes such properties as size, shape, taste, color, smell, chemical composition, weight, location in space and time. The second group includes powers that constitute property rights.

Two types of characteristics of goods correspond to two functions: transformational and transactional, which allow them to be created and changed. A function is called transformational if its implementation is aimed at changing the physical properties of a thing. A function is considered transactional if the characteristics of a thing related to property rights change. Thus, the resources associated with the implementation of the transformation function form elements of transformation costs, and those resources, the use of which determines the change legal characteristics things form the transaction component of production costs.

A firm that produces software products or computers increases transformation costs by ensuring that its products are compatible with those of competitors. However, this significantly reduces transaction costs, since it makes it unnecessary for buyers to make specific investments with the corresponding classic problem of quasi-rent erosion due to the opportunistic behavior of ex post producers. As a result of the reduction in transaction costs, the market capacity expands, which allows the company to compensate for the increase in transformation costs.

Another example is based on a comparison of two types of exchange: personalized and impersonal. Within the framework of personalized exchange, due to the high degree

22 It should be noted that the definition of costs as transactional or transformational is not invariant with respect to the chosen reference point. For example, a buyer of an apartment, paying for the services of a real estate company, incurs transaction costs. They are the income of the real estate company. At the same time, real estate agents provide transformation services for a given company, which is reflected in the emergence of transformation costs. Thus, if we assume that this company operates in a competitive environment, in the long run its economic profit is zero, respectively, transformation costs are equal in magnitude to transaction costs. However, the problem is complicated by the fact that the real estate company itself also incurs transaction costs when purchasing transaction services, in particular, to ensure the security of its activities. Expenses under this item turn out to be the income of organizations providing security entrepreneurial activity and contract protection. This chain can be continued. Here we also come across a good known issue double counting, which requires determining the market value of the final transaction services.

nor the repetition of transactions with the same participants; deception, fraud, theft, violation of assumed obligations are either completely absent or poorly represented. Thus, direct, explicit transaction costs in such an exchange are low. At the same time, personalized exchange is possible within very narrow limits, which turns out to be an obstacle to the division of labor and specialization. In turn, specialization is a condition for reducing transformation costs. Consequently, in conditions of personalized exchange, total costs turn out to be high due to transformation costs. At the same time, impersonal exchange allows economic agents to produce with low transformation costs due to a radical expansion of the scale of specialization. However, as the one-move prisoners' dilemma game shows, the conditions of which are quite consistent with the conditions of depersonalized exchange, the equilibrium set of strategies will involve mutual deception, fraud, counterfeiting of goods, unscrupulousness, which in some cases requires the intervention of a third party.

It is the structure and dynamics of transaction costs (together with transformation costs and technology) that determine the forms of organization of economic activity, the content and nature of real transactions. This circumstance makes it possible to formulate a hypothesis according to which not only technology, but also institutions are a source of economic growth.

The properties of existing institutions have a significant impact on the characteristics of economic outcomes, which is confirmed by studies according to which countries with high quality institutions were in a more advantageous position than countries with higher quality macroeconomic policies and large reserves. human capital, but the low quality of institutions.

It is often assumed that changes in technology affect the level of transformation costs, while institutional changes lead to an increase or decrease in transaction costs. However, there are at least two more forms of dependence that have been beyond the attention of researchers on the problem of transaction costs. Firstly, the impact of changes in technology on the level of transaction costs and, secondly, the impact of institutional changes on transformation costs. Including these dependencies in the analysis allows one to overcome the limitations of the naive version of the theory, according to which, given the state of technology, institutions are chosen that ensure the minimization of transaction costs. In parallel, this approach allows us to answer the question: do technological changes, which lead to a reduction in transformation costs, really lead to an increase in transaction costs and adapt to institutional changes?

According to K. Arrow, in the price system, transaction costs drive a wedge between the prices of sellers and prices of buyers and thereby lead to losses, causing damage to social welfare from the point of view of traditional economic theory. And from this position, transaction costs act like a tax. However, the distribution of the burden of transaction costs largely depends on the effectiveness of the strategic behavior of rivals.

anxious parties. However, taxes are sometimes included as one of the elements in transaction costs. In particular, this is possible if we assume that taxes are payment for transaction services provided by the state for the specification and protection of property rights.

So, transaction costs are an obstacle to mutually beneficial exchange. In this regard, the question arises about means that can reduce the level of transaction costs and ensure their distribution in such a way that voluntary exchange becomes possible. The variety of transaction costs also determines the variety of means to reduce these costs.

Opportunities for mutually beneficial exchange in conditions of positive transaction costs. In the previous paragraph, transaction costs were considered as an obstacle to mutually beneficial exchange, the realization of comparative advantages through specialization. In this section, we will show that in order to implement a voluntary mutually beneficial exchange and explain its scale, not only the absolute value of transaction costs is important, but also their distribution between interested parties. The analysis of this issue will be carried out based on determining the conditions and results of mutually beneficial exchange.

Let us recall that a mutually beneficial exchange is considered to be one in which both parties have the opportunity to increase their well-being. Within the framework of the “Edgeworth box” model, this is expressed in the transition to a higher indifference curve compared to the one to which the initial supply of goods corresponds to each of the exchange participants. The benefits from exchange can be represented not only in the form of a change in the level of utility, but also in the form of the quantity of one of the goods, which corresponds to the difference between two levels of utility: the corresponding level of the initial distribution of goods and the level that reflects the results of the exchange. We use the idea of ​​​​the possibility of expressing the benefit from exchange in the form of the quantity of a specific good or a composite good (money), assuming that the amount of gain for two individuals A and B is constant, does not change23 depending on the structure of the initial distribution of the stock of goods and is equal to: R = Ra + Re- These quantities of goods correspond maximum amount, which exchange participants are willing to pay for its implementation.

We also use the following premises:

transaction costs are homogeneous (defined as the costs of exchanging property rights);

the absolute value of transaction costs is fixed and equal to C (units of good, with the help of which the benefits from voluntary exchange are measured).

The amount that each of the participants in the exchange must pay for the transaction is equal to Cd and Cb, respectively, with C = Cd + Cb. If through to

23 More consistent analysis shows that this is not the case. However, the resulting modifications do not add anything fundamentally new to the answer to the question of the distribution of transaction costs between the parties as a factor of mutually beneficial exchange.

designate the share of total transaction costs paid by individual A, then CA = kC and SB = (1-k)C, where 0< к < 1.

Due to the peculiarities of the premises used, only two options are possible from the point of view of the exchange: either it exists or it does not. This means that the scale of exchange is fixed if it differs from zero. Complicating the model is possible by weakening the premise of zero variable transaction costs, when the total amount of costs depends on the number of goods exchanged.

The first option is implemented when the relation is satisfied: Ra + Rb< С. Величина трансакционных издержек настолько высока, что не позволяет извлечь выгоды от добровольного обмена.

The second option can be implemented if: Ra + Rb> C. At the same time, this is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the exchange. In this regard, several situations should be considered, each of which corresponds to the condition indicated by the inequality:

The first three situations show that the distribution of transaction costs matters in terms of the possibilities for voluntary exchange. In the first situation, a sufficient condition for exchange is the following ratio: 1 - R&/C< k < Ra/C. Во второй ситуации достаточным условием является 0 < к < Ra/C. В третьей ситуации 1 - R&/C < к < 1. Только для четвертой ситуации распределение трансакционных издержек не имеет значения в плане возможностей осуществления обмена. Вместе с тем это не означает независимости распределения выгод обмена от величины трансакционных издержек, которые вынуждены нести участники.

The set of situations can be significantly reduced if we assume the possibility of subsequent compensation that will be paid by one participant in the exchange to another. At the same time, the benefits from compensation must exceed the costs associated with concluding and enforcing the relevant agreement.

The formulation of the problem in the proposed form is not accidental. When studying issues related to the specification of rights and the exchange of property rights, as a rule, attention is paid to the possibilities of reducing the overall level of transaction costs as a means of ensuring mutually beneficial exchange. The above example shows that the mechanism that distributes the burden of transaction costs between the participants in the exchange is of fundamental importance.

Up to this point, we assumed that the total value of transaction costs does not depend on their distribution between the participants in the exchange. This is a consequence of the implicit assumption of homogeneity of economic agents, due to the lack of specialization, sharing of information, and comparative advantage. Removing this restriction leads to the fact that the distribution of transaction costs between different participants in the exchange simultaneously determines a change in the total value of data from

derzhek. Thus, in our example, there is no longer an exogenously given value of transaction costs C. Instead, there is a certain value Cd* for the situation when the entire burden of transaction costs falls on individual A, and Cb* for the situation when the costs of exchanging property rights are financed for account B. An individual who has advantages in assessing the quality of a particular product, realizing this opportunity, thereby saves on general transaction costs. Let us assume that A has such an advantage. With some degree of approximation, the total value of transaction costs can be considered as a linear combination of costs for A and B: C* = aCA* + (1-a)SB*, where 0< а < 1. Таким образом, dC*/da < 0.

The exception is the situation when, despite savings on general transaction costs, the exchange will not take place precisely because their residual value will still be higher than the marginal estimate of benefits from the exchange, or Ra< aC*. В этом случае вновь необходимо обратить внимание на возможности компенсации ex post со стороны того участника обмена, который не обладает преимуществами в экономии на трансакционных издержках, но в то же время согласен выплатить компенсацию за создаваемый «специалистом» позитивный внешний эффект.

As an illustration, we can propose the standard “Edgeworth box” model, within which the potential benefits of exchange are determined, expressed in units of goods exchanged.

Figure 2.1. Edgeworth's box: mutual benefits of exchange and transaction costs

UAi,Ua2 - indifference curves of individual A; UEbUE2 - indifference curves of individual B; E - initial distribution of goods X and Y between A and B; AYa, AYE - the maximum possible mutual benefits of exchange, expressed in units of good Y; АХд, АХБ - the maximum possible mutual benefits of exchange, expressed in units of good X; CC - contract curve; K] is the final distribution of benefits, when all the benefits of the exchange are assigned to B; K^ is the final distribution of benefits, when all the benefits of the exchange are assigned to A.

If transaction costs are equal to zero, then regardless of how the benefits from the exchange should be distributed, the latter should be

and the final allocation of resources should be located on the QC contract curve. If transaction costs are greater than zero, then to determine the final allocation of goods it is necessary to take into account (a) absolute value transaction costs; (b) distribution of the burden of transaction costs between interested parties, (e) the total value of the benefits of exchange; (d) distribution of the benefits of the exchange (in units of Y or X, respectively).

No less important is the presence of comparative advantages in savings on various types transaction costs, which means recognizing the significance not only of their heterogeneity and endogeneity.

2.3. Types of transaction costs and means of minimizing them

Due to the fact that transaction costs are a central category in the new institutional economic theory, and also due to the existence of quite complex methodological problems associated with the formulation of the operational definition of transaction costs, this chapter will consider various variants of the typology, as well as consider in more detail individual species transaction costs. These include: the costs of identifying alternatives, the costs of making calculations, the costs of measurement, the costs of concluding contracts, the costs of opportunistic behavior, the costs of specification and protection of property rights.

Costs of identifying alternatives. Due to the fact that uncertainty exists in any real economic system, as well as a moment of opposition in the economic interests of acting subjects, the universal distribution of transaction costs should also be recognized. At the same time, one of the fundamental aspects of the functioning of the economic system is individual choice, regardless of which economic system is the object of study. In turn, decision making involves a comparison of alternatives. However, alternatives are not initially given to the person. The decision maker. That is why their identification is the result of economic activity, since it is associated with costs.

In conditions of uncertainty, costs inevitably arise due to the search for the most favorable price (both on the part of buyers and on the part of sellers - for the transaction of the transaction), other terms of the contract, as well as the selection of potential counterparties (from the point of view of the reliability of the promises they make).

The existence of this type of transaction costs is determined primarily by the differentiation of prices for the same product, not due to differences in transport costs. The basis of such price differentiation is the phenomenon of uncertainty, which manifests itself in the fragmentation and heterogeneity of information that each economic agent receives.

A similar problem arises with potential counterparties, who also turn out to be heterogeneous.

It is the dispersion of prices for the same good (that is, within a relatively small region) that is one of the signs of market immaturity. From this point of view, the law of one price operates in its pure form when transaction costs are negligible or equal to zero.

As J. Stigler, one of the founders of the modern economic theory of information, noted:

“In all markets prices change more or less frequently, and unless the market is completely centralized, no one will know all the prices set in this moment different sellers (or buyers). A buyer (or seller) who wants to determine the best price must interview different sellers (or buyers), a phenomenon I will call "searching."

In its simplest form, the search model can be represented by assuming that the only essential element of the contract is the price of the product. Suppose the buyer decides to purchase good X. Sellers of this product distributed uniformly taking into account existing prices (Pi = 8 and Pr = 6), so that the standard deviation is equal to one. The number of search units (number of sellers surveyed) must be determined to make a purchasing decision. It is known that the search is carried out under the condition of constant return and is expressed by the equation: TC = 0.0625N, where N is the number of surveyed sellers. To do this, you need to calculate the expected minimum price for each step. Since sellers are evenly distributed, the expected minimum price as a result of the first step will be equal to 7:

P*A) =/*1 + b-Ppi=0.5x8 + 0.5x6 = 7

At the second step, the probability that the minimum price will again be Pg = 8 is equal to p = 0.25. Accordingly, the expected minimum price will be equal to:

^min (2)= Р2Р, +(l - P2)= 0.25 x 8 + 0.75 x 6 = 6.5 For an N-ro step in the search, the expected minimum price will be equal to:

Respectively:

( The calculation results can be summarized in a table.

24 Stigler J. J. (1995), Economics of Information // Theory of the firm V.M. Galperin (ed.), St. Petersburg: Lenizdat, p. 507–508.

Table 2.1. Optimal search scale

Probability of Pi as minimum price

Probability of Pg as the minimum price

Expected minimum price

Marginal gain from search

Net marginal gain

from search

Thus, in our example, the optimal number of search steps is 5. However, it should be borne in mind that the consumer, when deciding on the number of sellers he surveyed, must be aware of the existence of different prices for the same product. Only the distribution between specific sellers is uncertain. Strictly speaking, the proposed illustration gives a highly simplified picture, since it is not difficult to estimate the magnitude of the marginal benefits obtained from searching. Meanwhile, in reality, one of the problems, which is called the “information paradox,” is that determining the optimal scale of search is quite difficult due to the difficulty of assessing ex ante the significance of the information received.

To minimize this type of costs, institutions such as specialized markets, in particular exchanges, as well as advertising and/or reputation are used. As for organized markets, cost savings are possible due to the concentration of supply and demand. As a result, the circulation of information accelerates and more intensive price equalization occurs. They represent the main product produced by the exchange.

Checking the reliability of the counterparty (as one of the moments of the search process) also requires time and resources. Thus, in order to receive a checkbook with a bank guarantee, a potential client will have to not only fill out a fairly detailed form in which he provides information about himself that is of interest to the bank, including income, but also talk with an employee or head of a bank branch, provide letter of recommendation, and also, if necessary, go through probation with a book without the right to overdraft.

To save on this type of transaction costs, reputation is also used (as a socially significant assessment of an economic agent from the point of view business ethics, if we are talking about an entrepreneur), which, in turn, can be considered as an asset (having a certain value and, therefore, can be used, for example, as a contribution to authorized capital or to take legal action against him). In particular, instruct-

In the example given, the bond turns out to be a form of collateral that should ensure the predictability of the client’s behavior in the future.

In connection with the above, it should be noted that reputation is closely related to the means of individualization of enterprises, in particular with brand names, trademarks, service marks and appellations of origin of goods. It is these tools that allow consumers to save on search costs. Considering the importance of means of individualization of enterprises, in particular trademarks, from the consumer’s perspective, W. Landes and R. Posner write:

“I don’t need to research the characteristics of the brand I’m considering buying because the trademark, in a succinct way, tells me that it’s the same brand that I liked before.”25

The stronger (recognizable, confirming the expectations of buyers during repeated purchases) the trademark is as a source of information, the greater the savings on search costs, the higher, other things being equal, the price that the seller can charge. Economic aspects related to the creation and protection of trademark rights, taking into account the interests of various groups of economic agents, both for a developed market economy and for the Russian economy, are considered in a study by the Bureau of Economic Analysis26

Measurement costs. Any good has many dimensions, since it has a complex useful properties. Here is what D. North writes about this:

“The utility we obtain arises from the various properties of the product and service or, in the case of the activity of ... an agent, from the many individual operations that constitute its activity. This means... that when I consume orange juice, its benefit to me lies in the amount of juice I drink, the vitamin C content, the taste and aroma, even though the exchange I have made is simply paying two dollars for fourteen oranges. Likewise, when I buy a car, I get in return certain color, speed, styling, interior trim, legroom, gas mileage - all valued attributes, even though what I bought is only a car. When I buy the services of doctors, part of the purchase is their qualifications, their manner of treating patients and the time spent waiting in the waiting room. When, as the head of the economics department, I hire junior teachers, the object of hiring becomes not only the quantity and quality... of teaching and the output of scientific products... but also many other aspects of their work: do they prepare for classes, do they arrive on time, do they help colleagues , whether they participate in the life of the faculty, whether they abuse their power over students, whether they call friends in Hong Kong at the expense of the faculty... In order to assess these properties, it is necessary to expend resources; before-

25Landes, William M. and Posner, Richard A. (1987), Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 Journal of Law and Economics, 269.

26Shastitko A.E. (ed.) (2000), Transaction costs associated with the creation and use of property rights to trademarks in Russia, M.: TEIS, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Additional resources are required to establish and evaluate the rights that are transferred in the exchange."21

Since there are two types of characteristics of goods - physical and legal, we can distinguish two types of measurement costs associated with the assessment of properties belonging to different types.

It is necessary to measure and/or evaluate the presence of these properties, which involves the cost of measuring equipment, time, as well as the use of surrogates (assessment of the quality of a product by physical properties, by price, according to the estimates of other agents) or intermediaries (including government ones according to the formal status): in the form of state trade inspection, consumer societies, appraisers, competitors, etc. In addition, knowledge of the rules, as well as technology for ensuring their compliance, is necessary in order to assess how great the expected usefulness of a thing is.

In connection with the definition of this type of transaction costs, three categories of benefits could be distinguished: researched, experienced and trusted.

Goods with prohibitively high costs of measuring quality before their acquisition (consumption) are called experienced. Goods with a relatively cheap procedure for preliminary determination of their quality are called “search”. The quality of the latter can be assessed relatively easily before purchase, while the quality of others can be assessed mainly during consumption. Credence goods are characterized by high costs of quality measurement both ex ante and ex post.

Let us note that the same good can be experienced in one situation and studied in another. In particular, they can be of great importance physical properties goods, including divisibility, as well as technology and existing measurement rules. For example, if a buyer purchases one orange, then the measurement costs relative to its value are too high. However, if we assume that the oranges are standard, then when buying ten kilograms, you can eat one orange to evaluate the entire batch.

The trustworthiness of benefits is based on the difficulty of isolating a positive effect (or lack thereof) due to the complexity of the result obtained. Among the trust institutions there may well be institutions as goods, the coordination properties of which (allowing an increase in the well-being of each of the interested individuals) are not always clear even to specialists in the relevant field. From this point of view, the production of a given good does not necessarily lead to an unambiguous assessment of the correspondence of expected benefits to actual ones. Other examples include pharmaceutical drugs, especially the effects of which are extended over time and therefore are quite falsely identified.

When we are talking about organizing a market for an experimental durable good, a set of signals is of great importance, for example, warranty after-sales service, the possibility of replacement within certain period a defective product for a quality product of the same type, etc... Warranty after-sales service performs the function of a kind of insurance for the buyer, which means for him a fee for transferring the risk to the seller. In turn, the insurance will be valid if the consumer complies with a certain set of requirements for the use of the benefit.

27 North D. (1997), Institutions, institutional change and economic performance, M.: Nachala, p.47.

Information about the properties of goods is distributed unevenly between counterparties, which is the content of the phenomenon of information asymmetry, which forces the party with relatively less information to bear relatively higher costs (through the use of experts, time costs, etc.) associated with restoring symmetry in possessing it.

In the historical aspect, the institutional response to the costs of measurement was a system of weights and measures, which ensured the comparability of various quantities of goods, greatly facilitating exchange. However, it (the system of weights and measures) can be interpreted more broadly, including, for example, a measure of economic success in the form of the maximum (or acceptable value) of economic profit, which is socially significant, although perceived individually by each economic agent. Thus, economic profit (and in monetary terms) as a target function, as a parameter of success, is also a kind of means of reducing the costs of measuring performance.

The use of profit as a measure of economic success can be considered as a result of the evolution of the very mechanism of selection of economic units that shapes the environment surrounding the enterprise. In addition, due to the diversity of aspects of the functioning of modern economic organization, as well as the presence of short-term and long-term aspects of activity, this criterion requires clarification. That's why in financial management When assessing the state of an enterprise, a set of indicators is used.

Costs of entering into a contract. Since in conditions of uncertainty it is difficult to predict the development of events, contracts, on the one hand, are designed to give stability to relationships, but on the other, developing the terms of the contract and agreeing on them between the parties also requires resources and time.

The development of a contract containing promises involves the projection of the actions of the contract participants into the future. However, for this to happen, a formalized contract must contain codified information and also imply understanding (decoding) of the conditions specified in it. In addition, contract development requires preliminary communication.

To illustrate, we can list the constituent elements of a credit transaction between a bank and a client on the part of the bank: firstly, consideration of an application for a loan and conducting an interview with the client; secondly, studying the client’s creditworthiness and assessing the degree of risk based on documents accompanying the application (financial report, cash flow report, internal financial reports, financing forecast, tax returns, business plans); thirdly, preparation of loan proposals in the event of a fundamentally positive assessment of the application29; fourthly, it is necessary to document

28As for the conditions for maximizing profits in the long run, the use of this indicator depends on the method of specification and protection of property rights to the company, the market value of which is determined as a discounted stream of expected profits.

29 Due to the fact that these proposals may differ quite significantly from the borrower’s requests, there is a need for negotiations. Since the established price of the loan, terms, methods of repayment, and so on are subjects of bargaining, it is essential which of the bargaining participants has a comparative advantage in transfer

ment the loan and sign a loan agreement containing agreed terms on certificates and guarantees, loan characteristics, obligatory conditions, prohibitive conditions, determination of the situation of violation of the loan agreement, sanctions in case of violation of the agreement.

When considering the costs of contracting, it is necessary to take into account the properties of the transactions that they provide. In the economic theory of transaction costs, there are three key properties of transactions: frequency, level of uncertainty and asset specificity. If the level of uncertainty is low, as is the frequency of transaction repetition and the specificity of the asset, then developing a standard contract is not very difficult. Due to the standard nature of the contract, there are quite wide possibilities for using the state as an organization with comparative advantages in the implementation of violence, which at the same time, through the judicial system, allows controversial issues to be resolved.

It's a different matter when the level of uncertainty is high enough, as is the frequency of interaction. In this contract it is no longer possible to stipulate all the nuances of the relationship between the counterparties. Then a specialized system is required that determines the person responsible within the framework this relationship between economic agents (in particular, arbitration courts, industry associations, etc.). Finally, if transactions are characterized not only by continuity, but also by a high degree of specificity of assets, the contract not only cannot be complete, but a significant part of it becomes implicit. This is due to the fact that in conditions where the relationships between the parties are complex, their formalization may require significant costs, while the use of a legal mechanism to ensure their compliance is difficult or impossible due to the prohibitive high costs.

Among the ways to reduce the costs of concluding contracts, standard forms of contracts are sometimes used if the situations that are regulated with the help of these contracts are typical in terms of the mutual obligations of the parties. In addition, to reduce the costs of concluding a contract, a third party is used as a guarantor, which can partly compensate for the lack of trust of the parties to each other in the contract.

Costs of specification and protection of property rights. Since a good has many dimensions in terms of possible uses, it requires certain resources and time for a clear definition of the object and subject of property rights and the method of vesting them. A typical example is the determination of borders between neighboring states or garden plots. From this point of view, the costs associated with the settlement of border disputes (including the maintenance of armed units in the immediate vicinity of the border, the construction of fortified areas), as well as the cost of land surveyor services, should be

in dialects The key factor in obtaining these advantages is confidential information, which allows the owner to build a game on favorable terms for him. Accordingly, the extraction and/or preservation of confidential information also turns out to be an element of costs when preparing a contract.

categorized as transaction costs. The problem of specification of property rights, as well as delimitation of rights, arises almost everywhere if a system of interaction between people regarding limited resources is reproduced. In particular, defining the scope of competence within a company, household, government agency are also associated with the determination of the subject-bearer of the right, the object, the set of actions that can be carried out in relation to this object, as well as the conditions for the delegation of this right.

To the extent that the activity of specifying property rights is subject to the law of diminishing ultimate performance, we can talk about some optimal level of their “erosion” (that is, the reproduction of a situation when it is not possible to ensure strict compliance with a particular legal regime). Thus, complete exclusivity in the exercise of one or another power is the exception rather than the rule.

It must be emphasized that here we are talking not only about the costs associated with the direct protection of property rights, an essential element of which are the costs of maintaining law enforcement agencies, but also partly about the costs in the field of education to the extent that they provide:

informing people about existing legal and social conventions of exchange;

the process of socialization, which determines the appropriate fulfillment of obligations (stipulated in the contract);

direct reduction of costs associated with differences in social, ethnic, cultural terms between groups in society, through a common language, history, cultural values. From this point of view, the problem that countries face becomes quite understandable Western Europe due to the flow of immigrants from “disadvantaged” regions. The point is not even that the number of potential violators of established rules is increasing, but that increasing heterogeneity of the population inevitably leads to increased costs of maintaining order and communication between various groups population.

A key factor in saving on the costs of enforcing rules, and in particular contracts, is ideology. Through the use of ideology, not only savings are made on the costs of decision-making, but also the internalization of norms30, so that they are carried out even if their violation goes unnoticed by others. The formation of a common field of interaction (in the form of a common language, culture, etc.) generates a positive network external effect, which significantly facilitates the exchange of activities between economic agents.

Costs of opportunistic behavior.Opportunistic can be considered behavior that is aimed at achieving the economic agent’s own goals and is not limited by moral considerations. The basis of opportunistic behavior is the divergence of economic interests, due to limited resources, undetermined

30 Interiorization of a norm is the process of transforming a limitation into an element of a system of preferences and values.

division and, as a consequence, imperfect specification of the terms of the contract. If the expected benefits associated with evading the terms of the contract turn out to be less than the benefits that it will bring, then this economic agent will choose one or another form of opportunistic behavior.

From the point of view of the contract process, there are two types of opportunistic behavior - pre-contractual and post-contractual.

A form of pre-contract opportunism is adverse selection, or worsening the conditions of exchange. It is characterized by unfavorable properties for some economic agents external environment, highlighting as potential partners those economic agents that are least desirable for the subject in question. This is a consequence of the existence of characteristics of goods hidden for the economic agent. An example is the used car market, or “lemons,” in which inferior cars displace better quality ones.

The essence of this model comes down to the following. Let's assume that there are 160 owners on the market, each of whom offers one car for sale. Demand is also represented by 160 buyers. Cars and, accordingly, owners are divided into three groups, in each of which the offer price is the same for all cars. The distribution of cars by category is presented in Table 2.2. In addition, the demand price for a car of a certain quality is the same for all buyers. Information asymmetry is manifested in the fact that each car owner is aware of its quality, while buyers have information about the share of cars of different qualities in the market, which correspond to the probability of purchasing a car of the corresponding quality.

Table 2.2. Lemon market

Share of cars

Ask price

Offer price

Potential gain for buyers and sellers

High quality

Medium quality

Low quality

If the information were complete and distributed symmetrically, then there would be three submarkets of cars, in each of which buyers and sellers would receive a total gain estimated at 400,000 rubles (the method of distribution of this gain does not matter here).

However, for a buyer purchasing a car, the amount he is willing to pay for it corresponds to the mathematical expectation of demand prices (assuming he is risk neutral): 0.5*50000 + 0.25*40000 + 0.25*30000 = 42500. Thus, the buyer is willing to pay 42500 rubles for a randomly selected car. This price will suit sellers of cars of average and worse quality. Better quality cars are being displaced from of this market.

However, even after this the situation is repeated for cars of average quality (now they have become “plums”, that is, cars of better quality). The mathematical expectation of the demand price is: 0.5*40000 + 0.5*30000 = 35000 rubles. This price turns out to be lower than what the owners of the plums would agree to. Thus, only cars remain on the market

of worse quality, and the total gain for buyers and sellers due to the fact that the market has narrowed to one category of cars will be 80,000 rubles. The lost winnings are equal to 320,000 rubles.

J. Akerlof characterizes this situation as follows:

“Bad cars drive out good cars because they both sell for the same price.” 31.

Lost winnings create incentives for car owners to more High Quality produce signals that make it possible to distinguish these machines from the crowd. If this fails, it can be assumed that the transaction costs associated with measuring quality are prohibitively high.

One option that drain owners can use is warranties. In our case, a seller of cars of the first category can offer a deal according to which, if during the use of a car it is discovered that its quality is poor (and in this model it is assumed that a used car is an “experimental” or “experienced” good, since the costs of measuring its quality before the start of operation by the new owner is prohibitively high), the buyer is paid a predetermined amount in the agreement. The lower the probability of a malfunction occurring, the lower the expected amount of payment under the warranty, and vice versa. This is why owners of lemons are not interested in giving guarantees.

Another illustration of the problem of adverse selection is provided by the labor market. If the wage rate is set by the company at the level of the average productivity of a worker in a particular specialty, then the most productive workers will refuse to enter into a contract on such terms, since they, having advantages in information about their abilities, value them higher.

Under conditions of complete certainty, the wages of a productive and unproductive worker correspond to their marginal product, that is, Wn = MCI; WH = MRN. In the event that the level of productivity of a particular employee is unknown, the wage rate will be uniform and correspond to the expected productivity of the employee W* = xMRp + (1- x)MRn. Thus, Wn>W*>WH.

In this case, existing measurement costs adversely affect both the welfare of the employer and the productive worker, since they narrow the area of ​​mutually beneficial exchange. On the contrary, unproductive workers are interested in the existence of this kind of asymmetry, since in this case they can receive a higher income than in conditions of complete certainty. It can be said that productive workers create positive externalities for unproductive workers, and the latter create negative externalities for productive workers and employers.

As a result, people are hired whose average productivity is lower than that for which the established wage rate is calculated. In this regard, using wages as a signal to potential employees is unlikely to be flawless in terms of selection effectiveness.

An institutional response to the existence of the problem of adverse selection in the labor market may be, firstly, the use of signals,

31 Akerlof J. (1994), The market for lemons: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism// THESIS,issue 5, p.92.

secondly, self-selection. Data on the education of a potential employee, including the educational institution from which the employee graduated, a system of private recommendations, as well as preliminary obtaining of information through a questionnaire and interview are used as signals.

Receiving an education indicates a certain level of the employee’s ability to absorb necessary knowledge and skills. In this case, it is assumed that the educational institution whose diploma is considered as a signal has the necessary reputation. People are expected to forego investing in education if the opportunity cost of receiving it is too high relative to the wage differential.

To the extent that education costs increase marginal product worker, they are productive. However, due to the fact that it is often the fact of receiving education that matters, and not its content, the costs associated with the production of the signal can be considered unproductive.

It is important to note here that in order to explain the behavior of employees, the characteristics of educational institutions must be ranked according to a certain criterion, reflecting, in particular, the level of real requirements imposed on applicants and students, etc.... In turn, the latter can be summarized in the assessment of such an asset , as the reputation of the educational institution. In addition, the employment of graduates and their subsequent careers are essential. In other words, we are talking about the ranking of educational institutions in relevant specialties.

Written or oral recommendations are often of great importance in the selection process. This especially applies to the labor market, which is often characterized by informal connections and lack of standardization, which does not allow the use of publicly available information about a higher education institution as a reliable signal about the quality of the employee.

The signal system does not always make it possible to satisfactorily solve the problem of unfavorable selection; therefore, a self-selection system is used as a supplement to it. It can be built on the existence of a menu of contracts that shapes the expectations of potential employees and allows them to choose the form of agreement in accordance with their intertemporal preferences and capabilities. For example, M. Aoki notes that in the Japanese labor market the principle of choice is widely used between initially higher wages without guarantees of long-term employment and further wage growth and initially low wages with certain long-term prospects for employment and higher wages:

“...the coexistence of labor contracts to perform relatively standard work together with contracts for entry into the hierarchy of ranks functions as a mechanism for “self-selection” of workers when solving the problem of optimal choice”^2.

A similar situation arises with the selection of insurance buyers in the insurance market. If health insurance services were provided to all categories of the population at the same price, the result would be that insurance companies would have to deal only with customers who are at the highest risk of illness, particularly the elderly. Institutional reaction

32 Aoki M. (1994), SPb.: Lenizdat, p. 110.

The response to the unfavorable properties of the environment on the part of insurance companies is the use of age, as well as the results of a medical examination as a signal, which is complemented by differentiation of insurance premiums.

Since a contract in economic theory is a process that consists of several stages, along with pre-contractual opportunism, that is, before the conclusion of a contract as a document, there is also post-contractual opportunism. Post-contract opportunistic behavior includes moral, or subjective, risk (moral hazard) (including in the form of shirking). It is expressed in the concealment of information by one of the parties, allowing them to benefit to the detriment of the other party. For example, the use of working time in own purposes as free through the imitation of vigorous activity is a means of concealing information about the actual results. This form of post-contract opportunistic behavior is called “shirking.” Another example is the use of money received for the sale of investment project, for the construction of a mansion or transactions with securities. The following option is also possible: after concluding a contract, one of the parties, taking advantage of a favorable combination of circumstances and advantages in information, insists on changing the conditions that allow redistributing the gains from the exchange in its favor. In this case, another form of post-contract opportunistic behavior takes place - “extortion”, or blackmail (hold-up).

Let us consider in more detail the contractual relationship between the lender and the borrower. An important characteristic of these relationships is the impossibility of taking into account all circumstances in the future, especially when it comes to a long-term loan. This means that the contract cannot be comprehensive (due to the prohibitive costs of its development and conclusion). As a result, the economic interests of the lender and borrower are not fully aligned. Consequently, the requirement of incentive compatibility as a prerequisite for effective implementation of the contract is not met.

The institutional response to the possibility of post-contract opportunistic behavior by the borrower is control by the lender. As such a measure, credit monitoring is used by the bank as a lender. It can detect or prevent various forms of opportunistic behavior. For example, natural opportunism, according to Williamson, does not contain a conscious intention to violate the loan agreement. However, an analysis of the borrower's activities carried out by banking experts may show that in the future he will not be able to repay the loan. Another extreme form of opportunism is Machiavelli opportunism, which occurs immediately after the conclusion of a loan agreement, regardless of how the bank behaves. However, more common is, apparently, the strategic form of post-contract opportunism, which is based on the deliberate concealment of information and actions that are contrary to the terms of the contract, but caused by changed circumstances. That is why, to be on the safe side, the bank must invest in an information network to prevent the occurrence of problem and bad loans.

In connection with the last type of transaction costs, it should be noted that O. Williamson identifies three forms of selfish behavior: strong, semi-

strong and weak33. Opportunism refers to a strong form of selfish behavior, since it allows an economic agent to achieve its goal by incompletely providing the counterparty with information or distorting it, which is possible in conditions of asymmetry of the latter. Thus, opportunistic behavior is seen as following one's own interests, including through deception, which (deception) can take different forms. A semi-strong form of egoistic behavior is following one’s own interests in conditions of certainty. It is this form of behavior that was implicitly accepted in neoclassical theory (due to the equality of transaction costs to zero). Strictly speaking, neoclassical theory does not deny the existence of the problem of opportunism, since in recent decades models of choice and exchange based on subjective expected utility have been actively developed. This allows us to formalize the explanation of the process of formation of institutions, as exemplified by the addition at the end of this chapter devoted to the organization of the insurance market.

Finally, a weak form of orientation toward self-interest is “obedience,” which is possible primarily by identifying oneself with a certain community (family, company, state) of which the individual is a part.

2.4. Quantifying transaction costs

In the economic literature, there are two approaches to the possibility of quantifying transaction costs: ordinalist and cardinalist. Most researchers within the framework of the new institutional economic theory use an ordinalist approach, explaining changes in the structure of transactions in an economy or industry, the replacement of intra-company transactions with market ones and vice versa, the emergence of hybrid forms of institutional agreements by changes in relative transaction costs.

At the same time, many attempts have been made to quantify transaction costs in the cardinalist version, that is, to obtain such quantitative data that would show the value of transaction costs or their share in the gross national or gross domestic product, a share in the transaction price or as an amount of money (including monetary value time) necessary to complete the transaction.

Some of these assessments were made in relation to a single market, others - to the economy as a whole. In the first paragraph we will consider the problems of quantifying transaction costs within one market, and in the second - at the level of the economy as a whole.

33 Williamson O.I. (1993), Behavioral premises of modern economic analysis// THESIS, vol. 1, issue 3, pp.43–49; Williamson O.I. (1996), SPb.: Lenizdat, p. 97–101.

Transaction costs on the New York Stock Exchange. The choice of one of the fragments of the monetary sector of the economy as an object for quantitative assessment of transaction costs is in a certain sense logical, since it was within the framework of monetary theory that studies of transaction costs were presented quite widely before the tools of the new institutional economic theory were widely used in empirical studies.

The first attempt to quantify transaction costs in a single market was made by Harold Demsetz, which was reflected in his 1968 article “Transaction Costs”34. The object of analysis was the New York Stock Exchange (NSE) as a means of ensuring the rapid exchange of securities and, accordingly, ownership rights to real assets. On this basis, transaction costs were defined as the costs of using the NSE to quickly exchange shares for money.

X. Demsetz proposed to distinguish three elements in the composition of transaction costs: brokerage commissions, spread and transfer tax. However, in this article he suggests abstracting from taxes, since they complicate the analysis without affecting the conclusions. Apparently, this is also due to the fact that the taxes themselves are not directly related to the functioning of the exchange as such. In turn, commissions to brokers are set based on a collective decision of exchange members as a percentage of the share price. This is why the focus has been on spread shaping.

The spread arises due to the existence for a certain category of game participants of the need or desire to immediately sell or purchase shares in conditions where the search for a counterparty is associated with costs. There is then a gap between the price that a player would pay or receive if he was waiting for a trade (for example, during the day), and the price that he actually pays (receives) if the trade is carried out immediately (Figure 2.2). This situation can be reflected using a graph:

SS is the supply curve of sellers awaiting the sale of shares; S"S" - offer curve for immediate sale of shares; DD is the demand curve of buyers waiting to purchase shares; D"D" is the demand curve for buyers of shares with a zero waiting period; R*

34 Demsetz, Harold (1968), Cost of Transacting, 81 33–53.

Figure 2.2. Market spread valuable papers

The share price established if each of its holders and potential buyers directly carried out a transaction when the costs of the latter were negligible; Рп - price for immediate purchase of shares; Rsch- immediate sale price of the share; (Рп - Р*) - buyer’s payment for refusing to wait (per one purchased share); (P*-Ppr) - the seller’s payment for refusing to wait (per one sold share); S = Р„- Ррр- spread.

In Figure 2.2, point Eо corresponds to equilibrium conditions when transaction costs are equal to zero. All transactions are completed instantly and without the cost of completing the transaction itself. Point Eo" corresponds to the equilibrium conditions when transaction costs are greater than zero, but each of the shareholders makes a transaction independently. Finally, points Ei and Er correspond to the equilibrium conditions for buyers and sellers, when the transaction time is negligible due to the use of intermediaries, but transaction costs (expressed as intermediary services) are positive.

Then S/ P = (Pp - Ppr)/ P, (where P is the average price) can be considered as the level of transaction costs when selling and purchasing shares. X. Demsetz notes that the spread is 40% of the total transaction costs, which, in turn, are estimated at approximately 1.3% of the share price of $48.

X. Demsetz put forward a hypothesis according to which the spread depends on four factors: the number of players (N) participating in trading on a given promotion; number of transactions (T); the number of markets (M) on which this security is traded; finally, its prices (P). It was supposed to check the dependencies expressed by the ratios: dS/dN<0; dS/dT<0; dS/dM<0; dS/dP>0. In other words, the more actively a security is traded, the smaller the spread should be; the more expensive the paper, the larger the spread (Fig. 2.3). The activity with which transactions occur regarding a particular stock is expressed in the number of participants in the transaction, the number of trading platforms on which this stock is quoted and, finally, the number of transactions that are made with this security.

This hypothesis can be illustrated using a graph also proposed by X. Demsetz.

X - shares for which trading is carried out on each of the submarkets; Si Si is the supply curve of sellers waiting for the sale of shares Xi; S"iS"i - supply curve for immediate sale of shares X i; D1D1 - demand curve of buyers waiting to purchase shares Xi; D"iD"i is the demand curve of buyers of shares Xi with a zero waiting period; S2S2 is the supply curve of sellers awaiting the sale of shares X2; S"2S"2 - offer curve for immediate sale of shares X2; D2D2 is the demand curve of buyers waiting to purchase X2 shares; D"2D"2 - demand curve for buyers of shares X2 with a zero waiting period; P* is the price of shares Xi and X2, established in the event that each of its holders and potential buyers would directly carry out a transaction when the costs of the latter are negligible; Р„1 - immediate sale price of share Xi; Р„р1 is the price for immediate purchase of shares Xi; X*i - equilibrium volume of transactions taking into account the spread for the first type of shares (pcs.); X*2 - equilibrium volume of transactions taking into account the spread for the second type of shares (pcs.); (Pni - P*) - buyer’s payment for refusing to wait (per one acquired share of Xi); (P*-Pnpi) - the seller’s payment for refusing to wait (per one sold share) when selling the Xx share; Ppg - the immediate sale price of the X2 share; Ppr2 - price for immediate purchase of shares; (Рпг-Р*) - buyer’s payment for refusing to wait (per one acquired share); (Р*- Ршй) - the seller’s payment for refusing to wait (per one sold share) when selling share X2.

X. Demsetz gives a fairly simple explanation for this phenomenon. The more actively a particular stock is traded, the greater the economies of scale of operations, expressed in a decrease in the average value of transaction costs, or

costs per share. Significant potential for economies of scale is usually associated with the emergence of a natural monopoly, which makes it possible to extract economic profits in the long term. However, in this case, competition between different groups of players kept the spread at a level close to transaction costs.

Figure 2.3. Economies of scale and spread in the stock market

R

This analysis was carried out on a random sample consisting of two hundred types of company shares. Observations were carried out over two days, with a break between them of one month.

Estimation of transaction costs in the US economy. The first attempt to systematically assess transaction costs in the economy as a whole was made by D. North and J. Wallis. Its results were reflected in the article “Measuring the transaction sector in the American economy in 1870–1970”35. To this day, this work by D. North and J. Wallis remains relevant, despite the abundance of literature on transaction costs. The presentation in this section is based on the content of this article.

In order to assess the significance of the research conducted and understand the limits of their application, it is necessary to focus on the methodology of quantitative assessment, which is directly related to the definition of the concept of transaction costs, which is used by D. North and J. Wallis as a working one.

The certainty of transaction costs and their empirical prototype is presented through the analysis of four types of relationships and the corresponding activities:

35 Wallis, John J. and North, Douglass S (1986), Measuring the Transaction Sector in the American Economy, 1870–1970, in

a) the relationship between individual buyers and sellers;

b) intra-company relations;

c) production of services by intermediary firms of various types;

d) relations related to the protection of property rights.

A. TRANSACTION COSTS FOR INDIVIDUAL BUYERS AND SELLERS

The proposed list indicates that transaction costs are ubiquitous, associated with all types of behavior that involve interaction between economic agents36.

Consider the transaction costs that arise when buying and selling a home. First, let's find out how this problem looks from the buyer's side. Transaction costs include:

time to inspect the house (the value of which is determined through the opportunity costs of using time);

costs of obtaining information about prices and other options for purchasing a home;

investments in reputation as a necessary condition for demonstrating reliability for the counterparty (which in game theory is known as the reliability of promises);

attorney fees;

notary fees;

payment of a deposit in case of agreement to purchase a house, etc.

It should be noted that a problem arises here due to the emergence of secondary transactions, when, for example, the buyer hires a lawyer, who, in turn, uses the services of a security guard, secretary, or assistant. This is why the definition of transaction costs is relative. In this case, the cost of a lawyer is an element of the transaction costs of buying a house.

When selling a house, transaction costs include those costs that would not have to be borne if the seller sold it to himself. It is the value of the right to use and own a house that are the opportunity costs of its sale. Transaction costs of selling a home include: 1) hiring a real estate agent, 2) advertising costs, 3) costs associated with proving the counterparty's credibility (reputation), 4) time spent showing the house to potential buyers, 5) title insurance property.

36 In connection with the question of the limits of distribution of transaction costs, it should be noted that there are several possible answers. Firstly, the presence of transaction costs is typical only for a market economy and when carrying out market transactions. Second, transaction costs exist everywhere in a market economy. Finally, thirdly, transaction costs arise in any type of economy where there is an exchange of activities, problems of coordinating the actions of economic agents and distribution conflicts.

When analyzing a transaction to buy a house, we are faced with a situation where transaction costs are divided in terms of the possibilities of their quantitative assessment. As already noted, transaction costs corresponding to the value of the services of lawyers and realtors are relatively easy to evaluate. Estimating the time it takes to inspect a house by the buyer and the corresponding time spent by sellers, partly the costs of creating their reputation, can be carried out with great difficulty through determining the amount of opportunity costs.

The visible, observable and measurable elements of transaction costs will be called transaction services.

In addition to this, it should be noted that we are talking about transaction services in the legal sector of the economy. Thus, transaction services in the shadow economy also remain outside the scope of this quantitative assessment model. The relationship between various types of costs in connection with the problem of their measurement can be presented in the following form:

Figure 2.4. The relationship between costs of different types

TRANSACTION COSTS

Non-market transaction costs

Cost of transaction services

Unmeasured transaction costs

Measurable transaction costs

This approach is fully consistent with that adopted in the system of national accounts. Moreover, it is quite possible to separate out both intermediate and final transaction services, which turns out to be necessary to avoid double counting.

B. IN-HOUSE TRANSACTION SERVICES

Moving from the analysis of transaction costs in connection with the behavior of individual economic agents (buyers and sellers) to their analysis in connection with the behavior of groups, it should be noted that along with the general moments when the company acts as one of the market subjects, specific ones also arise when we consider transaction costs in connection with intra-company relations, implementation of intra-company transactions.

Two options for estimating transaction costs are proposed.

1. The first way is to consider the network of contracts as a certain sequence within a certain hierarchical structure: between the owners of the company (proprietors) and managers, managers and controllers (supervisors), controllers and workers. As an example, consider Ford, which hires accountants, lawyers, and secretaries to coordinate, direct, and oversee its exchanges with managers. Managers also incur associated costs that would not exist if Ford produced cars for itself. Further, managers use a similar set of services to carry out exchanges with controllers, etc.

It should only be noted that the structure of transaction costs varies depending on the level at which contracts are considered. The higher he is,

the more significant the share of costs of obtaining, processing and providing information. The lower this level, the higher the share of costs associated with monitoring the implementation of employment contracts.

2. The second method involves a simpler scheme: Ford (or shareholders) enter into contracts directly with direct car manufacturers, that is, those who themselves participate in the process of transforming resources into a product. Then all the costs associated with maintaining people in intermediate positions in the hierarchy (foremen, inspectors, controllers, clerks, managers) constitute that part of production costs that cannot be transferred to direct producers, and this is precisely an essential characteristic of transaction costs. Thus, all these intermediate links are used to coordinate, direct and control exchanges with those who directly ensure the delivery of transformation services. Sometimes the costs associated with performing these activities are defined as management costs or bureaucratic costs.

Regardless of the choice of scheme for quantitative assessment of the transaction sector within firms, it is necessary, according to D. North and J. Wallis, to fulfill two conditions:

3. Identification of professions that are directly related to the performance of transactional functions:

a) acquisition of resources;

b) distribution of the product produced;

c) coordination and control over the implementation of transformation functions.

4. Determining the amount of transaction costs through calculating the wages of those employed in the intra-company transaction sector.

B. Transaction industries

There is a special category of firms whose main activities are related to the provision of transaction services. Thus, if transformational resource services are used as part of their activities, at the level of the economy as a whole they are still assessed as part of transaction costs. This category of firms includes intermediaries. However, it is possible to propose a more precise specification of industries in which firms providing pure transaction services or primarily transaction services are grouped.

The so-called transaction industries include the following groups of firms:

Finance and real estate transactions. The main function of these firms is to ensure the transfer of property rights, including the search for alternatives, preparation and implementation of transactions.

Banking and insurance. The main function is the mediation of exchanges that depend on specific circumstances and requirements (uncertain, asynchronous in time and not corresponding in quantity and size), as well as reducing the costs associated with the security of the implementation of property rights to the relevant resources. In particular, one of the most important types of insurance when carrying out a transaction is title insurance, for example, for land.

It was already noted above that the chosen starting point for classifying costs into transaction and transformation is of fundamental importance. The banking sector can be used as an example of the non-invariance of the classification of production costs. The income that the banking sector receives for carrying out settlement operations, as well as mobilizing and placing temporarily free funds, is a measure of transaction costs, since banks ensure coordination of plans and actions of economic agents for saving and investing, on the one hand, and mutual settlements - with another.

However, as soon as we look at this situation from the bank’s perspective, it turns out that the part of the income that should go to cover costs corresponds to the transformation costs necessary to provide services to clients. Thus, transaction costs for one economic agent are a source of covering the transformation costs of another. In this case, not only the functional purpose of certain resources matters, but also the context in which their use is considered. Thus, here we are again faced with a special case of the double counting problem.

3. Legal (legal) services. The main function of the relevant organizations is to ensure coordination, direction and control of the implementation of contract terms. Since the existing institutional environment is quite complex, which results in significant difficulties in taking into account the various regulations37 related to the activities of the company, lawyers are hired to save on the costs of using the existing system of rules.

With regard to the qualification of transport as a transactional or transformational industry and, accordingly, transportation as a transactional or transformational service, the method of defining the good is of decisive importance. If a thing is defined as a good taking into account the place where its consumption will occur, then transport costs cannot be attributed to the transaction element. In particular, if materials are purchased for the construction of a country house, then these materials in the store and at the construction site are different benefits. This moment expresses the principle of complementarity of characteristics that make a thing good.

4. Wholesale and retail trade. The issue of wholesale and retail trade, which includes both transaction and transformation services, turns out to be more complex. The latter could include, for example, storage of goods, which is similar to transportation, only not in space, but in time. Our task does not include a special discussion of this issue, therefore, following the proposal of D. North and J. Wallis, we will classify wholesale and retail trade services as transactional.

37 Additional difficulties in using the existing system of rules are due to their possible inconsistency. It makes the need for specialized legal services even more urgent.

results of quantitative assessment of transaction services in US economy. Based on the formulated methodology for quantitative assessment of transaction costs, D. North and J. Wallis carried out measurements of their level in the private and public sectors of the US economy.

The dynamics of the level of transaction costs in the private sector in relation to GNP in the corresponding year is as follows:

Quantitative estimates based on the proposed methodology indicate the rapid development of the private transaction sector: over a hundred years, its share in GNP has increased by more than 18 percentage points. It should be noted that the relative growth of the transaction sector turned out to be quite stable, with the exception of the last decade (60s), when stabilization began.

To determine the size of the public, or state, transaction sector, D. North and J. Wallis proposed two options, according to which we can obtain the maximum values ​​of estimates: maximum and minimum

Table 2.3. Private

US transaction sector b

Wow from BHlf*

Based on the data obtained, we can conclude that the transaction sector in the US economy has expanded over the course of the century both in accordance with the option in which some government services are transactional and in accordance with the option in which all government services are non-transactional . In the first case, its share increased by more than 28 percentage points, and in the second - by 22. What is the reason for such a rapid expansion of the transaction sector?

38 Wallis, John J. and North, Douglass S (1986), Measuring the Transaction Sector in the American Economy, 1870–1970, in Long-term factors in American Economic Growth, Stanley Engermann and Robert Gallman (eds.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 121.

Table 2.4. Transaction sector, % from VNP39

Years

First option

Change in percentage points according to the first option

Second option

Change in percentage points according to the second option

Developing the idea of ​​the reasons for the expansion of the transaction sector, there are three main factors:

1. The importance of the costs of specification and protection of contracts has increased significantly, since as a result of increased specialization and urbanization, exchange has become increasingly impersonal and depersonalized, which requires the widespread use of legal specialists. The most important factor that determined the growth of this form of exchange was the development of material infrastructure, in particular transport and communications, which significantly expanded the range of possible exchange alternatives and, accordingly, led to an increase in the overall costs of receiving and processing information.

In addition, urbanization has led to the concentration of economic activity in space and the relative expansion of the real boundaries of the activities of economic agents, which has strengthened the element of interdependence. The latter, in turn, has as one of its consequences the emergence of numerous monetary, technological and consumer externalities. The arguments for the production functions of some producers of goods and services are the results of the economic activities of others in the form of volumes of goods and services produced. The same goes for the functions of income (for monetary externalities) and utility (for consumer externalities). This problem leads to an increase in the importance of the specification of property rights and their protection. In turn, the increasing importance of the distinction between property rights and their specialized protection is causing an increase in demand for legal services.

2. The second important factor was technological change. Capital-intensive technologies can be used profitably if they can ensure a consistently high level of product output, that is, realize economies of scale. However, this requires ensuring a rhythmic, uninterrupted supply of resources, firstly; creation of a system

Ibid., 121.

we, providing coordination and control over the actions of people within the company, secondly, and the creation of an established system for inventory management and sales of manufactured products, thirdly. These factors, together with changes in the level of transport costs, made it possible and necessary for the development of large forms of economic organizations with a complex system of intra-company specialization, division of labor and, accordingly, transactions mediating its reproduction. At the same time, the listed three components correspond to the three types of intra-company transaction functions in the transformational private sector of the economy, identified by D. North and J. Wallis. Thus, economies of scale, other things being equal, are associated with an increase in average transaction costs (Fig. 2.5).

Interpreting the changes that have occurred, they can be presented in the form of a picture, which is built on the basis of assumptions made by the same authors.

Figure 2.5. Average transaction costs and the optimal number of transactions when changing transformation technology

with H*N

N is the number of transactions, which determines the size of the company; T - transformation technology; I is a parameter that determines the characteristics of the institution; DtDt - implicit demand curve for transactions; StSt - implicit transaction supply curve; Dt"Dt" - implicit demand curve for intra-company transactions after changes in transformation technology

Technological changes lead to an increase in the marginal product of transformational resources. This means that the same number of transactions can be carried out without damage at higher average transaction costs, on the one hand, or allows an increase in the number of transactions at the same level of average transaction costs, on the other hand, which is equivalent to an increase in the size of the firm. As a result, as shown in Figure 19, the total value of intra-company transaction costs will increase from ATCi*Ni to ATC2*N2.

There is another aspect to this problem. Technological changes in one industry can lead to an increase in the marginal product of transaction resources in another industry and, accordingly, a decrease in average transaction costs.

derzhek40. The same result can be obtained due to institutional changes. In particular, the emergence and development of a system of rules that ensure the structuring of relationships between economic agents in limited liability organizations significantly facilitates the increase in the scale of the company. If average transaction costs within a firm decrease, then, in accordance with the principle of determining the size of a firm, which was formulated by R. Coase, the number of transactions within it should increase4. (see Fig. 2.6).

Figure 2.6. Average transaction costs and the optimal volume of intra-company transactions during institutional changes

ATC - average transaction costs; N - number of transactions; DtDt is the firm’s implicit demand curve for transactions; StSt - implicit transaction supply curve; St"St" - the implicit transaction supply curve obtained as a result of institutional changes

In this case, an increase in the size of a firm is not necessarily associated with an increase in the intra-firm transaction sector, since the elasticity of implicit demand for transaction services in absolute value may be less than one.

3. Reducing the costs of using the political system to redistribute property rights. This decline was due, from the point of view of D. North and J. Wallis, to a change in the system of rules for the production of rules: major decisions had to be made through legislative commissions, which made it much easier for various economic interest groups to exert pressure to make decisions that benefited them.

Taking into account the identified factors of changes in the size of transaction services in the US economy, as well as the features of the methodology for their assessment, we can conclude that the sources of dynamics in the size of the transaction sector turn out to be heterogeneous.

40Here we are talking about costs per transaction.

41North, Douglass S. and Wallis, John J. (1994), Integration Institutional Change in Economic History.A Transaction Cost Approach, 150 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 609–624.

The expansion of the transaction sector can occur due to changes in the structure of transactions: an increase in the market share. Other things being equal, this means that the overall level of transaction costs may remain the same. This suggests that measuring it by the value of transaction services is only a certain degree of approximation.

If the price elasticity of demand for transaction services is greater than one, then the expansion of the transaction sector can occur even with a decreasing price of transaction services.

The elements of production costs are transaction and transformation costs. We already mentioned above that they can be considered as substitutes. Then a situation is possible where, as average production costs decrease, total transaction costs increase, if transformation costs decrease to a greater extent.

Institutional changes in one sector of the economy (for example, the formation of an organized bond market with its own rules of the game) can significantly affect the situation in another sector. On the one hand, this is a new source of borrowed funds. But on the other hand, as happened in Russia, there is a factor of underinvestment in the real sector of the economy, since this market was focused mainly on transactions with government securities.

The rise in cost of the exchange process, due to the ineffective distribution of property rights, which is carried out by the state. This becomes possible because the economic interests of the agents making political decisions contradict the conditions for ensuring the efficient allocation of resources. At the same time, actions taken by individuals in accordance with the interests of a particular group are not associated with significant costs. In particular, this is due to the imperfection of the political market as a consequence of the inability to accurately assess the performance of a particular politician and the compliance of actions with the promises made to voters.

The rapid growth in the variety of goods, along with the complication of a significant part of them, causes an increase in difficulties associated with measuring the beneficial properties of goods according to various parameters and their further ordering, which is necessary for assessing the benefit as a whole.

Consequently, taking into account the last two points, the dynamics of the transaction sector cannot be considered as a uniquely positive or negative factor of economic growth and, accordingly, the development of a system of specialization and division of labor. The basis of this ambiguity lies, on the one hand, in the distributional aspect of interactions between economic agents, corresponding to the dual nature of institutions, and, on the other hand, in the peculiarities of the assessment methodology. So, to the extent that transaction costs turn out to be an exogenous or endogenous variable relative to institutions, there is not enough basis for drawing conclusions regarding the real dynamics of the latter in terms of Pareto optimality or Pareto improvements. The identification problem must first be resolved.

This duality is manifested in the special role of the state, which can reduce the level of transaction costs through the specification and protection of property rights, and can, on the contrary, increase their level, being an obstacle

for economic growth through the creation of favorable conditions for the distribution activities of organizations

Conclusion

This chapter examined such fundamental concepts for the new institutional economic theory as transaction and transaction costs.

It was shown that any transaction has a rather complex internal structure and differs from a simple exchange of goods. Transactions are diverse, reflecting the variety of forms of organization of economic activity. We examined the main characteristics of the pure types of transactions identified by Commons: trading transactions, management and rationing transactions.

The operationalization of the concept of transaction and institution occurs through the inclusion of the concept of transaction costs in the systematic analysis. This chapter has shown that there are different approaches to defining this concept, but in any case, transaction costs have a great influence on the efficiency of resource allocation and economic development.

It should be especially noted that the thesis that transaction costs hinder economic development are unproductive is incorrect if we assume a sufficient degree of realism in the analysis. This thesis, at first glance, has the right to exist only if we compare two situations: with zero and positive transaction costs.

Of fundamental importance is not only and not so much the level of transaction costs, but their structure, distribution between participants in economic exchange, which, in turn, reflects the specific configuration of institutions.

Chapter Concepts

Trust benefits

Costs of identifying alternatives

Costs of entering into a contract

Measurement costs

Costs of opportunistic behavior

Costs of specification and protection of property rights

Research benefits

Experienced benefits

Trade transaction

Transaction

Rationing transaction

Control transaction

Transaction costs

Transformation costs

Review questions

How does a transaction differ from the exchange of goods (services)?

What is the form of transaction in which it is possible to comply with the conditions of symmetry of legal relations between counterparties?

What are the features of a trade transaction as opposed to a management transaction?

What are the features of a management transaction as opposed to transactionization?

What are the features of a rationing transaction from a trade transaction?

What is a “Buchanan product”?

What type of characteristics of goods corresponds to the transformation function?

What type of characteristics of goods does the transaction function correspond to?

Can the distribution of transaction costs between exchange participants affect the overall value of these costs?

Name the main institutions used to minimize the costs of identifying alternatives.

How do researched, experienced, and trust goods differ from each other?

Name the main ways to reduce contracting costs.

Which form of opportunistic behavior (pre-contractual or post-contractual) is worsening selection?

Which form of opportunistic behavior (pre-contractual or post-contractual) is moral hazard?

Which form of opportunistic behavior (pre-contractual or post-contractual) is shirking?

Which form of opportunistic behavior (pre-contractual or post-contractual) is extortion?

What factors, according to Wallis and North, determined the expansion of the transaction sector of the American economy in the twentieth century?

Questions to Consider

1. “If the total value of transaction costs due to the corresponding rules of exchange is minimal, then its participants can extract the maximum possible benefit from it.” Comment on this judgment.

Explain why the listed types of transaction costs cannot be considered as a way to classify them.

List the main factors influencing the level of transaction costs on the New York Stock Exchange in accordance with the Dem-setz hypothesis. Explain the direction of action of each of these factors.

“The increase in the share of the transaction sector in GNP is a consequence of a decrease in the efficiency of the economy.” Comment on this judgment.

Literature

Main

Akerlof J. (1994), The market for lemons: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism// THESIS,issue 5, p. 91–104.

Williamson O.I. (1996), Economic institutions of capitalism. Firms, markets, “relational” contracting, SPb.: Lenizdat, p. 97–101.

Additional

Aoki M. (1994), Firm in the Japanese economy. Information, promotion and deal-making in the Japanese economy, SPb.: Lenizdat.

Williamson O.I. (1993), Behavioral premises of modern economic analysis// THESIS, vol. 1, issue. 3, p. 39–49.

Commons, John R. (1931), Institutional Economics, 21 American Economic Review, 648–657.

Demsetz, Harold (1968), Cost of Transacting, 81 Quarterly Journal of Economics, 33–53.

Wallis, John J. and North, Douglass S (1986), Measuring the Transaction Sector in the American Economy, 1870–1970, in Long-term factors in American Economic Growth, Stanley Engermann and Robert Gallman (eds.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 95-161.

In economic practice, the term “firm” is used to designate entities conducting commercial activities. Considering a company in this aspect, it can be defined as an economic unit that has separate property and formalized rights that allow it to carry out economic activities under its own property responsibility. Although this definition is most widely used in practice, it reflects the legal aspect of the nature of the company, without revealing such important aspects from the point of view of economic analysis as the features of the internal organization and the purpose of operation. A company is a complex economic phenomenon. It can be either a small enterprise or a large company uniting several enterprises. Therefore, in economic theory, several concepts of the company have developed: neoclassical, neoconstitutional, behaviorist, evolutionary.

The neoclassical theory of the firm views the firm as a production (technological) unit, the activities of which are described by a production function, and the goal is to maximize profit. The main task of the company is seen in finding such a ratio of resources that would provide it with the minimum. In this regard, optimization of firm size is postulated as a result of economies of scale. However, the supporting prerequisites of the neoclassical interpretation of the company - the given operating conditions (perfect information, complete rationality of behavior, price stability), ignoring the peculiarities of the internal organization and the lack of alternatives in the choice of decisions - made it vulnerable to criticism from the standpoint of economic practice.

The institutional theory of the firm assumes that the firm is a complex hierarchical structure operating in conditions of market uncertainty. The main task of the analysis is associated with explaining the behavior of a company in a system of expensive and incomplete information, and the focus is on questions about the reasons for the diversity of types of companies and their development. Using as prerequisites the presence of transaction costs (transaction costs), as well as the non-price method of resource allocation inherent in the firm, institutional theory defines the firm as an alternative to the market (price) mechanism for carrying out transactions (resource management) in order to save transaction costs. This is one of the premises of this theory.

Another premise of the theory of the firm is based on the understanding that, being a complex hierarchical organization, the firm is a set of relationships between resource owners. In this sense, the central aspect of the analysis becomes the study of the problem of distribution of property rights, and the firm itself is presented in the form of a contract concluded between resource owners, designed to ensure the most efficient use of resources. The assignment of power gives rise to the need for control by the guarantor of the performer, and therefore control costs arise. The company turns out to be the focus of two types of contracts - external (market), reflecting its interaction with market institutions and associated with transaction costs, as well as internal, reflecting the characteristics of the internal organizations of the company and associated with control costs. Therefore, the firm appears to be an entity that allows optimizing the ratio of transaction costs and control costs in the process of coordinating the decisions of the owners of production resources. The very ratio of transaction costs and control costs will serve as a criterion for determining the size of the company.

Behavioral theories of the firm focus on the active role of firms in the economy, their ability not only to adapt to a changing market environment, but also to transform this environment. They proceed from the impossibility of maximizing any goal and focus on studying the functioning of the internal structures of the company and decision-making problems. In this regard, we can highlight the entrepreneurial concept of the company, in which the company is considered as a system of interaction between different levels of manifestation of the entrepreneurial function (management). Having the consolidation of this function as the main task, the behavior of the company is defined as the result of the interaction of different levels of entrepreneurship, and the main issue comes down to solving the problem of interaction between owners and hired managers.

Another variation of this theory is the evolutionary concept of the firm. Its essence boils down to the fact that the company evolves under the influence of external and internal factors, and decisions are made based on the characteristics of the internal organization and the traditions established in the company. At the same time, the company does not have a single criterion for optimal decision-making and its behavior changes depending on the market situation, established traditions and historical experience of the company.

A common feature of all firms that are complex hierarchical structures is the problem of interaction between the owner and hired managers. The “employer-agent” problem arises whenever “agents” who have better information and have special knowledge can use this to their own advantage and to the detriment of the interests of the owner. The consequence may be a deviation from the company's goals, increased costs and decreased profits. Therefore, the main task of intra-company management comes down to ensuring the unity of their goals in the long term, and the condition for its solution is market discipline and the creation of mechanisms that stimulate managers.

A company is a production unit that operates on the principles of cost optimization in order to maximize profits.

Contract concept of the company

A company is a set of relationships between employees, managers and owners. These relationships are often expressed by formal agreements - contracts. But even if the relationship is not regulated by a formal agreement, there are rules of conduct between the company’s employees, employees and managers, between suppliers and consumers of products. These rules of behavior can be considered as informal contracts, since they are quite stable over long periods of time, and their violation causes formal or informal sanctions by other participants.

A company, being a collection of internal and external contracts, faces two types of costs to ensure their implementation. These are transaction costs (from the word “transaction” - deal, operation, contract) and control costs. Transaction costs are the (explicit and implicit) costs of enforcing external contracts, as opposed to the costs associated with internal contracts - control costs. Transaction costs are the costs of carrying out business transactions, including the monetary value of the time spent searching for a business partner, negotiating, concluding a contract, and ensuring proper execution of the contract. Control costs include the costs of monitoring the implementation of internal contracts, as well as losses resulting from improper execution of contracts. The market and the firm from this point of view represent alternative ways of concluding contracts. The market can be interpreted as a network of external contracts, and the firm as a network of internal contracts. A firm can buy a product or service on the market through an agreement with another, external counterparty, but the firm can produce the product itself using internal contracts with employees. The choice between external and internal contracts depends on the cost ratio of their use. The higher the transaction costs relative to control costs, the more likely it is that the good will be produced by the firm rather than by the market.

Transaction costs are especially high relative to control costs in situations where opportunities and incentives for opportunistic behavior exist.

Namely:

* production of unique goods;
* dynamic market with uncertain demand and unpredictable price movements;
* information asymmetry in the market.

Rising transaction costs due to inefficiencies in external contracts limit the scope of the market. This, in turn, determines the existence of relatively large firms, for which the problem of external agreement and the possibility of opportunistic behavior is in many cases removed by the development of internal contracts. Now the question arises, why does the market exist if the firm provides economies of transaction costs? Why are external contracts needed at all? As the firm grows, the number of employees and the dismemberment of the production process increases (a typical example is a conveyor belt with separate operations), so that the total result of the firm’s activities turns out to be the work not of one or several workers, as in the pre-industrial era, but of many divisions and many workers. As a result, the direct connection between labor and its result, characteristic of small-scale production, is lost. And immediately the “free rider” problem appears: a reduction in the intensity of work of one of the workers does not directly affect the total product of the company and may go unnoticed, and, therefore, tempts workers to work less than fully. Self-control of labor intensity ceases to serve as a way to increase production efficiency; a controlling authority is forced to take its place. The costs of monitoring the degree of intensity of labor (activity) of each production link appear and grow. The larger the firm becomes, the higher these control costs become. Eventually, the costs of enforcing internal contracts exceed transaction costs, the attractiveness of market contracts compared to internal ones increases, and internal contracts are replaced by external ones. A company as a separate subject of economic activity exists between two types of costs - transaction costs, which determine the lower limit of the company, its minimum size, and control costs, which set the upper limit, its maximum size.

Monitoring costs: the problem of tax evasion

The state actively participates in the economy through the formation of tax policy. Meanwhile, for producers, taxes are essentially transaction costs, evasion of which is a form of free-rider behavior. Taxation funds are used to produce public goods that are used by everyone. It turns out that firms that do not pay taxes use the services of the public sector for free, that is, the so-called “free rider” problem arises. The reason for this phenomenon lies in the property of a public good - non-excludability. For example, the protection of property rights in a country presupposes the existence of a large and expensive system of courts, control and government bodies, registration authorities, etc. Its maintenance requires significant costs, which are financed from the state budget. For a company, reliable protection of its property rights is a valuable benefit. But since this system is national and universal, it is impossible to exclude tax evaders from the number of market entities using it. After all, the police will not, before providing such a company with protection from robbers, find out whether it made tax payments on time and correctly.

The reasons for the “free rider” problem can be divided into subjective: dishonesty of citizens and objective, which in turn are divided into those associated primarily with the taxpayer (individual), and those associated with the state, that is, with each of the two subjects of relations: public goods - taxes.

Subjective reasons: concealment by taxpayers of true preferences in public goods. It is beneficial for participants in financing a public good to underestimate their declared need for a public good in order to pay less for it. If the number of consumers is small, then the situation encourages the latter to honestly express their preferences, since false information can lead to underproduction of the good. Conversely, an increase in the number of consumers leads to an increase in the number of hares hoping that the public good will be provided regardless of their contribution.

Objective reasons: citizens lack complete information, the presence of high costs of collecting fees for information about each individual public good in comparison with unified taxation and a number of other reasons that cause high transaction costs. For example, an individual who is not interested in geology may not know how much it costs to mine uranium, which is used to produce a nuclear bomb. Therefore, he may unconsciously distort his ideas about the costs of the country's defense.

The taxpayer is most often satisfied with the information provided by the state in the person of active participants in political life: politicians, officials, journalists, public figures. Often the latter convince individuals of the need for such financing of public goods when the marginal costs of its production (that is, taxation) exceed the marginal benefits received by consumers. This phenomenon, when the taxpayer underestimates the opportunity costs of producing public goods, is called fiscal illusion in economic literature. Fiscal illusion is “a situation in which the benefits of a particular government expenditure are clearly visible to its recipients, but the same cannot be said about the associated costs, which are spread over time and fall on a large number of people.”

Fiscal illusion is often promoted by producers of public goods. Thus, according to a number of economists in Russia, “the balance of power is skewed in favor of... producers of public goods at the expense of taxpayers and consumers.”

Objective reasons: errors in determining the optimal volume of production of public goods, which, as we know from the previous paragraph, is at the intersection of supply and demand for public goods.

Financing of public goods occurs on the basis of collective decisions. But the collective nature of the decision determines less interest in ensuring that the decision is as effective as possible compared to private choice. This is facilitated by two points: firstly, the position of an individual in collective decision-making is not of great importance, and secondly, he accounts for a small part of the benefits and costs that are formed in the process of implementing the decision. The more members there are in the team, the more obvious this situation is.

The state, regional and municipal authorities that collect taxes, in return, take on a significant part of the transaction costs of society, providing citizens with transaction benefits. It makes sense to identify four main areas of economic activity in which the state is actively involved in redistributing the burden of associated transaction costs.

These include:

* contracts,
* measurements,
* protection of existing property relations,
* providing background information.

Contracts. Guaranteeing the execution of contracts concluded in accordance with the law, providing a standard or mandatory (in) form of contracts.

Measurements. Issue of money as a universal unit of measurement of value; ensuring a system of weights and measures and other state quality standards. First of all, this is the monetary system. Money is the main and colossal element of saving on measurement costs. And only the state can issue them (if everyone starts printing their own money, a situation will arise that is almost equal to the fact that there is no money). Further, this is a system of weights and measures, a system of various standards, which also reduce our measuring costs. In those days when the state did not provide its citizens with institutions to reduce measurement costs, income accounted for up to one third of the transaction cost. And that’s exactly what he did - he determined the correspondence of weights and measures, different currencies, etc.

Protection of existing property relations. Guaranteeing correctly registered property using the monopoly apparatus of violence and providing free information about officially existing rules and property rights. Without the state, protecting your property is extremely expensive and difficult. And everyone knows that behind your officially registered property or the contract that you signed with them and registered with a public notary, there is the power of the state, or, more precisely, the threat of violence against anyone who dares to encroach on your property or disrupt contractual obligations. Guarantees are provided by the presence of a court, a certain armed force (which people who break the law are afraid of), and the law itself - a system of some formal rules. People follow these rules not only out of fear of punishment if they are violated. In 90% of cases, it is simply convenient for them to follow the proposed rules, which, for example, allow partners to predict each other’s actions, but otherwise the partners would incur huge information costs.

Providing background information. Due to our tax system, we use background information to the least extent. Only legal information is provided free of charge by the government. The state does not charge citizens anything for becoming familiar with the laws. Only those who propagate these laws for us take it.

Providing business entities with all of the above transactional benefits is associated with significant costs for the state for:

The state apparatus itself (including the Central Bank and the judicial and legal system);
- coercive apparatus (Ministry of Internal Affairs, etc.);
- provision of information and standards;
- foreign policy, national defense.

Therefore, from the point of view of the state, all these benefits are not free. To be able to use them (each individually - free of charge or at a symbolic price), enterprises and individuals must fulfill their obligations to the state: comply with laws and pay taxes.

At the same time, from the point of view of an enterprise or economic individual, all taxes are:

A) external costs in relation to its production activities;
b) a condition for access to free transactional benefits provided by the state.

Therefore, an economic entity views taxes solely as transaction costs. Enterprises do not take into account the positive effect of tax collections on the economy as a whole and view taxes as costs. With this formulation of the problem, enterprises are faced with the dilemma of evading payments and the danger of fines (bribes) from the state. The taxpayer must choose the degree of tax evasion without knowing for sure whether a tax audit will be carried out.

Materials, transportation, etc.), and with the indirect costs associated with this production for collecting and searching for all the information necessary for the activity, concluding various transactions, contracts, agreements, etc.

This term was first introduced by the American economist R. Coase in his work “The Nature of the Firm” in 1937, who later won the Nobel Prize in Economics for his study of transaction costs in 1991.

There are several types of transaction costs. Let us list the most important of them.

1. Costs of searching for information. This refers, first of all, to the costs associated with finding counterparties for business and other transactions, as well as the search for the most favorable conditions in terms of price, purchase and sale. Before concluding the necessary transaction, the economic agent collects the necessary information about the counterparty (for example, an insurance company, before insuring your life, will require many certificates from you about your health status, and will also check their accuracy). Prices for the same good can differ significantly in different markets, and each of us knows that people with lower incomes, before buying the necessary goods, will first go around several stores and markets in search of a low price.
2. Costs of concluding a business agreement (contract). It takes money and time to reach the necessary agreement between the parties. For example, let's say you're about to publish a detective novel you've written. You will need a knowledgeable agent to handle all the necessary negotiations with the publisher, so funds will be required to pay the agent's services. The negotiations themselves will take some time. And finally, signing the long-awaited contract, as well as a friendly dinner with the publisher, will also be transaction costs of concluding a contract.
3. Measurement costs. All goods have various properties that bring utility to their owner. For example, you are going to buy a fur coat. Before making a purchase, you need to make sure of the quality of the fur, coloring, tailoring, etc. Before making a choice, a picky buyer will wrinkle the fur, shake the fur coat, try to pull out the lint, and maybe even smell it in order to determine the quality of the workmanship. In this case, measurement costs make it difficult for those who do not have knowledge about the product to purchase. A property such as a trademark (brand) of a well-known company minimizes the cost of measurement, but in this case no one is immune from counterfeiting. Also, measurement costs are associated with the purchase of measuring equipment (calculators, scales, dosimeters, cash registers, etc.).
4. Costs of specification and protection of property rights. It can be noted that any specification, as well as the protection of property rights, is associated with the precise definition of an object or subject of property, law enforcement agencies, the functioning of the judicial system, etc. As a striking example, we can consider the activities of many private small businesses in the recent past of Russia. In fact, the private property rights of any company must be protected by the state, as in any civilized country in the world with a developed market economy. But, if for some reason the state does not cope with this task in full, then private business resorts to alternative means of protecting its property. In other words, companies resort to searching for so-called “roofs” that perform security functions for a fee.
5. Costs of opportunistic behavior. Those. costs associated with dishonesty and deception, concealment of information that economic agents may encounter in their activities. For example, identifying and punishing a dishonest counterparty who violates the terms of the contract entails considerable costs. Costs are also required to protect oneself from such opportunistic behavior. For example, in currency exchange offices and cash desks of many financial and credit institutions there are special devices for detecting counterfeit banknotes. When purchasing honey, connoisseurs must check it with a special chemical pencil. Dipping a pencil into honey, a person looks at the reaction: when it turns purple, one can conclude that the honey is not real.

Transaction costs permeate the entire sphere of economic life of society. We all face similar costs at every step, sometimes without realizing it. Scientists often compare transaction costs in economics and friction in physics, drawing an analogy between them. American economist D. Stigler wrote that “ the surrounding world with no transaction costs is as strange as the physical world with no friction forces" R. Coase argued that if all of the above types of transaction costs were suddenly absent, then nothing could interfere with the completion of transactions (transactions) and, as a result, eternity would be lived in a matter of fractions of a second. Exchange transactions would occur instantly, because not the slightest share of resources would be spent on searching for this or that information.

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